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During the first half of the twentieth century, the ability of writing to make 
unruly claims on our bodies preoccupied judges, jurists, authors, and crit-
ics involved in debates over ongoing revisions to the definition of and tests 
for legal obscenity in the United States. At the same time that modernist 
writing was challenging fiction and poetry as they had been created hith-
erto, state and appellate courts began undermining the grounds on which 
books could be prosecuted for their corruptive moral influences and salacious 
bodily appeals. Putting into dialogue obscenity case law’s crisis of legitima-
tion and modernism’s crisis of representation, Literary Obscenities argues that 
“obscene modernism” helps us to account for the cultural logic of a period 
in which the meaning, identity, and very existence of obscene writing itself 
seemed to be evaporating. “Modernism,” it should be noted, does not refer 
to fundamentally subversive, shocking, or disruptive texts here. Instead, it 
encompasses a widely dispersed set of discursive practices that are marked by 
concerns regarding the conditions of possibility for art as such. At the same 
time that these practices contributed to major formal innovations and to a 
further widening of aesthetic sensibilities, long-held certainties about legal 
obscenity began to wither under closer examination, and efforts to explain 
how books could be judged obscene appeared to become more and more 
Sisyphean with each passing year. In short, the expansion of what potentially 
counted as a text worthy of artistic or literary judgments under modernism 
coincided with the contraction of what could possibly be deemed proscribably 
obscene in a U.S. court of law. At issue in these obscenity cases was nothing 
less than the capacity of mute words to get off the page and affect readers 
in the world in ways that could not be fully controlled, especially in the 
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formation of their civic comportments and social identities. Depending on which 
precedents a given judge cited from the case law, however, obscene books either 
posed too much of a threat or no threat at all. Accordingly, proscribed writers such 
as Wyndham Lewis, Erskine Caldwell, and Lillian Smith responded to contem-
porary obscenity trials by interrogating the power of words to take on embodied 
dimensions even as they continued to grapple with the manner in which human 
interests, capacities, and self-knowledge nevertheless get fostered or distorted by 
the affecting appeals made by putatively obscene texts.
 Furthermore, ambivalence regarding what constituted obscenity in the first 
place extended to the realm of social relationships affected by it. Obscenity trials 
and the texts prosecuted in them were perennial news items and topics of debate 
in this period, as were the evolving standards for what constituted obscenity, which 
oftentimes shifted year to year, state to state, and court to court. Just as the definition 
of obscenity was up for grabs, so too were its broader effects on readers, who were 
variously depicted in case law at this time as children requiring parental oversight, 
women in need of male protectors, or adults able to determine what was or was 
not good for them. However, even those judges who treated readers of obscen-
ity like grown-ups still did not fail to assign them a common social role: that of 
consumers in a market economy. I contend that all of this was not accidental, as 
obscenity was a conspicuously contested field through which writers and judges 
addressed other, even more socially pervasive aspects of writing’s effects. As Literary 
Obscenities demonstrates, the struggle to account for the libidinal efficacy of writing 
prominently figured in a number of period disputes, such as those concerning the 
manipulative use of behaviorist-informed advertising practices, shifts in cultural 
hierarchies between print and visual materials, and activist strategies for desegre-
gating the Jim Crow South before the 1950s.
 Just as lascivious writing carried the weight of some enormously important 
cultural issues, a survey of the case law on obscene books shows that the more fre-
quent targets of obscenity prosecutions in the early twentieth-century United States 
were not modernist novels but literary naturalist texts such as those of Caldwell, 
Smith, and James T. Farrell. In this study I understand “literary naturalism” to 
refer to fiction that, in the words of György Lukács, “describes” life rather than 
“narrates” it.1 That is to say, it is fiction in which expansive descriptions are tacitly 
organized and fixed in place by the findings and methodologies of contemporary 
sociology, psychology, physiology, criminology, and evolutionary biology rather 
than by the (realist) impulse to model typical human characters and nascent forms 
of dynamic social action. Because early naturalist writing tended to rely heavily 
on these fields of scientific inquiry, many of its initial critics in the United States 
claimed it was robbing fiction of its own authentically literary forms, functions, and 
narratives. Moreover, by putatively adopting some form of determinism to present 
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their characters as the objects of the social and natural forces investigated by these 
same discourses of human knowledge, naturalist texts were widely believed to have 
reduced men and women to “human insects,” to use Malcolm Cowley’s expression, 
insofar as they reliably depicted a world in which people were more “done to” than 
“doing.”
 Notable scholarly work of the past few decades, however, has moved our dis-
cussions of U.S. literary naturalism beyond warmed-over debates about the two 
cultures (literary vs. scientific) or about the coherence of determinism as a philos-
ophy and its broader implications as a worldview. The attention devoted to literary 
naturalism by many notable critics aligned with New Historicism in the 1980s, for 
instance, shifted our focus to the ways in which U.S. naturalist fiction called into 
question the autonomy of literature with respect to the institutions and discourses 
in or alongside which it circulated. As a result, “co-optation” has increasingly 
replaced “determinism” as a keyword in studies of literary naturalism, and the 
result has been greater attention paid to complicitous relationships in naturalist 
works rather than to determinist subsumption pure and simple. In keeping with 
this, scholars and critics have since developed more nuanced conceptions of how 
subjectivity, will, and agency become informed (rather than wholly overmastered) 
by the tremendous social and natural forces set forth by naturalist fiction.
 Emblematic here remains Jennifer Fleissner’s work on compulsion, which 
has broadened our conception of how U.S. literary naturalist texts exemplify their 
embodied reception in readers by representing worlds in which embodiment as 
such reliably takes the form of repetition, habit formation, and failure. For Fleissner, 
subjectivity and agency are not abolished by the routine behaviors encrusted onto 
the bodies to which they are attached in naturalist fiction, nor are they canceled out 
by the conspicuous inability of this fiction to offer shapely narratives of triumph 
or tragedy. Instead, literary naturalism forces us to situate such subjectivity and 
such agency ever and always in terms of mundane, nonlinear habits and recurring 
motions (e.g., those involved with cleaning or lovemaking) that do not eventuate 
in a sense of mastery or completion so much as they do in bodily experiences of 
repetition and disappointment that nevertheless constitute the only path available 
to us in naturalist fiction that can still perhaps lead (beyond the frame of the text 
itself) to mastery and completion eventually. In short, failure in the present does 
not foreclose the possibility of different outcomes in the future, though according 
to Fleissner what distinguishes naturalism from other modes of writing is that it 
locates this future in our bodies (where self and world interface and become mean-
ingfully entangled), and in women’s bodies in particular.
 In many respects, then, what my calling attention to the literary naturalistic 
qualities of early twentieth-century obscenity in the United States entails is that we 
reckon more expansively with failure, by which I refer both to the recurrent failure 
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of courts at this time to formulate adequate tests for obscenity and to the ultimate 
failure of fiction to be deemed proscribably obscene, even though the works by 
Smith, Caldwell, and Lewis examined here were indeed proscribed in courts of law 
for their obscenity. I would also note that this preoccupation with failure is already 
encoded in the title of the first chapter—“Getting Off the Page”—in which the key 
propositions aimed at by its wordplay are only somewhat felicitously expressed. 
The salacious implications of the idiomatic “get off ” are easily discernible, but they 
badly need a preposition to make it clear that it is a prospective reader who is sex-
ually gratifying him- or herself on (or by means of) a book rather than the leaves 
of the book itself that are somehow being sexually satisfied by the reader. Despite 
the possibility of conjuring forth bizarre visions of readers clumsily jerking off or 
going down on or otherwise illicitly stimulating a book somehow, someway, I have 
nevertheless opted to omit the preposition, not simply because “Getting Off on the 
Page” is a less euphonious title but more importantly because “Getting Off the Page” 
nevertheless does indeed succinctly express the core preoccupation of this book, 
which has to do with how obscenity has more or less ceased to be something readily 
predicable of written texts of fiction in a court of law in the United States. In this 
less idiomatic sense, then, obscenity in this period ceased to get off the page in the 
ways expected by courts hitherto (namely, by having untoward effects on the bodies 
and behaviors of readers in the world) and started to get off the page entirely by 
leaving books behind and moving on to other media (primarily visual ones), with 
which it is more credibly associated now than it is with writing as such. While this 
is an outcome that did not become codified until the end of the Supreme Court’s 
repeated efforts to work up a suitable set of new standards for obscenity during the 
second half of the twentieth century, Literary Obscenities locates formative (and, 
up to now, largely overlooked) sources for this eventual result in the period, cases, 
and works of fiction examined here.
 This approach thus distinguishes itself from significant critical work on law, 
literature, and obscenity carried out by both literary critics and jurists, for whom 
quite different concerns and questions have guided much recent scholarship. On 
the one hand, obscenity has tended to provide many of those working in the New 
Modernist Studies an opportunity to reassert the subversive potentials of certain 
modernist texts that were creatively vivified by the tussles their respective writ-
ers had with obscenity laws and the various institutions enforcing them. On the 
other hand, some have used “obscene modernism” to express a deep and abiding 
skepticism about these transgressive potentials by drawing our attention to the 
ways in which such writing nonetheless ended up embodying the very sorts of 
interdictions and proscriptions it nominally sought to flout. For legal scholars, 
in contrast, questions of principle (Is obscenity even an instance of speech in the 
first place? Is obscenity law equipped to address the problem of moral harm that 
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would potentially justify the proscription of obscenity if such a thing were indeed 
an instance of speech?) and practice (Are obscenity prosecutions a wise use of 
limited institutional resources? Are the conceptions of art and literature offered in 
obscenity law really in line with how those two things are actually performed or 
created today?) have tended to predominate over the more historical and evaluative 
pursuits of those working in the New Modernist Studies.
 The aim of this book is therefore to offer an alternative angle of vision onto 
early twentieth-century writing and obscenity, one that orients itself more around 
states of development in the reformulation of legal obscenity in this period than 
around the retroactive credentialing of literary modernism as either a dependably 
subversive or regrettably compromised set of innovative texts and compositional 
practices. Likewise, I am not all that interested in reading law in/as literature or 
literature in/as law. Instead, my concerns are with assessing the consequences of 
treating proscribably obscene fiction in the early twentieth century not simply as 
an object of obscenity case law but more importantly as its respondent, as texts 
that answer to the conditions and limits placed on literary writing’s efficacy by the 
disparate accounts and appraisals made by judges themselves in this period. In 
particular, what this closer attention to case law makes salient about the relation-
ship between writing and obscenity in the United States throughout much of the 
past century is twofold. First, the proscription of obscenity in this period usefully 
indexes major shifts in contemporary cultural hierarchies that were then in the 
midst of slowly but surely prioritizing visual texts over written ones, a point I most 
fully expound in the chapter on Caldwell. When viewed from afar, the large-scale 
narrative of U.S. legal obscenity in the twentieth century is decidedly not a story 
of censorship forces heroically overcome by an elite group of modernist pioneers; 
instead, the tale forced on us by history is a decidedly more ambivalent one that 
foregrounds the wholesale neutralization of the claims that books can potentially 
make on bodies, and it is the U.S. literary naturalist texts of this period (rather 
than modernist works) that offer us a means of conceptualizing the end of book 
obscenity not so much as a timely victory over censorship forces but rather as 
the emergent recognition of the sobering and troubling possibility that reading 
books can no longer affect us in ways that are worth proscribing. Ever since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. California (1973), after all, it is always okay 
not to masturbate when we read.
 This brings up the second point made apparent by the story of obscene writing 
in the United States when it is first focalized through case law: when the libidi-
nal potentials of books were indeed being neutralized in U.S. courtrooms in the 
twentieth century, this tended to be carried out by positing art and literature as 
autonomous modes of human expressivity, along with the aesthetic conceptions 
of value typically associated with those two things. Hence, the nearly century-long 
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effort to deproscribe obscene books in this country principally entailed the efforts 
of liberalizing judges, jurists, writers, publishers, and academics to separate the 
“literary” from the properly obscene in the eyes of judges, juries, post office employ-
ees, police officers, and customs officials. In this view, literary writing could not 
and cannot be obscene because truly obscene writing was not and is not prop-
erly literary, a state of affairs pithily summed up in present-day obscenity statutes 
exempting prurient and patently offensive books from proscription so long as they 
possess “serious literary value,” which, since Miller, has been implicitly extended to 
all fiction. As the first chapter shows, modernist writing and its critical reception 
provided the immediate occasions for the expansive aesthetic arguments offered 
in defense of obscene writing in the early twentieth-century United States. As 
indicated earlier, however, even though such aesthetic considerations now allow 
previously objectionable books to be disseminated to adult readers without state 
interference, this does not signify a triumph of enlightened liberal attitudes toward 
salacious and unruly writerly practices but rather a diminution of writing’s effec-
tive power in the field of social representation. Ironically, liberalization of this sort 
reflects a judgment over writing that has already fallen “before the law”: the demo-
tion of writing’s capacity to affect our bodies with the sort of unsettling immediacy 
that various other media—such as television, film, photography, videogames, the 
internet, and so forth—still seem to possess with all the self-evident force of a 
publicly lewd man.
 Consequently, if books no longer appear to affect us in the eyes of the law in 
the United States, then that is due in no small part to their successful neutraliza-
tion on aesthetic grounds provided by modernism and its critical reception. In the 
twentieth century, obscene books became simply “literature,” which itself raises new 
terminological issues that raise all sorts of skeptical responses, beginning with the 
obvious question, “Well, what is literature, and what does it do anyway?” Yet despite 
brass-tacks questions such as this, the matter remains fairly settled for all that. We 
live in an age in the United States in which Stein-ese may be the best idiolect with 
which to convey how writing both expresses and yet holds in check its potential 
to make unmanageable libidinal or behavioral appeals: “Obscene books should be 
written and read since obscene books are literature and literature should be writ-
ten and read because literature is literature is literature and there is a difference 
between obscenity and literature in the character of their quality to be written and 
read and literature can be and ought to be written and read while obscenity cannot 
be read because it cannot be written anymore so it is literature that is different 
from obscenity anyway, meaning obscene books are not obscenity anymore just 
literature.” Alternatively, much like the attempts of various early twentieth-century 
avant-gardes to intervene violently into and qualitatively transform contemporary 
life, the abilities of obscene books to do much of anything in the world appear to 
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have become a matter of historical and antiquarian interest—matters for professors 
and collectors of rare books—but not anything we would want our overstuffed court 
system to squander its time considering.
 Disenchantingly, then, the overmastering imperative in telling the story of 
legal obscenity, modernism, and the dull persistence of literary naturalism in the 
early twentieth-century United States is not to make it new, but to make it neutral. 
Accordingly, in place of the familiar “obscene modernism” story of transgressive 
modernist writing practices and their wildly successful repurposing of a variety of 
censorship discourses, I want to put forward instead a highly recursive narrative 
that looks a lot like Invasion of the Body Snatchers, an ungainly story of textual 
identities and readerly bodies secretly compromised, evacuated, and replaced from 
the inside out through shadowy interactions between obscenity case law and early 
twentieth-century writing that are best described in an uneasy, equivocal middle 
voice. One day we woke up to find our offensive, foulmouthed, philandering neigh-
bors had become reputable suburban members of the community; books that were 
once dirty had been reborn as literature. This volume’s response is to elaborate how 
proscribed salacious writing in this period neither actively neutralized its own 
capacities to make unmanageable claims on readerly bodies, nor was it expressly 
deprived of its abilities to make such claims by heteronomous social forces. Instead, 
this overarching process of failure and cooptation is one in which English-language 
writing in the twentieth century got itself neutralized of the potential to deprave, 
corrupt, make prurient appeals, patently offend, or make libidinal claims of any 
consequence on human bodies. Whether writers and judges were ascribing too 
much power to the ability of printed words to ineluctably arouse the bodies of 
readers and incite them to action (as Lewis, Smith’s early writings, and the judges of 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court certainly did), or whether they were calling into 
question the ability of written language to do anything of note in an age increasingly 
suffused with and informed by visual representations instead (as Caldwell and 
Judge Curtis Bok did), literary obscenity was an occasion for naturalizing obscene 
literature: proscribably obscene writing in the early twentieth-century United States 
became something we could both take for granted and eventually disregard (it had 
become second nature, as it were, to accept that the obscenity of a book did not 
make it simply an obscene book) because much of that writing had situated its 
own unmanageable bodily appeals in terms of existing forms of human knowledge 
that helped us to articulate them descriptively rather than to reexperience them 
narratively (it had become second nature by way of literary naturalism). If mod-
ernism gives us the means of accounting for how aesthetic and literary exceptions 
to obscenity got articulated by judges in the early twentieth century, then literary 
naturalism offers us a way of conceptualizing how proscribed writing of this time 
got itself neutralized of the ability to act obscenely.
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 I would further note that two interrelated concerns have informed my selection 
of the obscenity cases and proscribed works discussed in the chapters that follow. 
First of all, I have chosen decisions and texts that exemplify the uneven and peculiar 
history of U.S. obscenity case law in the early twentieth century, a period in which 
obscenity was primarily a lower court (rather than a Supreme Court) concern. 
Hence, there is little sense of definite progress in the labile definitions of and tests 
for obscenity put forward by these lower courts between 1917 and 1950. Instead, 
judges seemed to be stuck returning to the same issues and precedents with little 
certain or lasting effect. Even District Judge John M. Woolsey’s famous holistic 
test for obscenity in United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses” (1933) did not mark 
an advance in the deproscription of obscene books insofar as the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court had no problem using his standard to find God’s Little 
Acre (1933) and Strange Fruit (1944) obscene more than a decade later. Thus, it 
would be wrong to interpret the legal battles surrounding Ulysses (1922) as the 
end of something. Woolsey’s decision and Augustus Hand’s affirmation of it in the 
appellate case that took place the following year are instead part of a much longer 
sequence of trials in which reproscribing and deproscribing tendencies are often 
hard to distinguish from each other when looked at up close. Consequently, the 
chapters on the proscribably obscene works of Lewis, Caldwell, and Smith do not 
organically follow from each other so much as they recursively work through the 
same legal precedents and deterministic processes over and over as issues con-
nected with behaviorism, voyeurism, and racial identity formation, respectively, 
come to the fore in each case. In other words, as in a naturalist novel, there is no 
shapely overarching narrative to be told here, only the variously failed efforts of 
judges, writers, and jurists to come to terms with the problems named by obscenity 
as they reappeared in different times, places, and texts.
 Second, my choice of cases and literary texts spotlights the belatedness of lit-
erary obscenity in the United States at this time. I mean “belated” in two senses. 
First, it was not the muckraking literary naturalism from the turn of the century 
that proved to be the primary target of obscenity prosecutions in this period but 
rather literary naturalism after modernism. With the exception of Dreiser’s An 
American Tragedy (1925), the literary naturalism being proscribed for obscenity in 
the years covered by this study was not comprised of the figures (Crane, Norris, 
London, Cahan) familiar to many of us from the customary surveys of U.S. litera-
ture. Instead, the texts that were targeted belong to what I refer to here as literary 
naturalism “after modernism,” with “after” doing double duty. On the one hand, 
it serves as an indication of imitative facility: modernist styles, techniques, con-
cerns, and problems were available to be mimicked or “taken after,” either with 
great gusto, as in the early fiction of Caldwell, or ambivalently, as in the work of 
Smith. On the other hand, “after” serves as a marker of temporal priority: the 
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event of modernism had already happened by the time Farrell, Caldwell, Smith, 
and others commenced their careers. This is not to say that modernism was a 
neatly contained phenomenon that had already run its course by the early 1930s. 
Much valuable work on periodizing modernism (into its late modernist and, more 
recently, its metamodernist strands) of course attests to the ways in which it subse-
quently unfolded and continues to ramify down to the present. Instead, my point 
is simply that the proscribably obscene naturalist writers looked at here took up 
writing after modernism’s horizons of legibility had already been disclosed both to 
a broader public and to (at least a few) judges. I develop this point at length in the 
chapter on Lewis, who is the token modernist here and whose legal troubles with 
obscenity in the 1910s afford us a chance to reflect afresh on how courts of law in the 
United States dealt with modernism before aesthetic and literary justifications for 
its jarring formal features and (at times) outré contents became matters of course. 
I would also underscore for my readers that it is this principle of selection that has 
justified the otherwise conspicuous exclusion of Dreiser, An American Tragedy, and 
Commonwealth v. Friede (1930) in this study.
 The belatedness of literary obscenity is also a preoccupation here because this 
period does indeed mark the beginning of the end of proscribably obscene books, 
if not their end as such. That is to say, despite the lack of clarity and agreement 
among many state and appellate courts during these decades, efforts like those of 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court to proscribe obscene books well into the middle 
of the twentieth century certainly did comprise derrière-garde actions in light of 
what the U.S. Supreme Court accomplished with its obscenity cases between the late 
1950s and the early 1970s. However, the chapters that follow resist the temptation 
to present the course of obscenity case law at this earlier contested time in a teleo-
logical fashion, not least of all because the beginning of the end of legally obscene 
books was a period marked by too much (rather than too little) obscenity law, as 
the first chapter shows. Literary Obscenities, then, is partly an effort to excavate and 
re-present the forgotten detours, byways, and dead ends that obscenity case law 
took in these critical and contentious years.
 In chapter 1, “Getting Off the Page,” I demonstrate how literary criticisms of 
naturalism illuminate debates around book obscenity in early twentieth-century 
U.S. case law. On the one hand, judges who wanted to continue to proscribe books 
for obscenity often resorted to drawing a distinction between works with redeeming 
“literary” value and those without it. In view of their literary qualities having been 
disputed since the late nineteenth century, naturalist texts proved to be a promi-
nent target for proscriptive forces. On the other hand, the ways in which literary 
naturalism was believed to divest characters of agency also relate to a number of 
legal arguments about how obscene books deprive readers of the willpower to 
resist their aroused sexual or immoral urges. Objective social forces and subjective 
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compulsions thus hazily overlap in obscene books and literary naturalism, just as 
they did in the debates occasioned by both, a point I develop through a close read-
ing of James T. Farrell’s Studs Lonigan (1932–35). As obscenity case law unfolded 
across the century, however, this view of the relationship between readers and sala-
cious texts became more vexed. Instead of taking for granted the obscene efficacy of 
writing, tests for obscenity today tend to assume that books no longer possess any 
such force. Much like a character in a naturalist novel, obscene writing over the past 
century has gotten itself deprived of the capacity to get off the page and transgress 
in the world, such that novels like Samuel R. Delany’s Through the Valley of the 
Nest of Spiders (2012) appear on bookstore shelves rather than on court dockets. 
Literary Obscenities ventures an account of how this naturalistic muting of writing’s 
libidinal effectiveness took place across different modes of fictional writing (the 
short story and the novel) and in a variety of publication formats (little magazines, 
deluxe limited-edition hardcover books, and mass-market trade paperbacks) that 
circulated among an emblematic range of readers, from small literary coteries to 
the mass audiences of best seller lists.
 Chapter 2, “How to Misbehave as a Behaviorist (if You’re Wyndham Lewis),” 
reveals that what the New York District Court found so troubling about “Cantleman’s 
Spring-Mate” in the October 1917 issue of The Little Review was its preoccupation 
with representing obscenity not as a quality intrinsic to a text but rather as a set of 
culturally produced reading habits. Lewis’s World War I narrative connects a young 
British soldier’s ludicrously overheated readings of Thomas Hardy’s The Trumpet-
Major (1880) to his wartime milieu, in which distinctions between man and animal 
appeared to be breaking down altogether. Comparing Lewis’s culture critiques of 
the 1920s and 1930s to the work of John B. Watson as a behaviorist psychologist and 
later as a successful advertising executive, I claim that for Lewis the bodily respon-
siveness of a reader to the printed word indexed a broader social trend whereby 
consumers everywhere were being reduced to well-oiled stimulus-response mech-
anisms by the twinned forces of behaviorism and modern advertising. “Obscenity,” 
in his view, was a by-product of cultural training—of a widely inculcated “art of 
being ruled”—not a primary datum of either “obscene works” or “depraved read-
ers.” “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” therefore demonstrates Lewis’s hypothesis through 
a fictional provocation to which, as it happened, the judiciary proved adversely 
responsive in the 1910s, though the legal and cultural absorption of modernist 
writing’s practices over the next decade or so would ultimately start to change that.
 Chapter 3, “Erskine Caldwell, Smut, and the Paperbacking of Obscenity,” exam-
ines how the fiction of Erskine Caldwell undermines Lewis’s basic assumptions. 
For Caldwell, obscenity was no longer something writers could take for granted 
by the 1930s, because books were quite possibly henceforth unable to elicit a bodily 
response at all. Instead, Caldwell’s novels in this decade addressed their doubtful 
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capacity for salaciousness through the calculated, repeated experience of mirth-
ful frustration. Evaluating such an experience in light of Judge Bok’s ruling in 
Commonwealth v. Gordon et al. (1949), which absolved God’s Little Acre of obscenity 
in the state of Pennsylvania, I approach both the novel and legal case as indicative of 
contemporary shifts in the cultural hierarchies existing between visual media and 
print texts. According to Bok, God’s Little Acre was not obscene because it failed 
to present its readers with the erotic allurement of a publicly lewd man, the clear 
and present danger of which he assumed as given. I then go on to consider more 
closely the roles played by frustration in Caldwell’s fiction, particularly in his repre-
sentations of visuality, by comparing the indeterminacies and gaps in Caldwellian 
voyeurism to the sorts of frustrating experiences elicited by the illustrated covers 
of the paperback reprints of his books in the late 1940s. In the concluding section 
of this chapter, I discuss both of these frustrations—verbal and visual—in connec-
tion with the concept of “smut” elaborated by Sigmund Freud in Jokes and Their 
Relation to the Unconscious (1905). For Freud, when smutty language does not lead 
to sexual acts, it can become an autonomous pleasure, albeit one thereafter primed 
to transmute into action with a change in circumstances. Smut, I contend, is a way 
of conceiving the linkages between erotic allurements, bodily experiences, and the 
various frustrations intervening between the two in Caldwell’s fiction and in writing 
more generally. Caldwell in turn opens up the possibility that the failure of words 
to seduce readers may nevertheless constitute a technique of “weak” seduction or 
salacity beyond the purview of proscriptive judges.
 Chapter 4, “Sin, Sex, and Segregation in Lillian Smith’s Silent South,” returns to 
the assumptions subtending Lewis’s position by showing that for Smith obscenity 
was indeed an overpowering result of a cultural training that hailed a specific kind 
of social identity. In particular, I contend that the essays, fiction, and little magazine 
publications of this civil rights activist in the 1930s and 1940s consistently presented 
the Jim Crow South as a region organized by obscene words that enacted racial 
difference through the dangers said to be presented by particular forms of sexual 
desire. Just as certain body parts were off-limits to Southern youth, so too were 
certain groups of people, and Smith’s work from this period comprises an attempt 
to account for the ways in which sin, sex, and segregation mutually reproduced and 
overdetermined the efficacy of the social, cultural, and political institutions of the 
region. In fact, in Commonwealth v. Isenstadt (1945) the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court criticized—and in part proscribed—Strange Fruit because of its artful 
capacity to make such linkages not only known but also overwhelmingly felt by its 
readers. According to the opinions in Isenstadt, whether panderingly attractive or 
unduly repellent, words in that novel did in fact move beyond the limits of what 
language ought to do to people. Far from being the biased observations of a group 
of robed censors, however, these opposing perspectives on the efficacy of Smith’s 
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language—its ability to push and pull its readers—were shrewdly attentive to the 
somatic functions her texts almost ceaselessly ascribe to words. In Strange Fruit, 
in particular, Smith sought to demonstrate how segregation had turned the early 
twentieth-century South into the nation’s closet, whereby symptomatic inconsis-
tencies and incoherence in a community’s sexual knowledge could act as guarantor 
for discriminating laws, behaviors, and folkways that trumped any rational appeals 
a reformer might hope to make to her community.
 The work of Lewis, Caldwell, and Smith accordingly typify the response of 
fiction to the evolving standards for obscenity in this period. From within the 
unfolding process that eventually delivered writing to its present-day neutral zone, 
Lewis’s essays and creative writing still assume that mere words on the page can 
hyperbolically affect readers in the world, though his account of obscene embod-
iment as something that can be performatively contradicted suggests that bodily 
sensations can be made to mean something other than what they in fact are: just 
because a woman in a Thomas Hardy novel gives a character in “Cantleman’s 
Spring-Mate” an erection does not mean that Lewis would have us understand 
this character to be aroused by her. What Lewis instead insists upon time and time 
again is that the body and its reactions to stimuli can be transformed into rhetorical 
gestures, into ironic expressions emanating from a dubious self barely subsisting 
just below the surface. The work of Smith provides a surprisingly complementary 
instance of an author from this period who also subsumes bodily arousal under a 
broader web of signification, although her focus is on allegory rather than irony. For 
Smith, obscenity does not so much offend as discriminate against, especially by cor-
poreally marking and enforcing otherwise unstable black-white divides. Ultimately, 
she responds to this dilemma by subjecting obscene words (and their inexorable 
efficacy in hailing racialized bodies) to an allegorical philosophy of history in which 
the problems posed by obscenity become null in the face of the evaporation of racial 
divisions in a projected future where being a human means acting collectively and 
cooperatively for the good of all. Between Lewis’s ironic embodiment of obscenity 
and Smith’s allegorical disembodiment of it, Caldwell’s fiction opens up a parenthe-
sis in which an aroused bodily response to writing need not (indeed, probably will 
not) occur. Caldwell’s writing alludes time and time again to voyeuristic scenes of 
salacity but refuses to evoke them visually, leaving his reader-viewers to wait and 
not see as they stare expectantly through a peephole looking out onto a void space 
that will not be filled, though it is said to remain engrossing all the same. Unlike the 
works of Lewis or Smith, Caldwell’s fiction problematizes the medium of obscenity 
rather than the fact of obscene embodiment itself. In sum, then, whereas Lewis has 
the bodily response evoked by book obscenity take the form of a performative con-
tradiction, and whereas Smith, following the proscription of Strange Fruit, spends 
the remainder of her career trying to allegorically efface the obscene human body 
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out of existence altogether, Caldwell cussedly doubts that such obscene efficacy is 
even possible in the case of books anymore.
 Finally, when we consider the history of legal obscenity and writing in the 
first half of the twentieth century, the story that fitfully emerges is not simply the 
naturalist one of failure but also the Body Snatchers tale of usurpations, howsoever 
improbable they may appear at first glance. We therefore come upon a contrar-
ian Wyndham Lewis who displaces the renowned James Joyce at the center of 
The Little Review’s legendarily outsized ordeals with obscenity; a know-nothing 
Erskine Caldwell, whose Southern legion of minimalist hick voyeurs cudfully 
dislodges D. H. Lawrence’s secular apostles of the flesh; and a decently indecent 
Lillian Smith, whose early determinist visions of the Jim Crow South and later 
evolutionary cosmologies supplant the more expressly tragic subjectivities explored 
in the proscribed writings of William Faulkner. In short, this book is all about 
modernism’s tardy cuckoos, the presumptive might-have-beens who never quite 
managed to make it and thus ended up being left behind in the discard pile among 
the never-weres, the preterite of “obscene modernism.” Literary Obscenities is for 
the scumbags, smut peddlers, and closet cases who populated the literary landscape 
towered over by the modernist giants we love to study, criticize, and esteem. More 
often than not, however, this thing called “obscenity” was produced by men and 
women as unprepossessing and downright disreputable as these bottom dogs.

1. Getting Off the Page
If you look into a textbook of chemistry for a definition of lithium, you may 
be told that it is that element whose atomic weight is 7 very nearly. But if 
the author has a more logical mind he will tell you that if you search among 
minerals that are vitreous, translucent, grey or white, very hard, brittle, and 
insoluble, for one which imparts a crimson tinge to an unluminous flame, 
this mineral being triturated with lime or witherite rats-bane, and then fused, 
can be partly dissolved in muriatic acid; and if this solution be evaporated, 
and the residue be extracted with sulphuric acid, and duly purified, it can 
be converted by ordinary methods into a chloride, which being obtained in 
the solid state, fused, and electrolyzed with half a dozen powerful cells, will 
yield a globule of a pinkish silvery metal that will float on gasolene; and the 
material of that is a specimen of lithium. The peculiarity of this definition—or 
rather this precept that is more serviceable than a definition—is that it tells 
you what the word lithium denotes by prescribing what you are to do in order 
to gain a perceptual acquaintance with the object of the world. 
—Charles PeirCe, “syllabus,” Ca. 1902
To say, “I know a sea lion when I see one,” is to report that one can identify 
a sea lion but not that one is now doing so.




Given that one of the places twentieth-century U.S. obscenity case law almost ended 
up was somewhere in the parking lot to B. F. Skinner’s Sea World (“But I know it 
when I see it!”), it ought to be remembered at the outset that this was not always so, 
nor is it now the case. In fact, if the statutory and case law involving obscenity could 
be understood to have tacitly developed its own theory of meaning by the beginning 
of the last century, then that theory looked a lot more like Charles Peirce’s famous 
definition of lithium than it did Skinner’s reports of visual certainty. For one thing, 
the first modern standard for obscenity in British and U.S. jurisprudence framed the 
problem much more tentatively and operationally than did Supreme Court Justice 
Potter Stewart’s notorious assertions regarding hard-core pornography in Jacobellis 
v. Ohio (1964).1 According to Lord Chief Justice Alexander Cockburn in Regina v. 
Hicklin (1868), the test for obscenity involved simply the determination of “whether 
the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those 
whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publi-
cation of this sort may fall.”2 Commenting critically on this test more than eighty 
years later in Commonwealth v. Gordon et al., Judge Curtis Bok of the Philadelphia 
County Common Pleas Court complained that, “strictly applied, this rule renders 
any book unsafe, since a moron could pervert to some sexual fantasy to which his 
mind is open the listings in a seed catalogue. Not even the Bible would be exempt.”3
 As Bok’s flippancy suggests, this British case from the Victorian era persisted 
as a much-contested touchstone for obscenity law in the United States well into 
the twentieth century.4 In fact, it was not until the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Roth v. United States (1957) that Cockburn’s test was definitively overturned in this 
country because it unconstitutionally restricted First Amendment rights.5 To be 
sure, this is a manifestly strange career for a judgment that could not have been 
produced in a more irreducibly British setting. After all, Cockburn formulated his 
infamous test for obscenity in response to The Confessional Unmasked (1836), an 
anti-Papist pamphlet that was being clandestinely sold as pornography and had 
been implicated in several riots in the United Kingdom. Sectarian strife, public 
unrest, and the hazy boundaries between obscenity and acceptable propagandistic 
writing informed the most pressing concerns in the Hicklin decision. Nevertheless, 
an attention to the circumstances under which Cockburn put together his test for 
obscenity does not belie the fact that it quickly migrated far beyond Britain. Within 
eleven years Hicklin was being invoked approvingly by U.S. circuit court judges, and 
by 1896 the Supreme Court further solidified its applicability to obscenity law here 
in Rosen v. United States.6 By 1913 District Judge Learned Hand was forced to admit 
that “[the Hicklin] test has been accepted by the lower federal courts until it would 
be no longer proper for me to disregard it,” even though Hand’s opinion made it 
abundantly clear how much he wished he could do precisely that.7 Consequently, 
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assessing the impact of Hicklin on U.S. obscenity case law requires we do to it what 
state and appellate courts did: take it out of its British context.
 While Hicklin proved to be an easy target for the derision and satirical animus 
of liberalizing jurists and proscribed writers in the United States for much of the 
twentieth century, it is nevertheless worthwhile to consider briefly the latent sophis-
tication of its conditional propositions. Implicitly conceived of in Hicklin both as 
a matter of poetics (of a making, a producing) and a matter of aesthetics (of a 
sensing, a receiving), obscenity is comprised of a virtual experience activated in a 
certain kind of encounter with a certain kind of text by a certain kind of reader. In 
particular, Cockburn’s opinion poses it as a convergence of two immoral inclina-
tions: that of the text (“to deprave and corrupt”) and a complementary one in the 
reader or viewer (“whose minds [and presumably bodies as well] are open to such 
immoral influences”). A property neither of a person nor of a text alone, obscenity 
in Hicklin refers us to a troubling heightening of the commerce between subjects 
and texts such that the two become morbidly intertwined in a mutual perversion. 
Obscenity accordingly presents us with a situation in which the singular quirks 
and kinks of individual readers get identified with the socially undesirable effects 
latent in salacious texts. Obscenity thus possesses a radical sort of exemplarity, 
whereby the contingent personal desires of readers blur together with the thoughts, 
behaviors, and impulses of the characters being depicted in a given obscene text. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, since obscenity is granted such a hyperbolically effective 
power to jumble distinctions, Cockburn’s test also implies an intention to manage 
vulnerable populations through the proscription of obscene texts. After Hicklin, in 
any case, the prosecution of obscenity in both the United States and Britain often 
seemed to provide judges, jurists, and lawmakers with a means to carry out any 
number of governmental, public health, and educational policies targeting a variety 
of marginalized demographic groups (women, children, adolescents, lower socio-
economic classes) euphemistically covered by the vague advertence to “those whose 
minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of 
this sort may fall.”8
 Of course, the administration of obscenity law in both countries was quite 
different. Whereas authorities in Britain targeted printers, publishers, and booksell-
ers, obscenity prosecutions in the United States primarily focused on distribution 
and the use of the mails. The relevant British statute in Hicklin was the Obscene 
Publications Act 1857, which had empowered magistrates with the authority to seize 
and destroy material they found to be obscene.9 Conversely, the closest analogues to 
this in legislation passed by the U.S. Congress at the time were the Comstock Laws 
(1873, amended 1876), which made obscene materials nonmailable. As these laws 
and their interpretations developed over the coming century, different concerns 
and institutional authorities respectively came to the fore. In the twentieth century, 
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extralegal civic agencies and ministerial departments such as the Home Office 
increasingly took the reins in the regulation of obscene publications in Britain.10 
By contrast, the Customs Bureau and the Post Office Department were the primary 
enforcement agencies alongside the police at the local, state, and federal level in the 
United States.11 An even more significant difference, however, is the fact that during 
the twentieth century the closer scrutiny of the grounds for regulating obscenity 
was most conspicuously undertaken by courts in the United States, whereas this 
role fell chiefly to Parliament in Great Britain.12 Notwithstanding these different 
institutional arrangements and proscriptive foci, however, what the elaborations 
of Hicklin in Britain and the United States nevertheless share are a preoccupation 
with protecting obscenity’s prospective receivers, howsoever they may be defined.
 Yet Cockburn’s single sentence leaves many things unspecified regarding what 
one has to do in order to create an obscene book or to produce either an obscene 
experience or an obscene reader. On its own, Hicklin offers no ramified account 
equivalent to Peirce’s experimental methodology concerning the trituration of a 
particular kind of mineral with lime or witherite rats-bane. Publishers, writers, and 
laymen could not categorically know how to make—or avoid making—books the 
occasions for obscenity. What Cockburn’s protopragmatic enframing of obscenity 
eventually did make possible, however, were a number of interactive cultural and 
legal processes that have been unfolding for well over a century. Legislators, judges, 
jurists, publishers, writers, artists, and cultural critics have ended up, howsoever 
intentionally or inadvertently, putting a lot of time into fleshing out those missing 
intermediary steps, be it in the interest of re- or deproscribing obscene books. As 
an example of where all of this collaborative effort has settled for the time being as 
far as the legal status of obscenity in the United States is concerned, here is the pre-
cept for the “obscene” as it is currently defined in the state of Tennessee’s criminal 
statute, which in turn closely follows the most recent federal standard for obscenity 
devised by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miller v. California: “‘Obscene’ means: (A) 
The average person applying contemporary community standards would find that 
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (B) The average person 
applying contemporary community standards would find that the work depicts 
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct; and (C) The work, taken 
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”13 In short, 
obscenity today in Tennessee and throughout the country is processual rather than 
substantive, as it has arguably been since Hicklin.14 A number of conditions must 
be experimentally established before obscenity can be legitimately proscribed. A 
judge or juror has to put the charged object through a threefold test according to 
which (1) that object’s potentially lascivious solicitations are assessed as a whole in 
light of an imaginary run-of-the-mill person’s grasp of imagined local norms and 
customs; (2) this imaginary run-of-the-mill person then makes use of these same 
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imagined local community norms and customs to determine whether or not the 
charged object’s representations of sex boldly give offense; and (3) the work itself 
gets holistically evaluated according to all sorts of heteronomous value judgments, 
deriving from the sciences, politics, art, and literature.
 Consequently, it appears that for both Peirce and an obscenity-defining U.S. 
juror or judge in the early twenty-first century, meaning itself has come to encom-
pass expansive descriptions (the Tennessee statute goes on to define “patently 
offensive,” “sadomasochistic abuse,” “sexual conduct,” and “sexual excitement,” 
among various other words and phrases), nonlinguistic embodied doing (according 
to later sections of the statute, graphic representations of sexual conduct can indeed 
lead to actual sexual excitement), and an awful lot of conditional thinking (if and 
only if all three prongs of the Tennessee precept for the “obscene” are present, then 
so is obscenity itself).15 To recur to an earlier, much more famous Peircian definition 
of what “meaning” means, obscenity in U.S. statutory and case law comes down to 
a text’s effects and what our notions of that text’s effects happen to be. Or as Peirce 
himself limpidly puts it in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878): “Consider what 
effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of 
our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our 
conception of that object.”16 Although it leaves open a space for taking into account 
the literary or artistic qualities of a text, legal obscenity in the twenty-first-century 
United States continues to privilege issues and questions pertaining to a text’s effi-
cacy in evoking prurient and patently offended reactions among its prospective 
receivers.
 Of course, one must nevertheless concede that a rather big difference exists 
between Peirce’s steps for producing floating specimens of lithium and U.S. law’s 
thought experiments about the production, dissemination, and reception of 
obscene texts. If, for a pragmatist like Peirce, meaning involves what everyone has 
to do to have a perceptual relationship to objects in the world at all, then for our 
hypothetical obscenity-assessing juror or judge the meaning of obscenity concerns 
what someone else has to do to orient him- or herself obscenely with respect to the 
various potentially salacious texts out there in the world. The quality of this other 
person may, it is true, have shifted in the century and a half since Hicklin from an 
amorphously conjured obscene reader to that shadowy statistical entity denoted by 
the Tennessee statute’s “average person.” Still, the sorts of operations Cockburn inti-
mated in his decision remain very nearly the same today. For you, the trier of fact, 
obscenity is a matter of what happens to other people’s bodies that you presume not 
only to speak for but also in the place of. Moreover, you insist on this presumption 
even if your own sensoria and habituated modes of reading occlude the kinds of 
experiences occasioned by the potentially obscene texts upon which you are called 
to judge. To be sure, the substance and medium of obscenity can be quite variable: 
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U.S. statutes and case law on obscenity since the 1860s have prosecuted a wide range 
of materials—from books, newspapers, pamphlets, and magazines to photographs, 
films, and advertisements. Nevertheless, the grounds for proscribing these texts 
have consistently required judges and juries to approach them with impressive 
speculative scope, particularly in terms of the various contemporary social pres-
sures that inform mass identity itself, whether these pressures tend to dissociate 
the masses from traditional moral standards, as they did in Hicklin, or influence 
them through dangerous alternative norms, as they do in Miller. Obscenity in these 
instances pertains less to objectionable or possibly harmful objects than to the 
governance of a variety of public and private experiences, particularly as these 
relate to moral, social, and aesthetic self-formation. Not simply the freedom of 
expression and the potential for its suppression are at issue in the modern legal con-
cept of obscenity but also the manner in which human interests, moral capacities, 
and self-knowledge get shaped by restrictions placed on the behaviors, techniques, 
and dispositions modeled in putatively obscene works. In short, the issue of legal 
obscenity raises multiple questions about what sorts of social identities and inter-
personal practices obscene texts foster and disseminate within historically changing 
circumstances.
 For contemporary literary critics whose conceptual lexicon is replete with libid-
inal apparatuses, affects, jouissance, performativity, and confessional depictions of 
sexuality as they relate to cultural context and artifacts of all sorts, such claims will 
hardly appear earth-shattering. After all, we have become well accustomed to recog-
nizing and making effective use of the tools of the trade that late twentieth-century 
literary theory has bequeathed us to interpret bodies, texts, images, narratives, and 
identities. More surprising, however, is to uncover congruent sorts of moves and 
concepts within autonomously developed legal discourses that were compelled to 
account for the unruly claims that twentieth-century books might make on readers’ 
bodies and self-formation. Yet it is indeed the case that the U.S. case law on obscene 
books since Hicklin constitutes a repository of more or less sophisticated attempts 
to come to terms with what happens when words printed on a page uncontrollably 
arouse or affect the readers into whose hands they happen to fall.
 This need not be a crude way of suggesting that obscenity law is a straight-
forward reflection of contemporaneous developments in modern literary studies, 
despite the prominent use of a number of New Critics and academics from univer-
sity English departments as “experts” in obscenity trials in the middle of the last 
century.17 It simply means that more is to be made of obscenity case law and the 
texts proscribed by it than has necessarily been registered in recent work by legal 
scholars, for whom the questions and problems that obscenity law continues to raise 
(particularly as it relates to literature and art) have provided the occasions to do 
one of four things: (1) argue that we deprioritize the prosecution of obscene works 
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altogether on the grounds that such prosecutions entail an unwise use of limited 
institutional resources,18 (2) account for the ways in which obscenity law is or is not 
equipped to handle the problem of moral harm it nominally seeks to address,19 (3) 
debate whether or not obscenity and pornography are indeed instances of speech 
in the first place,20 and (4) disclose how the third prong in the Miller test tacitly 
codifies a view of what counts as literature and art (namely, works possessing “seri-
ous” literary or artistic value) that no longer seems to apply to the literature and art 
actually being produced and consumed today.21
 In reassessing the relationship between early twentieth-century law, writing, and 
culture in the United States, I wish to emphasize instead the interactions of all three 
of these fields in mutually defining this thing called “obscenity.” Just as obscenity 
in Hicklin is dynamically a matter of texts, readers, and experiences, so too here it 
ought not to be understood simply as the reified object of legal thought. Obscenity, 
rather, is the collaborative, mutable product of overlapping cultural, literary, and 
legal positions concerned with a wide variety of works. Only through close attention 
to their interaction can we begin to understand the assorted processual grounds 
given for justifying or refuting the proscription of salaciously offensive texts.
 Moreover, early twentieth-century obscenity in the United States should like-
wise be interpreted through relevant statutory and case law without recourse to 
censorship logics or concepts, no matter how nuanced these may have become 
in much of the recent work produced on obscene writing by scholars in the New 
Modernist Studies.22 It bears repeating that there is a lot more to obscenity in the 
early twentieth century than censorship forces and their artful subversion by a 
stylish canon of modernist innovators, be they ever so high (James Joyce) or late 
(Vladimir Nabokov). To be sure, this particular narrative of a “bad modernism” 
is credible as far as it goes, but it is easy to overlook all of the ways in which it 
insinuates that modernism’s badness here is perhaps not something peculiar 
to modernism as such insofar as it betrays latent affinities of English-language 
obscene modernist books to various literary and artistic movements (particularly 
decadence) of the 1800s, during which ignobility, ugliness, decay, and disorder 
increasingly became the preoccupations of texts that did not necessarily cast these 
things in an unflattering light.23 In this respect, it is useful to refer to the ambiv-
alent reception of “modern literature” in the work of Lionel Trilling, for whom 
early twentieth-century modernism was merely the “apogee” of a period that began 
“in the latter part of the eighteenth century.”24 Notably, in place of the more cele-
bratory views of “bad modernisms” often offered in the New Modernist Studies, 
Trilling’s engagement with “modern literature” tended to foreground misgivings 
about the effects of the embrace of adversary cultures, nonethical forces, and anti-
civic comportments that he believed to be essential to such literature. For Trilling, 
these misgivings were most apparent when it came to teaching works of “modern 
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literature,” for which merely formal analysis “went against the grain of [modern] 
authors themselves—structures of words they may indeed have created, but these 
structures were not pyramids or triumphal arches, they were manifestly contrived 
to be not static and commemorative but mobile and aggressive, and one does not 
describe a quinquereme or a howitzer or a tank without estimating how much 
damage it can do.”25 Two things are worth noting. First, Trilling’s anticipation of 
New Modernist Studies’ “bad modernisms” already read them like U.S. case law was 
disposed to read works of obscenity: in terms of their (potentially harmful) efficacy 
on readers. Second, “obscene modernism” is shown here to be a misnomer only so 
far as it blinds us to the ways in which the obscene writing undertaken by canon-
ical modernist writers is part of a longer historical continuum and vaster range of 
literary-artistic movements than are customarily encompassed by “modernism” 
when it is posed as a phenomenon neatly contained between the late nineteenth 
century and the early twentieth century. In any case, we as modernist scholars and 
critics have gotten too used to telling just one kind of story about modernism and 
obscenity, and that story remains doggedly rooted in an assumed background of 
puritanical suppression, which in turn allows us to assumptively esteem modernism 
for its singular transgressivity.26
 To be sure, in the hands of its best recent expositors, this narrative of trans-
gression and subversion tactfully abstains either from making visionary heroes 
out of prosecuted modernist writers or from allocating to social purity move-
ments, the British Home Office, and the U.S. Post Office the cartoonish role of 
hypocrite, philistine, or villain. Instead, most scholars working on early twenti-
eth-century writing and obscenity have been quite attentive to heeding the lessons 
learned from both the “end of obscenity” free-speech movement in the 1960s and 
the far-reaching critiques of pornography made by second-wave feminists such 
as Kate Millett, Catharine A. MacKinnon, and Andrea Dworkin in the follow-
ing two decades. Gingerly skirting the fraught political dimensions of obscenity 
that proved so explosive to its prospective feminist censors and its freedom of 
(bodily) expression spokespersons, the story of modernist transgression that we 
tell and retell ourselves instead tends to focus on the largely formal properties and 
reassuringly historical problems posed by early twentieth-century obscene books. 
Neither the revolutionary activation of new communal sensoria nor the reliably 
patriarchal means of violently dispossessing women of their agency and access to 
authentic subjective experiences, obscenity has instead become just another evoc-
ative modern phenomenon, like advertising or fascism or fashion or speed or little 
magazines, attachable to canonical modernist texts seemingly in need of more 
and more recovered historicist content, which critics, scholars, and teachers have 
been supplying at an impressively rapid clip in recent decades. Obscenity has thus 
made visible a variety of hitherto occluded networks, archives, material objects, 
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institutions, and figures. Armed with these, we have been able to undertake the 
meritorious intellectual labor of resituating literary modernism in terms of actually 
existing censorship forces and their uneven influences on the genesis of indisput-
ably important modernist texts such as Ulysses, Lady Chatterley’s Lover (1928), or 
Orlando (1928), to take but three notable examples. We have freshened up the hoary 
old narrative of modernism’s implicit transgressivity by elaborating upon the ways 
in which “obscene modernism” incorporated and transformed various censorship 
discourses (both official and unofficial) through an analyzable set of sociocultural 
relationships and compositional procedures.
 Celia Marshik’s British Modernism and Censorship (2006), for instance, makes 
a strong case for understanding literary modernism in Britain as having devised a 
number of its most familiar formal features—self-reflexivity, fragmentation, irony, 
and satire—in response to the institutionalized pressures of censorship forces.27 For 
Marshik, the encounters that Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, and Jean Rhys respec-
tively had with censors required these particular writers to negotiate between the 
claims of total expressive freedom and the sorts of resistance actually evinced by 
all kinds of offended readers, such that the texts produced by each of these eminent 
modernists were qualitatively impacted by these encounters. In many instances, 
the repressiveness of early twentieth-century censorship practices threw a number 
of major contemporary writers back on their heels and forced them to make ever 
more complicated texts in order to get around the looming threat of their poten-
tial suppression, either in seats of governmental power or in the offices of their 
own publishers. Consequently, the censorship of obscenity did not merely pro-
scribe books; it also helped to shape the dense formal structures of many canonical 
modernist texts along with the estranging compositional methods used by seminal 
modernist authors either to conceal or exacerbate the offensively prurient qualities 
of their writing. Obscenity censorship, in other words, played an important role in 
the creation of difficult works, long prized as a determinate characteristic of most 
Anglo-American modernist writing.28
 From this perspective, therefore, censorship’s repressive measures all proved to 
be creatively—if no less improbably—generative, suggesting that accounts such as 
Marshik’s owe more than a little to Leo Strauss (in terms of shared interpretive frame-
work at least, if not political commitments). In Persecution and the Art of Writing 
(1952), after all, Strauss argued that there can be no such thing as censorship if we 
understand that term to refer us to the absolute silencing of free expression, because 
the persecution of writing “cannot prevent independent thinking. It cannot prevent 
even the expression of independent thought.”29 According to Strauss’s provocative 
rereadings of the works of preeminent medieval Jewish philosophers such as Moses 
Maimonides and Baruch Spinoza, the effect of censorship on writing simply leads to 
the development of a variety of compositional strategies that make any given text by 
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a persecuted author more elaborate and obscure: “For the influence of persecution 
on literature is precisely that it compels all writers who hold heterodox views to 
develop a peculiar technique, the technique which we have in mind when speaking 
of writing between the lines.”30 It does not seem much of a stretch, therefore, to 
observe that for most recent literary modernist scholars, like Marshik, the impulse 
informing the story we tend to tell about “obscene modernism” has been precisely 
this Straussian one of reading between the lines of exemplary modernist texts, both 
to find the more or less deeply buried traces of censorship forces and to disclose 
the artful subversion of those same forces by these definitively modernist—and, 
correlatively, difficult—works. In this widely shared view, the novelties of form and 
content in so much proscribed British and U.S. modernist writing betoken the cre-
ative functions indirectly served by nominally repressive forces, whether they were 
to be found in social purity movements, commercial publishing houses, printing 
presses, or branches of national governments themselves.
 Notable recent attempts to deviate from this mode of reading do little more 
than invert the Straussian paradigm. For instance, according to Florence Dore’s The 
Novel and the Obscene: Sexual Subjects in American Modernism (2005), sexually 
graphic modernist fiction did not overcome censorship logics and forces so much as 
it performatively enacted them: “American modernists do represent divergent forms 
of desire, I argue, but only in castrated subjects—their desire construed as a pro-
hibitive, negative aspect of civic identity.”31 “For American modernism,” Dore goes 
on to contend, “bodily coherence requires participation in a social order—the very 
social order these authors seek to challenge in their explicit opposition to obscenity 
law. The discovery of phallic logic in these laws and in these novels suggests that we 
should continue to cultivate skepticism wherever the body appears to have at last 
been revealed.”32 What the difficulties of modernist writing continue to disclose for 
Dore is not creative ingenuity so much as the disciplining omission of non-phallo-
centrically sexualized bodies, leading her to demand of modernist novels over and 
over again: Habeas corpus!
 Thus, in the favored story we tell ourselves about obscenity and early twen-
tieth-century English-language writing, all roads invariably start with and lead 
unerringly back to literary modernism. Modernist writers and what they wrote 
always win, while the organizations that tried to be modernism’s censors always 
end up playing invaluable (if involuntary) parts in its victory. As a result, historical 
censorship forces have been consistently made to pay their obeisance to a mod-
ernism triumphant in the image projected by its own champions and the beliefs 
that these same champions have compensatorily generated of social and cultural 
resistances not only confronted but also epically overcome. Conversely, even when 
a more glum reckoning is required, as in Dore’s bracing work, modernist preju-
dices still carry the day. For instance, according to The Novel and the Obscene, 
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Theodore Dreiser, Willa Cather, and Richard Wright are all modernist writers. In 
a single introductory paragraph, an entire century of criticism that has posed them 
as canonical naturalist writers gets effaced willy-nilly because Dore “takes mod-
ernism as a general term encompassing—and emphasizing overlap among—the 
distinct literary movements of the twentieth century. . . . If ‘social criticism’ began 
as a naturalist goal, it came to fruition as a modernist presumption.”33 For Dore, 
if it is an early twentieth-century book published in the United States that is still 
worth reading and thinking about today, then it is best approached in terms of 
literary modernism. In sum, all of the attention we modernist scholars have lately 
been devoting to obscenity seems to have demonstrated but one thing: much like 
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, we know literary obscenity when we see it 
in and as an exemplary instance of literary modernism.34
II
Instead, U.S. case law ought to be calling the tune when it comes to the study of 
book obscenity. Such a shift in orientation has several merits, starting with the fact 
that it foregrounds a number of obscene works and writers not often considered by 
the more exclusive canons of either “obscene modernism.” A comparative study of 
the cultural, literary, and legal contexts of modern U.S. obscenity law reveals that 
modernism’s centrality in the narrative of twentieth-century obscenity is, for all of 
its popular and scholarly appeal, historically unwarranted. Embarrassingly persistent 
expressions of literary naturalism, much more so than emergent or consummate 
articulations of “modernism” per se, comprised the primary book targets for obscen-
ity prosecutions in the United States well into the middle of the last century. In the 
legal realm, one might say, modernist obscenity is derivative from, or even parasitic 
upon, the cultural work done by naturalist provocations against community norms.
 While a complete list of such proscribed works is probably impossible to com-
pile without inadvertently omitting some texts, and while a number of important 
obscenity cases from this period were unreported, it is worth considering the fol-
lowing list of books that were prosecuted on grounds of obscenity in the United 
States and resulted in court opinions between 1900 and 1950:35
1909 Voltaire, The Works of Voltaire (1901) St. Hubert Guild, 118 N.Y.S. 582
Elinor Glyn, Three Weeks (1907) Buckley, 200 Mass. 346
1913 Daniel Carson Goodman, Hagar Revelly 
(1913)*
Kennerley, 209 F. 119
1915 Margaret Sanger, Family Limitation 
(1914)36
William Sanger, 154 N.Y.S. 414
1918 Theodore Dreiser, The “Genius” (1915)* Dreiser, 171 N.Y.S. 605
Literary Obscenities
26
1920 Théophile Gautier, Mademoiselle de 
Maupin (1835)
Halsey, 180 N.Y.S. 836
Anonymous, Madeleine, the 
Autobiography of a Prostitute (1919)
Brainard, 183 N.Y.S. 452
1922 Théophile Gautier, Mademoiselle de 
Maupin (1835)
Halsey, 234 N.Y. 1
James Branch Cabell, Jurgen (1919)37 People v. Holt, McBride and Company et 
al., Court of the General Sessions of the 
Peace in and for the County of New York, 
October 19, 1922
1924 Arthur Schnitzler, Casanova’s 
Homecoming (1918)
Seltzer, 203 N.Y.S. 809
1929 Radclyffe Hall, The Well of Loneliness (1928) Friede, 233 N.Y.S. 565
1930 Arthur Schnitzler, Reigen (1900/1903) Pesky, 243 N.Y.S. 193
Mary Ware Dennett, The Sex Side of Life 
(1919)38
Dennett, 39 F.2d 564
Theodore Dreiser, An American Tragedy 
(1925)*
Friede, 271 Mass. 318
D. H. Lawrence, Lady Chatterley’s Lover 
(1928)
DeLacey, 271 Mass. 327
1931 Marie Stopes, Married Love (1918) One Obscene Book Entitled “Married 
Love,” 48 F.2d 821
Marie Stopes, Contraception (1923) One Book Entitled “Contraception,” 51 F.2d 
525
1933 James Joyce, Ulysses (1922) One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. 182
Erskine Caldwell, God’s Little Acre (1933)* Viking Press, Inc., 264 N.Y.S. 534
1934 James Joyce, Ulysses (1922) One Book Entitled “Ulysses,” 72 F.2d 705
Donald Henderson Clarke, Female (1934) Berg, 272 N.Y.S. 586
1935 Gustave Flaubert, November (1842) Herman Miller, 279 N.Y.S. 583
1936 André Gide, If It Die (1924/1926) Gotham Book Mart, Inc., 285 N.Y.S. 563
1940 Maurice Parmelee, Nudism in Modern 
Life (1927)
Parmelee, 113 F.2d 729
1944 D. H. Lawrence, The First Lady Chatterley 
(1944)
Dial Press, 182 Misc. 416
1945 Paul Bowman Popenoe, Preparing for 
Marriage (1938)
Walker, 149 F.2d 511
Lillian Smith, Strange Fruit (1944)* Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543
1946 Serge G. Wolsey, Call House Madam (1942.) London, 63 N.Y.S.2d 227
1947 Serge G. Wolsey, Call House Madam (1942) Rodd, 165 F.2d 54
Edmund Wilson, Memoirs of Hecate 
County (1946)39
Doubleday, 71 N.Y.S.2d 736;, and 
Doubleday, 297 N.Y. 687
Calder Willingham, End as a Man (1947) Vanguard Press, Inc., 84 N.Y.S.2d 427
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1948 Kathleen Winsor, Forever Amber (1944) The Book Named “Forever Amber,” 323 
Mass. 302
Edmund Wilson, Memoirs of Hecate 
County (1946)
Doubleday, 335 U.S. 848
Charles O. Gorham, The Gilded Hearse 
(1948)
Creative Age Press, Inc., 79 N.Y.S.2d 198
1949 William Faulkner, Sanctuary (1931)
James T. Farrell, The Studs Lonigan 
Trilogy (1932–35)*
Erskine Caldwell, God’s Little Acre (1933)*
James T. Farrell, A World I Never Made 
(1936)*
William Faulkner, Wild Palms (1939)
Calder Willingham, End as a Man (1947)
Harold Robbins, Never Love a Stranger 
(1948)
Gordon, 66 Pa. D.&C. 101, aff ’d sub nom. 
Feigenbaum, 70 A.2d 389
1950 Erskine Caldwell, God’s Little Acre (1933)* The Book Named “God’s Little Acre,” 326 
Mass. 281
James M. Cain, Serenade (1937) The Book Named “Serenade,” 326 Mass. 324
This inventory helps make clear at least two things. First, the prosecution of obscene 
books in the first half of the twentieth-century United States was often a recursive 
undertaking. Just because a text got off clean on obscenity charges in one state in 
one year (as Erskine Caldwell’s God’s Little Acre did in New York in 1933) did not 
mean that it was thereafter exempt from prosecution in another state (as in fact hap-
pened to Caldwell’s novel in Pennsylvania in 1949 and then again in Massachusetts 
the following year). Therefore, the legibility of potentially obscene books was not 
always punctually linked to the date of original publication, and the legal strate-
gies for re- or deproscribing them from state to state or year to year were variably 
responsive to evolving sociocultural forces. For instance, as we will see later, the 
belated attempts to proscribe God’s Little Acre in the 1940s have as much to do with 
the contemporary boom in mass-market trade paperbacks as they do with the car-
icatural organ grinding of Caldwell’s Walden family. Furthermore, this recursivity 
is a built-in feature of Western legal systems insofar as the proscription of obscene 
books in lower courts is almost always appealable, which accounts for the multiple 
appearances on this list of Edmund Wilson’s Memoirs of Hecate County, a novel that 
was deemed obscene in two New York appellate courts in 1947 before it later led to a 
split decision in the U.S. Supreme Court. (Justice Felix Frankfurter recused himself 
from participating in the deliberations concerning the book due to his friendship 
with Wilson, and the court went on to affirm the lower court decisions in its curt 
two-sentence opinion the following year.)
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 This list also makes visible the degree to which canonical works of English-
language literary modernism (e.g., the exhaustively studied examples of Ulysses or 
the various proscribed novels of Lawrence and Faulkner) recede into the background 
while other modes of writing come to the fore. The collected works of Voltaire, erotica 
(Glyn and Wolsey), contraception and sex health manuals (Sanger, Dennett, Stopes, 
and Popenoe), autobiographies (Madeleine and Gide), works of fin de siècle Viennese 
decadence (Schnitzler), a historical romance (Winsor), a work of lesbian realism 
(Hall), an ornate comic allegory (Cabell), a fictional exposé of the book publish-
ing industry (Gorham), pseudoscientific nudist propaganda (Parmelee), a popular 
collection of satirical short fiction on sex in suburbia and New York City (Wilson), 
an account of sadism at a Southern military academy (Willingham), and pulp fic-
tion (Clarke, Robbins, and Cain) were all prosecuted for obscenity in this period, 
and all (with the exception of Flaubert’s juvenilia and Gide’s memoir) are not easily 
subsumable within existing modernist frames of reference. Even more saliently, how-
ever, works of literary naturalism appear over a longer period of time than any other 
single genre, mode, or type of writing on this list (see the starred [*] entries above). 
Far from indexing the startling innovations of subversive modernist writing prac-
tices, obscenity case law presents us instead with the unruly, salacious, and offensive 
appeals evoked by the obstinate remainders of a nineteenth-century mode of writing 
often assumed to have been surpassed by literary modernism itself. In short, if we 
take en masse the kinds of books most often proscribed by obscenity case law as a 
useful archive from which to draw our generalizations, then early twentieth-century 
book obscenity in the United States would seem to persist in rubbing our faces in 
the lower depths noisesomely explored by works of literary naturalism, a mode that 
likewise faced obscenity prosecutions as it spread throughout Europe in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.40 What we have here, then, are not modernism’s 
naughty self-reflexive monoliths so much as a naturalist preserve of sorts.
 By recognizing literary naturalism’s rival claims to primacy as an object of 
concern for U.S. courts in this period, we fundamentally readjust the accepted 
understanding of modernism’s relationship to legal obscenity. Far from being the 
typical or exemplary target of obscenity prosecutions in the early twentieth century, 
modernism instead should be more precisely understood to comprise a variably 
articulated cultural field in early twentieth-century Europe, Britain, and the United 
States, according to which past modes and forms of art were subjected to vari-
ous negative procedures (cancellation, allegorization, negation, irony) in order to 
pose art as a problem to itself. In countless interpretations of the art and cultural 
objects of this period, the delaying, discrediting, and negating of preexisting genres, 
modes, and forms in a particular work of art have long persisted as one of the 
key identifying features for both modernism and the historical avant-garde. While 
pathbreaking early twentieth-century visual artists were in the midst of calling into 
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question the significance of rules of perspective through a belabored emphasis on 
the flattened surface of the canvas, and while inventive composers were unsettling 
the values usually assigned to fundamental compositional elements such as tonality, 
a similar project of literary innovation through critical self-reflection sought to 
upend the coherence of inherited realist narratives and (in some cases) narrative 
altogether. At their most extreme, the more properly avant-garde of these prac-
tices—such as the assault that Duchamp’s ready-mades waged on art exhibition in 
the second decade of the century—could call into question the very possibility of 
art altogether, such that at the end of his life Theodor Adorno was still credibly able 
to observe that art, in order to survive, “must turn against itself, in opposition to its 
own concept, and thus become uncertain of itself right into its innermost fiber.”41 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, art could no longer afford to ignore its 
own “impossibility” as it came to be increasingly governed by heteronomous forces 
and arrangements in which the art-object’s claims to exceptional status with respect 
to market relations and dominant modes of social organization looked more and 
more like the mutterings of a lyrically dissolute basket case. At the very least, such 
was the polemical thrust of the frame narrative in F. T. Marinetti’s “The Founding 
and Manifesto of Futurism” (1909), in which the pointedly decadent trappings of 
the opening paragraph (replete with filigreed mosque lamps and “opulent oriental 
rugs”) get exuberantly discarded (goodbye to all that!) in favor of automotive sprees 
that end in collisions with muddy, womb-like ditches.42
 Understandably, then, the words most often used to describe the highly stylized 
and deforming compositional maneuvers carried out by innovative early twenti-
eth-century writers on realist narratives and on narrative itself tend to circle around 
procedures characterized by negation or negativity. Perhaps the most prominent 
English-language expositor of such a position, Fredric Jameson has more than once 
in his career disputed the novelty of modernist fiction by describing that writing 
instead as “rather something like a canceled realism, a realism denied and negated 
and aufgehoben in genuinely Hegelian fashion.”43 Analogizing it to the relationship 
of consumer capitalism to classical capitalism, Jameson posits that modernism was 
not the demiurgic expression of unfettered creative self-reflexivity unleashed upon 
an unsuspecting mass culture so much as it was a second-order articulation of an 
older and long-accredited mode of narrative (realism) with which early twenti-
eth-century writers and critics had simply become tired. Blanket boredom—not a 
feat of superhuman originality or the inspiration of a singular genius—is said by 
Jameson to comprise the fountainhead of modernist writing, which in the main 
sought to liven up the old realist way of telling stories by making nearly illegible 
the representational codes on which such narratives had usually tended to rely. 
According to this influential account, the strange and off-putting surfaces that mod-
ernist fiction presents to the world obfuscate the continued existence of realist 
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narrative structures somewhere beneath the superficial pyrotechnics and hyperstyl-
izations of such writing. All that the cancellation of realism did was simply move 
realism from text to subtext, as it were, in modernist novels and short stories.44 In 
Jameson’s disenchanted readings, the transgression of convention and its reaffirma-
tion remain inextricably affiliated activities. As a result, we ought not be too easily 
impressed by the subversive claims that authors and critics have happened to make 
on modernist writing’s behalf, because realism still persists as the operative norm 
or measure. In departing from realist systems of representation, modernist writers 
could not help but continue to feed off of them.45
 Seen in this light, “obscene modernism” is better suited not to account for the 
primary objects of early twentieth-century obscenity prosecutions but rather to 
describe a period in which the value, identity, and very existence of obscene books 
themselves became subjected to protracted, inconclusive arguments between judges, 
jurists, and writers. In this view, modernism refers us to a broad set of dispositions 
painfully marked by doubts about the possibility for art and writing as these had 
been traditionally undertaken. Crucial for any interpretation of the relationships 
between modernism and obscenity, in turn, is the corollary recognition that similar 
doubts manifested themselves as well in the case law on the obscene writing of this 
period. Keeping this in mind, consider the following remarks on and definitions of 
obscenity produced by U.S. judges in the period between 1896 and 1950:
Swearingen v. United States (1896)
The words “obscene,” “lewd” and “lascivious,” as used in the statute, signify that 
form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity, and have the same 
meaning as is given them at common law in prosecutions for obscene libel.46
United States v. Kennerley (1913)
I hope it is not improper for me to say that the rule as laid down [in Hicklin], 
however consonant it may be with mid-Victorian morals, does not seem to me 
to answer to the understanding and morality of the present time, as conveyed 
by the words, “obscene, lewd, or lascivious.”47
If there be no abstract definition, such as I have suggested, should not the word 
“obscene” be allowed to indicate the present critical point in the compromise 
between candor and shame at which the community may have arrived here 
and now?48
To put thought in leash to the average conscience of the time is perhaps tol-
erable, but to fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least capable seems 
a fatal policy.49
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Anderson v. Patten, Postmaster (1917)
Few would, I suppose, doubt that some prevention of the mailing of lewd publi-
cations is desirable, and yet no field of administration requires better judgment 
or more circumspection to avoid interference with a justifiable freedom of 
expression and literary development.50
I have little doubt that numerous really great writings would come under the 
ban, if tests that are frequently current were applied, and these approved pub-
lications doubtless at times escape only because they come within the term 
“classics,” which means, for the purpose of the application of the statute, that 
they are ordinarily immune from interference, because they have the sanction 
of age and fame, and usually appeal to a comparatively limited number of 
readers. It is very easy, by a narrow and prudish construction of the statute, to 
suppress literature of permanent merit.51
Halsey v. New York Society for the Suppression of Vice (1922)
No work may be judged from a selection of such paragraphs alone. Printed 
by themselves they might, as a matter of law, come within the prohibition 
of the statute. So might a similar selection from Aristophanes or Chaucer or 
Boccaccio or even from the Bible. The book, however, must be considered 
broadly as a whole.52
United States v. Dennett (1930)
An accurate exposition of the relevant facts of the sex side of life in decent 
language and in manifestly serious and disinterested spirit cannot ordinarily 
be regarded as obscene.53
United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled “Married Love” (1931)
In Murray’s Oxford English Dictionary the word “obscene” is defined as follows:
 “Obscene—1. Offensive to the senses, or to taste or refinement; disgusting, 
repulsive, filthy, foul, abominable, loathsome. Now somewhat arch.
 “2. Offensive to modesty or decency; expressing or suggesting unchaste or 
lustful ideas; impure, indecent, lewd.”54
United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses” (1933)
The meaning of the word “obscene” as legally defined by the courts is: Tending 
to stir the sex impulses or to lead to sexually impure and lustful thoughts. 
Whether a particular book would tend to excite such impulses and thoughts 
must be tested by the court’s opinion as to its effect on a person with average 
sex instincts—what the French would call l’homme moyen sensuel—who plays, 
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in this branch of legal inquiry, the same role of hypothetical reagent as does 
the “reasonable man” in the law of torts and “the man learned in the art” on 
questions of invention in patent law.55
United States v. One Book Entitled “Ulysses” (1934)
It is settled, at least so far as this court is concerned, that works of physiol-
ogy, medicine, science, and sex instruction are not within the statute, though 
to some extent and among some persons they may tend to promote lustful 
thoughts. We think the same immunity should apply to literature as to sci-
ence, where the presentation, when viewed objectively, is sincere, and the erotic 
matter is not introduced to promote lust and does not furnish the dominant 
note of the publication. The question in each case is whether a publication 
taken as a whole has a libidinous effect.56
Parmelee v. United States (1940)
Probably the fundamental reason why the word obscene is not susceptible of 
exact definition is that such intangible moral concepts as it purports to con-
note, vary in meaning from one period to another. It is customary to see, now, 
in the daily newspapers and in the magazines, pictures of modeled male and 
female underwear which might have been shocking to readers of an earlier 
era. An age accustomed to the elaborate bathing costumes of forty years ago 
might have considered obscene the present-day beach costume of halters and 
trunks. But it is also true that the present age might regard those of 1900 as 
even more obscene.57
Commonwealth v. Isenstadt (1945)
A book is “obscene, indecent or impure” within the statutory prohibition 
if it has a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers by inciting 
lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desire. It also violates the statute if it 
“manifestly tends to corrupt the morals of youth.”58
Commonwealth v. Gordon et al. (1949)
I assume that “obscenity” is expected to have a familiar and inherent meaning, 
both as to what it is and as to what it does. It is my purpose to show that it has 
no such inherent meaning; that different meanings given to it at different times 
are not constant, either historically or legally; that it is not constitutionally 
indictable unless it takes the form of sexual impurity, i.e. “dirt for dirt’s sake” 
and can be traced to actual criminal behavior, either actual or demonstrably 
imminent.59
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A book cannot be a present danger unless its reader closes it, lays it aside, and 
transmutes its erotic allurement into overt action. That such action must inevi-
tably follow as a direct consequence of reading the book does not bear analysis, 
nor is it borne out by general human experience; too much can intervene and 
too many diversions take place.60
Attorney General v. The Book Named “God’s Little Acre” (1950)
Viewing the book as a whole we find ourselves unable to agree with the con-
clusion of the trial judge that the book was not obscene, indecent, or impure as 
those words have been defined in our decisions. The book abounds in sexual 
episodes and some are portrayed with an abundance of realistic detail. In some 
instances the author’s treatment of sexual relations descends to outright por-
nography. Nothing would be gained by spreading these portions of the book 
on the pages of this opinion.61
 What these various definitions of obscenity in this selection from relevant case 
law over half a century should make clear is that it is anything but simple to negate 
a received tradition. It proved as tricky for a liberalizing judge eager to deproscribe 
book obscenity once and for all as for a modernist artist responding critically to 
an inherited set of forms, narratives, and generic conventions. Thus, in the years 
between 1930 and 1950, we end up with a number of attempts either to reaffirm or 
to do away with Cockburn’s notorious processual account of obscenity in Regina v. 
Hicklin. On the one hand, book obscenity in these two decades is said to be both 
too amorphous and too unreal to warrant legal oversight or restriction anymore. 
On the other hand, as described in those Massachusetts cases where precedential 
continuity was more explicitly valued, obscenity in this same span of time is what 
Cockburn always said it was—depraving and corrupting—even if new consider-
ations have entered the picture since 1868, such as the concession that books ought 
to be judged now “as a whole” and that the readers most in need of protection 
belong to youth demographics. As with Jameson’s modernist “cancellation” of realist 
narratives, the very legal postulates being canceled by later rulings linger as norms 
long after they were supposed to have been overcome or surpassed.
 In this view, then, what modernist literary studies meaningfully contribute 
to critical work on legal obscenity in the early twentieth-century United States is 
attention to negative processes rather than to singular events or acts of negation. 
This period confronts us not with the end of book obscenity (that had to wait until 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. California in 1973) but rather with 
the beginning of the end of book obscenity, the undertaking of a protracted labor 
of negation. Consequently, Woolsey’s much-mythicized opinion in the Ulysses case 
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was part of a much longer sequence that both started well before 1933—his redefi-
nition of obscenity in terms of holistic interpretations was first expressed by Judge 
William S. Andrews in Halsey, a 1922 case involving Théophile Gautier’s historical 
romance from the previous century, Mademoiselle de Maupin—and unfolded across 
decades of further litigation well after him. In fact, following Woolsey’s revisions 
to Cockburn, there began a forty-year period in the United States in which there 
was too much obscenity law. Before the early 1930s, the Cockburn test in Hicklin did 
effectively comprise the obscenity law of the land; after Woolsey, new tests (some 
slightly different, others extremely so) started to appear, making determinate assess-
ments as to what constituted legal obscenity in the United States more and more 
of a rebarbative task. The Supreme Court itself soon enough realized this when its 
1957 opinion in Roth v. United States set off a cavalcade of new decisions, tests, and 
opinions on obscenity over the next fifteen years.62
 What this means for the comparative study of law and literature is that any 
attempt to coordinate a modernist frame of reference with early and mid-twen-
tieth-century obscenity case law must stress a provisional open-endedness. We 
should be cautious not to read backward from the achieved end of book obscenity 
so as to conclude that the complicated twists and turns of the case law were leading 
inevitably toward greater freedom. Instead, there were books, opinions, and jus-
tifications along the way that startlingly impeded, detoured, and sometimes even 
effaced this long-term trajectory. For instance, both Lillian Smith’s Strange Fruit and 
Erskine Caldwell’s God’s Little Acre were proscribed in 1944 and 1950, respectively, 
because of the direct application of Woolsey’s Ulysses test. Moreover, we would 
do well to resist the temptation to interpret these later applications of Woolsey’s 
decision as misappropriations of his widely admired standard. If anything, our 
modernist frame of reference in this instance should put us on the lookout for 
how subsequent proscriptive uses of the Ulysses test reveal the ways in which that 
standard—much like literary modernism itself with respect to realism—continued 
to rely upon Cockburn’s much-reviled and supposedly suspended definition of 
obscenity in Hicklin. Taking the modernism of legal obscenity in this period seri-
ously demands nothing less.
III
The negative processes slowly unfolding across the early twentieth century in lit-
erary texts and courtrooms also sensitize us to the anxieties evoked by obscene 
texts and “provocative” literary naturalist ones, both of which straddled the shifting 
boundaries between literature and paraliterature. Cockburn, it will be remem-
bered, quite pointedly demurred from making an exception on behalf of works 
of high literary value in his test for obscenity in Hicklin. Just because an obscene 
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text possessed literary merit did nothing to detract from or otherwise qualify its 
capacities to deprave and corrupt those whose minds were open to such influences 
and into whose hands such a work might have happened to fall. Fittingly enough, 
then, throughout this period books frequently found themselves proscribed on 
grounds of obscenity alongside religious pamphlets, advertising circulars, photo-
graphs, contraception guides, sex manuals, nudist magazines, and instruments of 
abortion, among other apparently nonliterary objects of legal disapproval.
 The first effective legal challenge to this lack of distinction between obscene 
works and literary ones did not take place in the United States until 1894, when 
Anthony Comstock, the head of the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, 
opposed the sale of a collection of books as part of the assets of the recently insolvent 
Worthington Company. Included among these assets were Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
Confessions (1782–89), Henry Fielding’s The History of Tom Jones, a Foundling 
(1749), the collected works of Rabelais, Boccaccio’s The Decameron (circa 1353), 
and Ovid’s The Art of Love (1 c.e.)—all of which Comstock claimed were examples 
of “immoral literature” that were so far beyond the sanction of New York state law 
that they could not be offered for sale within its borders.63 The members of the New 
York Supreme Court, however, were ultimately unconvinced by Comstock’s bold 
assertions:
 
It is very difficult to see upon what theory these world-renowned classics can 
be regarded as specimens of that pornographic literature which it is the office of 
the Society for the Suppression of Vice to suppress, or how they can come under 
any stronger condemnation than that high standard literature which consists 
of the works of Shakespeare, of Chaucer, of Laurence Sterne, and of other great 
English writers, without making reference to many parts of the Old Testament 
Scriptures, which are to be found in almost every household in the land. The 
very artistic character, the high qualities of style, the absence of those glaring 
and crude pictures, scenes, and descriptions which affect the common and 
vulgar mind, make a place for books of the character in question, entirely apart 
from such gross and obscene writings as it is the duty of the public authorities 
to suppress. . . . A seeker after the sensual and degrading parts of a narrative 
may find in all these works, as in those of other great authors, something to 
satisfy pruriency. But to condemn a standard literary work, because of a few 
of its episodes, would compel the exclusion from circulation of a very large 
proportion of the works of fiction of the most famous writers of the English 
language.64
Tacitly calling into question not only the scope of Hicklin’s test but also its methods 
of proscribing entire texts on the basis of brief or isolated passages, In re Worthington 
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Company set an important precedent for taking into account the literary merit of 
a charged book by defending the classics and “standard literary work[s]” against 
obscenity prosecutions in the state of New York.
 While the Woolsey test articulated in United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses” 
in 1933 may be the most famous instance of a lower court judge extending this care-
fully observed distinction between legal obscenity and literature to a contemporary 
book, it was Judge Augustus Hand’s affirmation of Woolsey’s opinion and ruling 
in United States v. One Book Entitled “Ulysses” the following year that even more 
trenchantly expressed the growing sense among liberalizing judges and jurists that 
whatever obscenity may have once consisted of, it was probably not going to include 
the literary anymore: “We think the same immunity should apply to literature as to 
science, where the presentation, when viewed objectively, is sincere, and the erotic 
matter is not introduced to promote lust and does not furnish the dominant note of 
the publication. The question in each case is whether a publication taken as a whole 
has a libidinous effect. The book before us has such portentous length, is written 
with such evident truthfulness in its depiction of certain types of humanity, and is 
so little erotic in its result, that it does not fall within the forbidden class.”65 At least 
two things are worth noting here. First, because it was (on the whole) long-winded, 
frank, and not very titillating, Ulysses was almost certainly a specimen of literature, 
meaning that it was not to be mistaken for an instance of obscenity since literature 
was literature and obscenity was obscenity. Second, the immunity prospectively 
extended to literature by Hand was expressly modeled after exceptions made ear-
lier on behalf of scientific works, thus securing the recognition of literature as its 
own field by way of the immunity already granted to a wholly different one. The 
story of literary value in U.S. obscenity case law, therefore, should not omit the 
interdisciplinary pressures exerted by science on literature and vice versa. Given 
the foundational appeals to “scientific” values in naturalism—starting with Zola’s 
programmatic essay, “The Experimental Novel” (1880)—a shift in focus from the 
texts of modernism to those of literary naturalism becomes all the more exigent.
 Although the literary value test broached here would ultimately win out forty 
years later in Miller v. California, the 1930s and 1940s were hardly a period in which 
this view ended up getting seamlessly ratified court by court and state by state. For 
instance, in the notoriously censorious Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which 
made “banned in Boston” a household phrase, an especially subtle appropriation 
of holistic tests occurred in the 1940s, albeit with the important difference that 
questions of literary merit ended up being evaluated in an entirely different way. 
In Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, for instance, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court argued that literary value was not all that relevant to determining whether 
or not a given text was proscribably obscene: “It is possible that, even in the mind 
of the general reader, overpowering sincerity and beauty may sometimes entirely 
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obscure or efface the evil effect of occasional questionable passages, especially with 
respect to the classics of literature that have gained recognized place as part of the 
great heritage of humanity. The question will commonly be one of fact in each case, 
and if, looking at the book as a whole, the bad is found to persist in substantial 
degree alongside the good, as the law now stands, the book will fall within the 
statute.”66 In proscribing Lillian Smith’s naturalist antilynching novel, Strange Fruit, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reminded judges, jurists, and writers 
everywhere that obscenity was indeed not not literature, because it was impossible 
to distinguish salacious literature from the claims of indecency, impurity, and cor-
ruption effectively mounted by obscene works more generally. In fact, if anything, 
the beauty and sincerity of good writing provided authors with the means of cam-
ouflaging the unruly claims of their obscene passagework, making certain parts of 
their texts all the more indecent, impure, and corrupt. The literariness of literary 
works potentially made them more, not less, obscene.
 Since the late nineteenth century, however, literary naturalism in the United 
States had provided reliable occasions to doubt the self-sufficiency of “literature” as 
a meaningful category in the reception of fiction. Just as Stephen Crane’s Maggie: 
A Girl of the Streets (1893) had presented itself as being of a piece with the urban 
ethnographic and psychological analyses inaugurated by Jacob Riis’s How the Other 
Half Lives (1890), Theodore Dreiser quite self-consciously described his early fiction 
as metaphoric reappropriations of Herbert Spencer’s materialist metaphilosophy, 
particularly as it was expressed in First Principles (1862).67 Likewise, in the return of 
naturalist fiction in the interwar period, sociological and eugenic discourses came 
more to the fore, particularly in the novels of James T. Farrell and Erskine Caldwell, 
respectively.68 More recently, Christopher L. Hill has made the compelling case 
that this confusion of literary naturalism with other “non-literary genres of social 
knowledge” was indispensable to its development not only in the United States but 
also in other countries: “The rise of naturalist schools around the world was the 
result of the circulation of multiple genres, literary and otherwise, through distinct 
paths whose intersections were enormously varied but mutually reinforcing in the 
aggregate. Naturalist fiction would have been unlikely to travel so widely without 
these other genres, or they without it or each other.”69 Not purely literary by nature, 
literary naturalism has always constituted itself as an alloyed mode of writing in 
which sociological, psychological, evolutionary, physiological, criminological, and 
other extraliterary discourses have been adopted and transformed by self-identified 
naturalist writers the world over.
 Following the attacks mounted against it in the first half of the century and 
the structural analysis that it subsequently underwent, literary naturalism fittingly 
enough became a privileged object of study for the New Historicism. After all, the 
interpretive procedure of structural homology, most forthrightly put into practice 
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in Walter Benn Michaels’s The Gold Standard and the Logic of Naturalism (1987) but 
also implicit in June Howard’s Form and History in American Literary Naturalism 
(1985), is predicated upon a refusal of context: nothing is background because every-
thing is foregrounded. For instance, nothing in Caroline Meeber’s milieu or situation 
“explains” her in Sister Carrie (1900). Instead, everything about her, her milieu, and 
her situation can be transformed into everything else.70 Consequently, the same 
entanglement plays itself out again and again in New Historicist criticism: “literature 
tries to distinguish itself with respect to other social and cultural formations and 
fails.”71 Not revolt, but cooptation is the paradigmatic story told by New Historicism, 
and the fact that literary naturalism already collapses the literary and the social 
into one messy heap meant it was a ready-made venue for critics in the 1980s to 
explore—rather than traduce—the ramifications of this unconsoling worldview.72
 Among many early twentieth-century critics, however, U.S. literary naturalism’s 
uncomfortably close associations with nonliterary discourses were cause for disdain 
rather than for doubts about the possibility of adopting an oppositional stance in 
the first place. A notable expression of this is Malcolm Cowley’s “Naturalism in 
American Literature” (1950), which poses the tradition of naturalist writing in the 
United States—from Frank Norris, Crane, and Dreiser through to Farrell, John 
Steinbeck, and Richard Wright—as one bound together principally by a spirit of 
rebellion against gentility and orthodoxy.73 Glumly assessing the pseudoscientific 
objectivity of naturalist writing in terms that emphasize its fundamental misap-
prehension of scientific materials and methods, Cowley contends that one of the 
manifest shortcomings of the naturalist tradition in the United States has been its 
tendency “always to explain the complex in terms of the simple: society in terms 
of self, man in terms of his animal inheritance, and the organic in terms of the 
inorganic. The result is that something is omitted at each stage in this process of 
reduction. To say that man is a beast of prey or a collection of chemical compounds 
omits most of man’s special nature; it is a metaphor, not a scientific statement.”74 By 
confusing figural language with the presentation of facts and the procedures used to 
test the validity of those facts, naturalism manages to evacuate literature of its own 
authentically literary forms, functions, and effects, including—most troublingly in 
Cowley’s estimation—the ability to tell credible tragic narratives:
 
This scientific weakness of naturalism involves a still greater literary weakness, 
for it leads to a conception of man that makes it impossible for naturalistic 
authors to write in the tragic spirit. They can write about crimes, suicides, 
disasters, the terrifying, and the grotesque; but even the most powerful of their 
novels and plays are case histories rather than tragedies in the classical sense. 
Tragedy is an affirmation of man’s importance; it is “the imitation of noble 
actions,” in Aristotle’s phrase; . . . for the naturalists, however, men are “human 
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insects” whose brief lives are completely determined by society or nature. The 
individual is crushed in a moment if he resists; and his struggle, instead of 
being tragic, is merely painful or ironic, as if we had seen a mountain stir itself 
to overwhelm a fly.75
A year before “Naturalism in American Literature” appeared, Philip Rahv voiced a 
similar dissatisfaction with the lack of tragic potentials in literary naturalism: “The 
world of naturalist fiction is much too big, too inert, too hardened by social habit 
and material necessity, to allow for that tenacious self-assertion of the human by 
means of which tragedy justifies and ennobles its protagonists.”76 Not the protago-
nists but the social and natural worlds themselves were the real heroes of naturalist 
writing, and with this dehumanizing displacement of agency from character to 
setting, in Rahv’s view, tragedy had been well and truly lost to U.S. fiction for a time.
 According to Cowley, from beneath the thin conceptual protection provided 
by its pseudoscientific cover story, literary naturalism had thus spent the past half 
century traducing the dignity of humanism. People in naturalist fiction were little 
more than abstractly composed formulae, “the blind result of conditions, forces, 
physical laws, or nature herself.”77 Therefore, literary naturalist authors may indeed 
have deserved credit for having “immensely broadened the scope of American 
fiction” by integrating materials, social classes, and subject matter hitherto marked 
off-limits.78 However, in doing so they had relied far too much on “the meanest 
of everything they describe,” with the result that this widening of subject matter 
likewise represented a watering down of U.S. fiction.79 When mankind as a whole 
was not being thoroughly proletarianized in the pages of a naturalist novel, it was 
undergoing a grotesque ordeal of devolution and degeneration before the reader’s 
very eyes, of which Frank Norris’s Vandover and the Brute (1914) still provides the 
most famous (but by no means the only) example: “All in an instant [Vandover] 
had given way, yielding in a second to that strange hallucination of that four-footed 
thing that sulked and snarled. Now without a moment’s stop he ran back and forth 
along the wall of the room, upon the palms of his hands and toes, a ludicrous figure, 
like that of certain clowns one sees at the circus, contortionists walking about the 
sawdust, imitating some kind of enormous dog.”80 For Cowley and most other 
mid-twentieth-century critics, the overmastering preoccupation of such naturalist 
writing with the bestial and the brutish betokened not a serious reflection upon 
species-being so much as it did an act of juvenile delinquency on the part of the 
guilty naturalist writers, who could be seen to be gleefully doing the dirty on man-
kind’s self-image in the name of a mechanistic and filth-obsessed materialism that 
could only be called, in the words of Oscar Cargill, “pessimistic determinism.”81
 To be sure, not all literary critics at the time were so quick to view naturalism’s 
representations of the world quite so reductively. For one thing, as Charles Child 
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Walcutt hastens to point out in American Literary Naturalism: A Divided Stream 
(1956), the deterministic philosophies so comprehensively excoriated by contempo-
raries such as Cargill and Cowley do not have to be taken at face value. Just because 
the ideology espoused by the narrator or by a character in a given naturalist work 
appears to be mechanistic in the extreme does not necessarily indicate that this 
same novel is bereft of the means of contradicting or otherwise inflecting this overly 
simplistic account of the world. In other words, apathy and “mass insensibility” are 
not the ineluctable results of our reading a novel whose ethos is supposedly consis-
tent with that of literary naturalism.82 Instead, according to Walcutt, the naturalist 
novel in the United States constitutes a complex linguistic artifact informed both 
by progressive idealism and scientific determinism, the two currents that make up 
the divided stream of his book’s title.83
 Due to this animating antagonism between intuition and empirical investi-
gation, naturalist fiction in this country is said to have insinuated itself into all 
sorts of extraliterary discourses, running the gamut from pure speculative science 
to the social sciences and on to public policymaking. The result of this scram-
bling of discourses and institutional authorities is that any sufficient reading of a 
given naturalist text first has to evaluate the claims and appeals being made by that 
work within its various interdisciplinary and social contexts. In other words, if a 
naturalist novel rather conspicuously deprives characters of agency or will, then 
that deficit is probably being made up for somewhere else. In particular, Walcutt 
argues that in so graphically denying volition and effective intentionality to the 
subjects it sets forth, naturalist fiction more often than not ends up transferring 
intentionality and volition from its characters to its readers and—correlatively—to 
society itself. If a given work of literary naturalist fiction is in fact correct about 
the situations it so implacably and gloomily depicts, then society and readers of 
naturalist fiction are now in a better position to do something about it. Much like 
Peirce’s processual account of lithium, in which the act of defining lithium gets 
equated with the activities one has to undertake in order to produce real exist-
ing specimens of lithium, naturalist novels in Walcutt’s view have the potential to 
self-reflexively elaborate the steps by which naturalist milieus and characters get 
themselves produced off the page and in the real world. Therefore, unlike the pitiless 
machinations of fate, naturalism’s gruesomely reductive determinisms need not bar 
the possibilities for amelioration or even revolutionary transformation. Not only 
mortified but also edified at the sight of the impending mountain, Cowley’s poor 
fly could, in a collective effort with other like-minded flies, potentially overwhelm 
it instead: “The more helpless the character [in naturalist writing], the stronger the 
proof of determinism; and once such a thesis is established the scientist hopes and 
believes that men will set about trying to control the forces which now control men. 
. . . Thus can the scientists’ ‘optimistic’ purpose be served by a ‘pessimistic’ novel.”84 
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In this way, the antihumanist cul-de-sac condemned by Cargill, Cowley, Rahv, and 
many other mid-twentieth-century critics of U.S. literary naturalist fiction could 
be meaningfully transformed by bringing out the incipient activist, reformist, and 
humanist impulses underlying the violence, brutishness, and implacability in all 
sorts of naturalist works.
 Despite the ingeniousness of his reading, however, Walcutt never quite con-
vinces himself that naturalist fiction actually works this way. Instead, he goes on 
in American Literary Naturalism: A Divided Stream to insist that “whatever its 
ultimate social intent, naturalist fiction does not exhort the reader to action.”85 As 
he quite disenchantedly points out: “If some of Zola’s best novels are still read it is 
because of their logical, integrated, relentless movement toward disaster—not that 
L’Assommoir will discourage drunkenness, or Germinal usher in the Revolution, or 
Nana apprise us of the evils of sexual license in a decadent society.”86 For Walcutt, 
therefore, the implicit contradiction between a faith in human progress and a com-
mitment to mechanical determinism in literary naturalist fiction is less an index 
of unquestioned social optimism through unfolding scientific processes than it 
is an expression of “a profound uncertainty as to whether science liberates the 
human spirit or destroys it.”87 Offering in effect a protodeconstructive interpretation 
of literary naturalism’s relationship to its putative first principles, Walcutt’s book 
seeks not merely to undermine the operativity of deterministic philosophies and 
science in naturalist novels but also to explore the affective terrain on which such 
things could be erected. According to Walcutt, U.S. literary naturalism’s founda-
tions were originally constructed on fear and doubt in the face of the disturbingly 
ambiguous effects that modern science was having on human existence at that time. 
Consequently, once these same scientific developments had successfully started 
to make inroads into everyday life and even into the subjective interiorities of the 
masses, the matrix of uneasy affects that had made naturalist writing possible in 
the first place ceased to exist: “When science has brought us to a moral relativism 
that substitutes therapy for personal responsibility, the last trickle of the stream of 
idealism has disappeared, and the divided stream of naturalism has lost a vital half 
of itself.”88
 Walcutt’s book accordingly argues that the popularization of science is respon-
sible for the end of naturalism. Inadvertently echoing Wyndham Lewis’s attacks in 
the 1920s on the utility of cutting-edge scientific research as a means of ideological 
warfare in the relativization of social, moral, and cultural values, Walcutt contends 
that the most widespread insights of early twentieth-century science—from the 
Oedipus complex to the theories of general and special relativity—had become 
elements of general culture by the first decade of the Cold War, with the result that 
there no longer seemed to be absolutes on which the doubts and fears of literary 
naturalism might continue to corrosively act. Instead, existentialism and orthodox 
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Christianity were now the more timely expressions of the persistence of an idealist 
faith in nature.89 Correlatively, now that its affective wellspring had been depleted, 
literary naturalism in the 1950s was said to be “[spread] out so far that it covers the 
whole literary landscape—but very thinly.”90 Naturalism no longer existed as an 
independent mode of writing, though that did not belie the likelihood that all U.S. 
fiction would continue to bear a naturalistic impress for some time.
 As a result, the problem for critics was increasingly that of recognizing literary 
naturalism when they saw it. Every writer and critic of naturalism in this period 
appeared to have his or her own sense of how to define it, and no consensus seemed 
to be evolving from this clash of informed opinions. Arguably the best expression 
of literary naturalism’s elusiveness as a concept at this time is to be found in an 
audio lecture recorded by Erskine Caldwell entitled “Naturalism and the American 
Novel” (1953). Using the talk mostly to get in some jabs at the same literary critics 
who had spent the past decade calling into question his worth as a writer of fiction, 
when they were not simply ignoring him altogether, Caldwell starts by admitting 
that the “critical man of letters” is “by reason of heritage, birth, and environment, 
. . . a man far superior in mind and morals, and a man who can outtalk a mere 
writer of fiction anytime, anywhere.” Consequently, as “a mere writer of fiction,” 
Caldwell himself must be whatever it is these men of letters say he is. Unfortunately, 
it seems that these vastly superior men of morality and knowledge cannot quite 
make up their minds as to what to do with him: “Some critics have called me a 
realist, and I came to believe them. Other critics have called me a romanticist, and 
I came to believe them too. Now, if I am to be called a naturalist, I shall no doubt 
believe that as well, but I can’t be all things, and until the question is resolved for 
once and for all, I would be content to remain just what I thought I was: a writer of 
fiction, a storyteller from Georgia.”91 Despite the sarcasm here, however, Caldwell 
is emphatically not content to remain a Georgian teller of tales, because the charge 
of being a naturalist has gotten under his skin like a hookworm, leading him to 
go on in this audio essay to determine just what “the meaning of such a term as 
‘naturalist fiction’” might credibly be.92
 Caldwell’s principal stalking horse throughout his lecture is American Idealism 
(1943), in which Floyd Stovall ranged U.S. writers under four headings: Idealists 
(Ralph Waldo Emerson, Walt Whitman, and Thomas Wolfe), Romantic Realists 
(Willa Cather, Ellen Glasgow, Edna Ferber, Sinclair Lewis, Steinbeck, and John 
P. Marquand), Sometimes Naturalists or Realists (William Dean Howells, Crane, 
Hamlin Garland, Norris, John Dos Passos, and Ernest Hemingway), and Undisputed 
Naturalists (Jack London, Dreiser, Faulkner, Farrell, and Caldwell).93 Discovering 
himself placed among the “Undisputed Naturalists,” Caldwell claims to be “some-
what surprised and well-taken-back too.” Whatever naturalism happened to be 
ultimately, its widespread use as a label of disapproval among most contemporary 
Getting Off the Page
43
critics in the United States leads the world-famous author of Tobacco Road (1932) 
and Gods Little Acre to quip, “I find that all comfort and peace of mind has been 
taken from me.”94
 The remainder of Caldwell’s lecture attempts to cope with this satirically pre-
sented dark night of the soul by shifting the shortcomings of literary naturalism 
from the texts of naturalism to the critics of naturalism themselves. Instead of 
agreeing with the Cargills and Cowleys of the world in finding literary naturalism 
to be an unduly pessimistic mode of writing, Caldwell calls the definitional efforts 
of these same scholars to be “pessimistic to an extreme.” Not naturalist fiction itself 
but interpreters of naturalism such as Cargill are to blame for its supposed cynicism, 
doubt, and gloom. Similarly, Cowley is singled out for propagating the erroneous 
notion that naturalism somehow constitutes the subtraction of all human responsi-
bility from fiction in the United States. Consequently, it is the detractors—and not 
the writers—of literary naturalism who are said to be proceeding far too determin-
istically, irresponsibly shutting down the kinds of experiences and ideologies that 
naturalist fiction can be made to embody or represent in the act of reading itself. 
According to Caldwell’s lecture, the violent and the ugly, as well as the poverty and 
class conflicts of life, often exist side by side with “spasms of laughter, the horseplay 
of humor, and the enjoyment of living” in literary naturalist fiction like his own. 
Therefore, instead of approaching literature as a “laboratory frog to be sliced, pick-
led in a jar, and labeled this, that, and the other thing,” literary critics in this country 
in the mid-twentieth century would better serve their reading communities by 
treating creative writing as if it were “an untamed, rampaging creature ranging the 
land” and in need of guidance perhaps but not the proscriptions or finicky classifi-
cations of a group of men wholly out of touch with the world. Naturalist archetypes 
thus end up mediating Caldwell’s cheeky account of contemporary writing and the 
burgeoning Cold War industry of academic literary criticism. Whereas fictional 
texts are said to constitute the Jack London–esque wolves shiftily roaming the lit-
erary landscape in this country, its critics are apparently unprepared to confront or 
otherwise account for these undomesticated beasts because they are too much like 
Zerkow, the miserly rag-and-bone man of Norris’s McTeague (1899), fussily coveting 
and hoarding those objects that have long outlived their use: “Next to a dull novel,” 
Caldwell observes, “I don’t know anything more depressing than a critic who has 
mewed himself up from the world, and especially a naturalistic critic.”95
IV
These thematic problems and issues raised by U.S. literary naturalism for its 
mid-century critics ought to make more salient the degree to which the period’s 
arguments over the criminally libidinal appeals of writing encompassed more than 
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just the relationships embodied by chance between mute words and their presum-
ably lewd readers. Literary naturalism was no more depraved, corrupt, offensive, 
or prurient than any other contemporary mode of writing, though its constitutive 
incorporation of extraliterary forms of social knowledge and its attention to the 
impact of societal forces upon personal identity made it better suited than most to 
reflect upon the putative uses—normal and aberrant—to which writing’s effective 
force could be put. If early twentieth-century readers really were so in thrall to their 
somatic responses that books needed to be prohibited for their illicit solicitations, 
then the threats evoked by the potential manipulability of irrational consumers 
went well beyond masturbatory gratification.
 This concern over the embodied subsumption of identities gets trenchantly 
thematized throughout the three volumes of James T. Farrell’s Studs Lonigan, which 
details the deleterious impact of mass urban life in the early twentieth-century 
United States on historical consciousness, particularly that of its titular protagonist. 
In fact, as the frightening exemplification of these effects, William “Studs” Lonigan 
has “no language and no experience, whether societal, personal, or physical, which 
he can genuinely call his own.”96 Depicting modernity in the first decades of the last 
century as an impoverishment not just of language but of experience, Studs Lonigan 
again and again calls into question the operativity of literature as an autonomous 
sphere of human activity by ranging all writing within the context of mass culture, 
the nature and functions of which prove to be far from affirmative.
 Frequently, the anxieties and concerns evoked by this get expressed in satiri-
cal episodes like the mission sermon described in the twenty-first chapter of The 
Young Manhood of Studs Lonigan (1934), where Father Shannon declaims against 
a number of writers on the grounds that their books are “vile,” as are the sins to 
which they tend to lead their readers:
And if I met the authors of the books I shall mention, I should tell them to 
their faces (his voice rose, almost to a shout): “Your books are vile. In order to 
make a sale for them, you fill them with spiritual poison, with all the resources 
of your filthy and putrid minds. For thirty pieces of silver, you sign your names 
to oozing immorality. You are worse than dogs! You are the vilest of the vile, 
the most vicious of the vicious, lower than snakes, you rats who write books 
to rob youth of its shining silvered innocence!”97
And just who are these Judas-like “rats who write books”? Father Shannon singles 
out Sinclair Lewis, whose novel Elmer Gantry (1927) is said to make a mockery 
of “the most sacred profession that man can enter”; Judge Ben Lindsey, whose 
Companionate Marriage (1927), “like the anarchistic, atheistic Bolshevists in 
unhappy Russia, says (his arms flung out in a gesture): ‘Away with the holy bonds 
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of Matrimony!’”; H. L. Mencken, whose articles spread the gospel of nihilism and 
blasphemy to American youths who thereafter “think themselves (sneering) smart”; 
H. G. Wells, whose popularization of evolutionary outlooks marks him out as an 
egotist and materialist of the lowest kind; and the various propagandizing writers 
of birth control pamphlets, who do nothing but instigate a lack of sexual conti-
nence throughout the United States (SL, 437–40). Suitably, the result of all these 
bad influences—together with “Filthy movies. Newspapers. The doctrines in uni-
versities aimed to destroy morality” (SL, 441)—threatens nothing less than the 
end of the United States of America because “vile” books such as these are said by 
Father Shannon to be leading not just good Catholic men and women but in fact 
all Americans toward “that drastic, terrible fate which befell the proud and mighty 
empire of Rome” (444). Since they appear to be especially efficacious instruments 
of a degrading mass culture, books are therefore more than an affront to Catholic 
or American morals; more importantly, they are also potentially a mortal threat to 
all nations, no matter the time or place.
 As shrill as Father Shannon’s attacks on “vile” books manifestly are, it would 
nevertheless be a mistake to read Farrell’s cunning pastiche of the fire-and-brim-
stone histrionics of the retreat described in the third chapter of James Joyce’s A 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916) as a straightforward send-up of the 
overwrought fears of crumbling religious and moral orders in a modern secular 
society. For one thing, Father Shannon’s attacks on mass culture get complicated by 
the fact that his fellow clergymen are in the midst of successfully co-opting various 
media outlets of contemporary mass culture itself. In the final volume of the trilogy, 
Judgment Day (1935), Father Moylan hosts a popular radio program in which he 
casually throws around Red-baiting quips and obliquely anti-Semitic references 
as if he were a bona fide demagogue. At one point, Studs Lonigan’s father asks 
him, “What does Father Moylan say? He tells what the bankers are doing. Loaning 
American money to Europe. If they had kept American money in America where it 
belongs, there wouldn’t be any depression” (734). Unpacking Father Moylan’s views 
a bit more fully, his father goes on to observe:
 
America was a fine country. And all these foreigners came here to take jobs 
away from Americans who have a right to them. And now we got too many 
men for the jobs we got. Well, I know what we ought to do. Put all the for-
eigners we got taking jobs away from Americans, pack them in boats, and say 
to them, “Now, see here, America belongs to Americans. You get back where 
you belong.” And if we did that, we wouldn’t have these Reds here agitating 
to overthrow the government. Say, you know what those dirty Reds are doing 
now? They’re exciting the niggers down in the Black Belt, telling them they’re 
as good as white men and they can have white women. I tell you, Bill, some day 
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American people have got to wake up and take things into their own hands. 
(734–35)
It is presumably because of bigotries and xenophobic insights such as these that 
Studs Lonigan’s father can then claim that Father Moylan is “one of the finest and 
smartest men in America, and he tells the people what’s what” (735). Furthermore, 
it is because of demagogic appeals such as these that Ann Douglas has been able to 
demonstrate how the social and spiritual functions of Catholicism are inextricably 
linked to those of mass culture throughout Studs Lonigan: “At best, Studs’ parents 
and their friends go to church in much the same spirit Studs and his gang go to 
the movies, to have their prejudices reinforced and their discontent siphoned off 
in fantasy.”98
 As Judgment Day also reveals, however, Father Shannon’s complaints about 
mass culture are not simply reactionary or hypocritical; they are, it seems, quite 
well founded. At the beginning of the tenth chapter, Studs kills time by aimlessly 
walking around an urban street while erratically trying to distract himself from 
thinking about a fight he has recently had with his fiancée, Catherine. After getting 
hassled by a cop for looking like “a suspicious character,” Studs wanders off down 
a street and overhears a bit of music from “Piccolo Pete” (SL, 659–61): “Radios all 
over. And he hated that damn song. But women, now, they never did seem to know 
their own minds, or what they wanted, so how could a guy know it? Even so, and 
even if he was in the right, still, he needn’t have been so goddamn mean to her. Yes, 
he was kind of sorry about it.” Unable to make up his own mind because the women 
in his life cannot seem to make up their minds, Studs moves farther on down the 
street and “stopped at a window of a book store and rental library, looking from a 
stack of greeting cards to books piled up and spread around the window, with their 
bright jackets, reading the titles, Lumber, Jews Without Money, The Women of Andros, 
The Crystal Icicle, Iron Man, The Mystery of Madame Q, Bottom Dogs, Arctic Quest. 
Sometime he might rent one or two of the books they had and do a little reading, he 
reflected, turning away from the window” (SL, 661). Instead of doing a little reading, 
however, Studs starts to admire some young women (“not at all bad on the eyes”) 
passing by him before he moves on to a corner drug store (SL, 662). In the drug store, 
he almost calls Catherine’s home, but ends up deciding against it:
 
He laid the slug on the counter, picked up his nickel, stopped by the magazine 
rack near the door and thumbed through a copy of an art magazine, looking at 
the pictures of naked and veiled women. Hot babies, but why the hell didn’t it 
show them in different positions to give the whole works. He set the magazine 
back and selected a copy of True Confessions, opening it at a photograph of a 
dishevelled girl. Her dress was torn down one shoulder as she gripped a door 
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knob, her face trapped in fear, with a man looking beastly, lurching toward her, 
his shirt torn, his face scratched and bleeding. Studs quickly skipped through 
the story, written in the first person, coming upon the scene represented in the 
paragraph where the girl was attacked. He hoped the fellow would succeed, 
and it would be described. But she escaped, and his eagerness sapped away.
 Now, I learned my lesson.
 The clerk stared at him with cold suspicion. He replaced the magazine and 
left the drug store. Girls weren’t always so lucky as the gal who’d written the story.
Glaring “idly and half-interestedly” at the headlines of the papers displayed at a 
nearby newsstand, Studs decides finally to go home for lunch and figure out just 
what the hell it is he is going to do with the rest of his day (SL, 663). After all, maybe 
Catherine has left a message for him with his folks.
 As he certainly is throughout the remainder of the trilogy that bears his name, 
Studs Lonigan in this passage proves to be unduly responsive to the conflicting 
stimulations and cues provided to him by his surroundings, with the result that 
he is never really quite sure how he comes to do the things he finds himself doing. 
The books glimpsed through the window of the bookstore and rental library, for 
instance, catch his eye not so much for the words they contain as for “their bright 
jackets,” which lead to the short-lived notion that he really ought to get around 
to “do[ing] a little reading” sometime soon. Rather than check out a book or two, 
however, he eventually finds himself inside a drug store skimming through mag-
azines. The sight of the books gets intermingled with his ogling of passing women 
on the street in such a way that both impulses get displaced onto another activity 
that combines the two in the drugstore, where Studs can critically appraise the 
“naked and veiled women” in an art magazine before being deprived of the rape 
he wants to see verbally depicted in the issue of True Confessions (1922–present). 
The supposedly “vile” desires once satisfied by the “vile” books described in Father 
Shannon’s mission sermon are now apparently more readily fulfilled by nonliterary 
means: visual culture and the luridly exhibitionistic moralism (“Now, I learned my 
lesson”) of early twentieth-century confessional magazines.
 As pictures, movies, illustrated book covers, and (later) comic books increas-
ingly supplanted the libidinal appeals of mere words on a page as the primary 
targets of criminal prosecution and legislative oversight in the United States, writing 
itself gradually became an outmoded way of delivering salacious or patently offen-
sive experiences to prospectively obscene consumers, for whom books seemed to 
be little more than supplements to the supposedly more provocative and immediate 
stimulation provided by their paperback covers.99 Appropriately enough, therefore, 
the interest of Studs in this particular confession in this particular confessional 
magazine hinges upon the “photograph of a dishevelled girl” that accompanies 
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it. Very much a seeker after the sensual and degrading parts of a narrative, Studs 
hastily shuffles through the woman’s story to the paragraph that seems most like 
the caption to the photo. Regrettably, to his mind at least, it does not follow through 
on the rape fantasies this image first stimulated in him.
 In effect, then, the reading habits of Studs Lonigan in the 1930s would mark 
him out as a prototypically obscene reader in the estimation of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in the 1940s. For Studs, words on a page are not to be read 
consecutively as a whole but instead are just a series of holes, of more or less sugges-
tive lacunae either to be manically skipped over or to be scrutinized lasciviously.100 
Whereas the judges in 1894’s In re Worthington and in the two Ulysses cases of the 
early 1930s were quite certain that literary books reliably tended to call forth the 
properly literary modes of reading them, the notoriously proscriptive opinions in 
Massachusetts countered that there were in fact no innate linkages between literary 
texts and literary reading practices. Instead, putatively literary books could in fact 
be read obscenely—that is to say, selectively, with an eye and a body attuned to 
maximizing self-arousal at the prospect of graphic descriptions and actions isolated 
from the unitary frames or forms put around them in a text.
 Studs Lonigan thus helps to call into question the holistic prejudices of 
Woolsey’s test (obscene works are obscene as a whole) and to muddy the distinc-
tion between literary and obscene texts. For instance, an issue of True Confessions 
may not have been “literary” the way Ulysses eventually was in the minds of its 
contemporaries, but it was no less deserving of being read as a whole than Joyce’s 
novel happened to be. Writing in the 1950s, George Gerbner assessed the social 
functions performed by U.S. confessional magazines—including True Confessions 
and Bernarr Macfadden’s True Story (1919–present)—and concluded that despite 
the garishness of most of the “true” narratives published in them, these confessions 
ultimately served moralistic functions when read as a whole:
 
The social appeal of the confession story pivots around the heroine’s human 
frailties in a bewildering and punitive world she cannot fully understand. The 
“truth” of this world is brought home through the inevitable encounter and 
the final coming to terms—resigned and tragic—with the code of society. The 
dynamic power of respect and sympathy for confused victims struggling in a 
web they cannot avoid or escape, or really comprehend, is harnessed to the 
cause of individual restraint. The flame of rebellion is first kindled, then con-
trolled in scope or divorced from its broader social context, and then doused 
in jet streams of remorse, sacrifice, and compromise.101
While Studs Lonigan’s salacious reading of a True Confessions story briefly alludes to 
this tendency toward restraint and self-control in such types of periodicals (“Now, I 
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learned my lesson”), the moral of his own encounter with the confession of this par-
ticular “dishevelled girl” appears to be that there are reading practices that not only 
show a complete lack of self-control or restraint but also nullify whatever restraint or 
self-control a text may be immanently claiming for itself through either its contents 
or forms. In other words, if Studs ever really did get around to checking out Edward 
Dahlberg’s Bottom Dogs (1929) or Mike Gold’s Jews Without Money (1930), then he 
would likely not be reading them for their plot or ideological consistency so much 
as skimming through them rapidly for the naughty, juicy bits. Similarly, one readily 
imagines that Gerty MacDowell might have caught Studs’s eye and imagination as one 
hot babe as well, should a copy of Ulysses have ever fallen into his hands before his 
premature death from heart failure in the last volume of the trilogy bearing his name.
 Furthermore, the separability of text from social context gets undermined alto-
gether in Judgment Day because by the end of the tenth chapter in that book, Studs 
finds himself within a real unfolding True Confessions–style narrative. After losing 
money on every horse race at the gambling establishment run by his brother-in-
law, a luckless housewife solicits Studs and three other men to come back to her 
apartment for sex. Studs agrees, and after lots are drawn, he gets to go first:
 
Grinning foolishly, Studs walked down the hall, opened the bedroom door.
 “All right?” he asked.
 “Come in,” she said.
 He entered the small, neat bedroom and saw her, naked, her black hair 
falling down her back, reclining on a high poster bed, with feminine clothes 
and a copy of True Stories magazine on a chair beside it.
 “Well, I suppose we better get started,” she said coldly. (SL, 679–80)
With a confessional magazine in place beside the bed to recursively mark the cul-
turally mediated nature of his imminent sexual encounter, Studs is presumably in a 
position to realize the sort of ending he sorely felt the lack of in the True Confessions 
narrative he skimmed through earlier in the day. Now, he himself is cast as the 
relentless sexual predator, while the housewife plays the role of the “dishevelled 
girl” who ought not to have been quite as lucky as she ended up being.
 Instead of being jubilant following this opportunity to enact his rape fantasies, 
however, Studs “was disappointed, because it had all happened so quickly.” Leaving 
the woman’s apartment, he is altogether confused as to how to account for what he 
has just done or how he feels about it:
 
All over so quickly. He wanted more, but she’d said no encores without another 
two and a half [dollars]. And he’d rather go back alone some morning than now 
with the others there.
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 He felt lazy, too, and he thought of how when he went back it would be 
better. She was nice, and he remembered her naked on the bed when he’d 
entered the room. But a married woman and mother who’d do such a thing, 
lower than a snake. What was the difference between her and a whore? None. 
And what a chump and a sap of a husband she must have.
Catherine didn’t know about it, and what she didn’t know wouldn’t hurt her. 
If she wanted to be tough, as she had last night, let her, and then she could see 
what she was going to lose. Lighting a cigarette, he thought that this was a just 
revenge on her. (SL, 680)
The street was alive with people, women rushing through their last-minute 
marketing, people coming home from work. Suppose one of these men coming 
along was George Jackson. Nice surprise for Georgie.
And now that the day was finished, he had to get through the night. Christ, 
things sometimes got dull for a guy.
 But maybe [Catherine would] call up after supper, and he’d go over and see 
her. He thought she would. She really cared for him. Maybe when he got home 
there would already be a message for him from her. (SL, 681)
An overgrown lab rat traversing a maze with no goal, center, or exit, Studs Lonigan 
reacts to his own “true story” in ways that closely follow the well-worn habitual 
grooves embedded deep within his body and mind by the world around him. After 
leaving open the prospect of an encore performance with the housewife on some 
future morning, he immediately refers back to Father Shannon’s mission sermon 
in the previous volume of the trilogy. Like Sinclair Lewis, Judge Ben Lindsey, H. L. 
Mencken, and H. G. Wells before her, the housewife is said to be “lower than a 
snake,” which makes evident yet again the impoverishing quality of Studs Lonigan’s 
experiences. After all, the very language he uses to make sense of his encounters 
in the world around him is made up largely of citations he unreflectively produces 
on the spot in response to present or recent stimuli. A button is pressed, and other 
people’s words start to spool out of his mouth or to cycle through his head.
 Unfortunately for Studs, however, these reactions tend to overlap and fre-
quently contradict one another, leading him to carry out a series of conflicting 
responses that leave him endlessly deferring either an assertion of willpower or the 
actualization of an intention. The housewife is desirable and should probably be 
pursued by him again sometime later. Then again, the housewife is a cuckolding 
whore, and her husband a sap. On the one hand, Catherine does not need to know 
about what Studs and the housewife-whore did together. On the other hand, even 
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if Catherine were to find out somehow, it would serve her right because she would 
only be getting what she has coming to her. George Jackson, the housewife’s hus-
band, sure is a sap. Maybe Catherine has left a message with Studs Lonigan’s folks so 
that they can make up and he can put this enervating day behind him by spending 
the night out with her instead. Much like the heroines of early twentieth-century 
confessional magazines analyzed by Gerbner, Studs Lonigan is a confused victim 
struggling in a web he cannot avoid, escape, or really comprehend. Unlike them, 
however, there is no final reconciliation with existing social codes in his future, just 
a premature death.
 No doubt, John B. Watson would have found Studs Lonigan to be an excellent 
case study for why societies, governments, and businesses badly needed behav-
iorists to take the reins in educating men, women, and children if human beings 
were ever going to start realizing their evolutionary potentials as a species. Both 
professionalizing and transforming the study of psychology by grounding it in 
physiologically observable behaviors, habits, and reactions, this “founder” of behav-
iorism popularized the notion in the early twentieth century that humans were 
little more than complexly arranged stimulus-response mechanisms that could 
be streamlined and made to run more effectively once comparative psychologists 
had experimentally determined the protocols by which we all functioned: “In a 
system of psychology completely worked out,” Watson wrote, “given the response 
the stimuli can be predicted; given the stimuli the response can be predicted.”102 
Accordingly, Watson went on to submit that behaviorism
ought to be a science that prepares men and women for understanding the 
principles of their own behavior. It ought to make men and women eager to 
rearrange their own lives, and especially eager to prepare themselves to bring 
up their own children in a healthy way. I wish I could picture for you what a 
rich and wonderful individual we should make of every healthy child if only 
we could let it shape itself properly and then provide for it a universe in which 
it could exercise that organization—a universe unshackled by legendary folk-
lore of happenings thousands of years ago; unhampered by disgraceful political 
history; free of foolish customs and conventions which have no significance in 
themselves, yet which hem in the individual like taut steel bands.103
Without this unshackling of human behaviors from irrational—but no less resil-
ient—customs, and without correlatively transferring governmental control from 
democratic institutions to the oversight of behaviorist scientists themselves, con-
temporary social environments would continue to produce subjects with erratic 
behaviors as well as unreliable response mechanisms. No business or governmental 
agency would ever be able to effectively anticipate or control the actions of such 
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mass populations, because the individuals making up these populations would be 
too much like Studs Lonigan.
 From this point of view, then, English-language book obscenity at this time 
brought out the degree to which words on a page were potentially reducible to 
mechanical stimulation and the reader to an unduly responsive automaton. As a 
result, to insist that readers were not really just creatures of habit and that literature 
was actually separable from obscenity implied that literary writing was without 
sensory content, a claim that behaviorists, illiberal judges, and I. A. Richards alike 
were rather reluctant to grant.104 In the mid-1920s, Richards conducted a famous 
experiment with his Cambridge students (mostly undergraduates) in which he 
asked them to write “protocols” in response to thirteen decontextualized poems. 
The students knew nothing about each work’s author, title, or date of publication 
beforehand; all they had to go on were the words in the poem itself.
 In part, Richards’s purpose in undertaking this study was to carry out “a piece 
of field-work in comparative ideology” that would be of use to those seeking to 
improve pedagogical methods and to elucidate obstacles to proper literary criti-
cism.105 Among the obstructions expansively itemized and analyzed in Practical 
Criticism (1929) were the “stock responses” found throughout the written proto-
cols his students produced. Stock responses, according to Richards, “have their 
opportunity whenever a poem seems to, or does, involve views and emotions 
already fully prepared in the reader’s mind, so that what happens appears to be 
more of the reader’s doing than the poet’s. The button is pressed, and then the 
author’s work is done, for immediately the record starts playing in quasi- (or total) 
independence of the poem which is supposed to be its origin or instrument” (PC, 
15–16). For example, in one of the protocols responding to the most disliked of 
the thirteen assigned poems, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s “In the Churchyard 
at Cambridge,” Richards discovered that a student found “again only stock mate-
rial and stock treatment.” According to this anonymous student, “the poet has 
attempted to describe a quiet contemplative mood. He has not felt it. These are just 
a few commonplaces about Death the Leveller uttered with an ill-feigned naïvete 
which cannot pass for sincerity. The poem is like the oft-delivered sermon of a 
preacher who knows what he ought to say. Hence all its conventional tricks—‘a 
lady of high degree,’ ‘vanity and foolish pomp,’ ‘Christian charity,’ ‘failings, faults 
and errors’—he might have added ‘trespasses’—and above all ‘the village church-
yard,’ the conventional setting for ruminations upon death” (emphasis original). 
Although the student actually went to the trouble of quoting from the poem, he 
cited these passages mostly as proof of what he already assumed was the case with 
the poet and his intentions or state of mind. Like a hypocritical preacher, this 
shabby poet had merely used ready-made conventions to sham sincerity in the 
descriptive expression of “a few commonplaces about Death the Leveller,” leading 
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Richards to voice “doubt [as to] the closeness of [the student’s] reading” insofar 
as this protocol revealed more about the student’s stereotyped expectations than 
it did about the meanings of the assigned poem (PC, 164).
 Despite the negative connotations of calling responses such as these “stock,” 
it ought to be kept in mind that Richards did not view such reactions as simply 
“wrong” or “bad” in and of themselves. For one thing, humans unquestionably 
require a vast store of stock responses if they are to function effectively in the world. 
In particular, according to Richards, “unless an awkward misfit is going to occur, 
we may agree that stock responses are much better than no responses at all. Indeed, 
an extensive repertory of stock responses is a necessity. Few minds could prosper 
if they had to work out an original, ‘made to measure’ response to meet every sit-
uation that arose—their supplies of mental energy would be too soon exhausted 
and the wear and tear on their nervous systems would be too great.” The problem 
for Richards then became that of determining the contexts in which such reactions 
would be most appropriate and in response to what kinds of stimuli these reactions 
would tend to be most apt:
Clearly there is an enormous field of conventional activity over which acquired, 
stereotyped, habitual responses properly rule, and the only question that needs 
to be examined as to these responses is whether they are the best that practi-
cal exigencies—the range of probable situations that may arise, the necessity 
of quick availability and so forth—will allow. But equally clearly there are in 
most lives fields of activity in which stock responses, if they intervene, are 
disadvantageous and even dangerous, because they may get in the way of, and 
prevent, a response more appropriate to the situation. These unnecessary mis-
fits may be remarked at almost every stage of the reading of poetry, but they 
are especially noticeable when emotional responses are in question. (PC, 241; 
emphasis original)
Richard therefore contended that stock responses in the reading of good poetry 
deformed it because such poetry always betrayed itself by forcing readers to dis-
pense with many of their expected emotions or accustomed reading habits: “Nearly 
all good poetry is disconcerting, for a moment at least, when we first see it for what 
it is. Some dear habit has to be abandoned if we are to follow it” (PC, 254).
 Notably, however, Practical Criticism indicated that the obstacles and dangers 
that stock responses presented to literary interpretation were not really marked 
by class, gender, educational, or political differences. In fact, these stereotyped 
reactions seemed to be affecting pretty much all of Richards’s protocol writers, 




If we wish for a population easy to control by suggestion we shall decide what 
repertory of suggestion it shall be susceptible to and encourage this tendency 
except in the few. But if we wish for a high and diffused civilisation, with its 
attendant risks, we shall combat this form of mental inertia. In either case, since 
most of the protocol writers would certainly regard themselves as belonging 
to the few, rather than the many, were such a division to be proposed, we shall 
do well to recognise how much of the value of existence is daily thrust from us 
by our stock responses, necessary though a substratum of stable and routine 
mental habits may be. (PC, 314)
For Richards in Practical Criticism, this propensity to respond to a diverse batch 
of poetic stimuli in a limited number of ways was both an asset to governments, 
businessmen, and educators wishing to behavioristically standardize the repertoire 
of mass behaviors and a threat to those who did not want to be so easily susceptible 
to such suggestive lures. For both the many and the few, however, reading at the 
time was little more than habituation and predictable reaction, free of conscious 
reflection and certainly free of the tendency to seek out new and unusual meanings. 
Remarkably, Richards described this reduction of contemporary reading practices 
to stimulus-response relationships in terms that anticipate Ann Douglas’s assess-
ment of mass culture’s effects on Studs Lonigan: “If we consider how responses in 
general are formed, we shall see that the chief cause of ill-appropriate, stereotyped 
reactions is withdrawal from experience” (PC, 246; emphasis original).
 Nevertheless, the manifest shortcomings of the interpretations offered by 
Watson, Richards, and illiberal judges alike principally involve their certainty 
that particular stimuli reliably elicit equivalent responses. All three tended to be 
unduly deterministic in their outlooks on the capacity of the sensory content of 
words to have directly observable effects in the world. If deproscribing judges 
like Woolsey and Augustus Hand could be taken to task for assuming that lit-
erary texts necessarily called forth literary reading methods, then so could the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for insisting upon the obscene efficacy of 
obscene texts or obscene parts of obscene texts on an imagined obscene reader. 
Similarly, U.S. literary naturalism was itself no less an object of scorn for early 
twentieth-century literary critics who, like so many stock responsive automatons 
themselves, found themselves censuring naturalist fiction for its overly mecha-
nistic representations of the world and the incapacity of its characters to exert 
any meaningful agency.
 However, at least one cogent way out of the apparent determinist impasses of 
naturalist (and, I submit, obscene) writing and reading has recently been put for-
ward by Jennifer Fleissner. In Women, Compulsion, Modernity (2004), she contends 
that all of the critical attention devoted to parsing the determinist philosophies in 
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literary naturalism over the past century has covered up the remarkable degree 
to which U.S. naturalist fiction at this time approached the relationship between 
human beings and the forces that shape them in a much more open-ended way. In 
particular, Fleissner argues that nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century 
conceptualizations of compulsion better account for how nature and society affect 
characters and their intentionalities in naturalist texts. Compulsion, for Fleissner, 
“has the potential to name an understanding of agency in which individual will 
and its subjection to rationalizing ‘forces’ appear as more deeply intertwined. More 
specifically, to the extent that nature appears not as the presocial wilderness in these 
texts but as an important feature within human social life, various everyday rituals 
taking place around the fact of embodiment (sex, birth, death, illness, cleanliness, 
etc.) take on new interest, to these novelists just as to the era’s anthropologists, 
psychologists, historians, and sociologists.”106 Far from gloomily depicting the 
implacable dominion of heteronomous forces over subjects without agency, nat-
uralist texts instead continue to present their readers with a more nuanced—if no 
less totalizing—vision in which nature, society, and individual agency all mutually 
constitute each other through the habitual forms that embodiment happens to 
take. Furthermore, the compulsive features of these habit formations foreground 
nonlinear, repetitive narratives as opposed to the shapely arcs of triumph or decline 
so commonly ascribed to naturalist novels, suggesting that these novels never really 
end so much as defer the possibility of closure as such. In effect, Fleissner has 
attempted to open the black box around the mind that Watson said could not be 
opened and to elaborate the various ways in which cognition somehow manages to 
get embodied in naturalist fiction, despite the failure of its deterministic cover sto-
ries to be totally in control. In this view, U.S. literary naturalism’s representational 
breakdowns—and not its intended, predetermined outcomes—end up telling us a 
great deal about what it actually could (and does) achieve.
 Such failure happens to be a hallmark not only of naturalist fiction but also of 
legal obscenity itself at this time. The difference, of course, is that whereas the study 
of U.S. naturalist fiction has been revitalized by this shift in emphasis away from 
determinism and toward compulsion, the collapse of determinist ways of describing 
obscenity between the 1930s and the 1950s altogether undermined the legitimacy 
of book obscenity in the opinions of many liberalizing judges. For instance, in 
Commonwealth v. Gordon et al., which refused to deem Studs Lonigan, God’s Little 
Acre, Sanctuary, Wild Palms, and three other novels obscene, Judge Curtis Bok 
insisted that legally obscene books could only be proscribed if they posed a clear 
and present danger to the community. While readily conceding that public lewd-
ness and seditious speech presented just such a danger, he went on to express his 
misgivings about lumping books in with these more obvious threats. According to 
Bok’s opinion, mere words on a page no longer seemed to have as much affective 
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force as did a treasonous public address or the genitalia of a man exposing himself 
to passing women and children on a city street. The problem with allegedly obscene 
books was that they did not reliably elicit an observable reaction—good or bad—
from their readers.
 In short, obscene books were simply not obscene enough to meet Bok’s pseudo-
behaviorist criteria, insofar as they so often failed to “get off the page” and into the 
“real” world in any sort of clear-cut way. The lack of an immediate deterministic 
relationship between an erotic stimulus in an obscene book and a lewd response 
in its obscene reader thereby called into question whether obscenity itself ought to 
exist any longer as a criminal offense. According to Bok, hereafter a book could only 
be credibly charged with obscenity “where there is a reasonable and demonstrable 
cause to believe that a crime or misdemeanor has been committed or is about to be 
committed as the perceptible result of the publication and distribution of the writ-
ing in question: the opinion of anyone that a tendency thereto exists or that such a 
result is self-evident is insufficient and irrelevant. The causal connection between 
the book and the criminal behavior must appear beyond a reasonable doubt.”107 
As Bok made clear earlier in his opinion, however, such a causal connection with 
respect to book obscenity “does not bear analysis.”108
 Bok’s doubts regarding literary obscenity later informed the reasoning of many 
lower court judges who were themselves ever more skeptical about the legitimacy 
of proscribing books. For instance, in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Melko (1953), New 
Jersey Superior Court Judge Sidney Goldmann held that the prosecution of Vivian 
Connell’s The Chinese Room (1942) “violated the constitutional guarantee of free-
dom of the press,” but not before he discussed at great length the troubles he was 
experiencing with legally defining obscenity in the first place:109
The problem is to discover, if possible, what “obscene” means. It has been 
suggested that the word comes from ob and scena—done off the scene or off-
stage, and hence furtively. Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1943) 
gives the derivation as obs (ob) and caenum, filth, and then goes on to define 
“obscene” as: 
 “Offensive to chastity of mind or to modesty; expressing or presenting 
to the mind or view something that delicacy, purity and decency forbid to be 
exposed; lewd; indecent[”]; 2 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Rawle’s Third Revision, 
page 2396 (8th ed. 1914) gives the definition:
 “Something which is offensive to chastity; something that is foul and filthy, 
and for that reason is offensive to a pure-minded person. That which is offen-
sive to chastity and modesty.” These and similar reference works provide no 
objective standard or formula for determining when obscenity exists. The defi-
nitions all lead to the dead-end of a subjective determination. To paraphrase 
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Samuel Johnson, the yea or nay saying of the censor becomes the standard of 
the permissible.110
Not objectively determined processes, but subjective determinations arbitrarily 
arrived at were all that legal concepts of obscenity had produced over the past 
fifty years in the opinion of this New Jersey Superior Court judge, who went on 
to express doubts as to the exigency of proscribing obscene books at all anymore.
 Twenty-five years earlier, Morris L. Ernst (the lawyer who defended Random 
House in the Ulysses cases of the early 1930s) and William Seagle famously began To 
the Pure . . . : A Study of Obscenity and the Censor (1928) with an equivalent claim, 
from which they ended up drawing very different conclusions:
But few words are as fluid and vague in content as the six deadly adjectives—
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent and disgusting—which are the basis of 
[obscenity] censorship. No two persons agree on these definitions. We shall 
see that judges differ to such an extent that courts divide by narrow margins, 
thus justifying the ironic complaint of infallible government by the odd man. 
Juries disagree with judges and the cynicisms and enthusiasms of lawyers bear 
a relation to the size of the retaining fees. Authors have to adapt their ideas to 
an unknown measure and jails invite those who cannot guess the contemporary 
meaning of obscenity.111
“The final refutation of criminal obscenity laws,” Ernst and Seagle went on to claim 
in the book’s concluding pages,
lies in their futility. Even if a legal sage arose to define with precision the words 
“lewd,” “lascivious,” “filthy,” “indecent,” “disgusting,” and “obscene,” the ulti-
mate logic of life would remain. Life itself has deep tendencies both toward 
elevation and corruption. None can escape such forces from the cradle to the 
grave. Even if sexual excitement were proved to be a fatally vicious influence 
we could scarcely hope to eradicate it by law or to establish ideals of asceti-
cism by the suppression of every art. Although the censors are often accused 
of underestimating æsthetic values and the potency of the arts, their actions 
belie their words. Each assault on the printed word is a confession of a greater 
potency in art than in life.112
For Seagle and Ernst, all the proscriptive legal attention that writing had been 
receiving in the United States in the 1920s sufficed to indicate the power of artfully 
arranged words on a page to act on and through a world that was no longer as life-
like as art itself. The tautological acrobatics of obscenity-defining judges were thus a 
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distraction from the more consequential social dimensions indicated by the recent 
explosion in obscenity cases involving writing, which entailed that books—and the 
arts more generally—were so vital a force that they ought to be moved beyond the 
law’s purview. In other words, the fact that there was so much criminal litigation 
being brought against obscene books only confirmed Ernst and Seagle in their 
certainty that art and aesthetics could no longer be underestimated by censors, 
judges, and legislators alike. Obscenity was, in their words, an “index” of writing’s 
capacity to still shake up a politically free, intellectually open, and progressively 
secular society.113
 As we have been able to see in the opinions of Bok and Goldmann, however, 
this hyperbolic investment in the vitalistic “potency” of books hardly carried over 
into subsequent U.S. case law. The difficulties encountered more and more by judges 
in merely defining obscenity gave rise not to mute awe in the face of writing’s 
affective powers but rather to grave doubts about writing’s capacity to do anything 
much of notice in the world anymore. To rephrase Ernst and Seagle, then, the final 
refutation of criminal book obscenity ended up having to do more with the futility 
of believing that obscene books could actually still instigate obscene actions than it 
did with the difficulty of legislators and judges in accounting for the experience of 
obscenity itself. After all, the U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of obscenity in Miller 
persists to this day, while the prosecution of obscene books effectively does not. 
The eventual granting of institutionally recognized autonomy to creative writing 
in obscenity case law hence came about through the conspicuous underestimation 
of the effective force of the printed word, which was increasingly neutralized by 
the opinions of deproscribing judges and the arguments of liberalizing jurists in 
the decades following Woolsey’s ruling in the Ulysses case. No buttons are pressed 
when twenty-first-century Studs Lonigans read today, because it is not all that clear 
that twenty-first-century Studs Lonigans read books to get themselves off anymore, 
nor is it likely that any novel, even a thoroughly depraving one, would catch their 
eye in the first place.
2. How to Misbehave as a Behaviorist  
 (if You’re Wyndham Lewis)
Accepted as a sort of disciple of Watson, I attracted to myself a modicum 
of limelight. I had a measure of success. “How Science can be almost more 
entertaining than Fiction”—you know the sort of idea. “People Behaving” 
the first of these two books was called. This gave the critic of the silly 
season (it is always the silly season in the “Book Pages”) his opportunity, as 
indeed I had calculated it would. “People Misbehaving” the cheerful ruffian 
called it, with great satisfaction. This did a lot of good.
—Wyndham leWis, snooty bAronet, 1932
With all this war stuff abaht it might do no harm to indicate that you did 
in 1916 or 17 (Cantleman) what the lot of em are now cashing in on. Can’t 
remember whether Cantleman was suppressed or not?????? However things 
have moved since.
—ezra Pound, letter to Wyndham leWis, 1930
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As a matter of fact, Cantleman was suppressed, though Pound can be forgiven this 
lapse in memory because an awful lot was happening during the final year and a 
half of World War I. Leaving Harriet Monroe’s Poetry (1912–present) in a huff, he 
had recently taken up foreign editorship duties for The Little Review (1914–1929). 
Wyndham Lewis—whose work, along with that of T. S. Eliot and James Joyce, was 
to be Pound’s most substantial contribution as editor for this quintessential mod-
ernist little magazine—had finally been deployed to the front around the beginning 
of June 1917 as an officer in the 224 Siege Battery of the Royal Garrison Artillery. 
And, around the time that the Bolsheviks were storming the Winter Palace in Saint 
Petersburg, The Little Review was being denied use of the mails by the U.S. Post 
Office and the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
 Anticipating the almost mythically outsized ordeals undergone by the journal 
in its serialization of James Joyce’s Ulysses, the November 1917 obscenity trial con-
cerning the publication of Wyndham Lewis’s wartime short story, “Cantleman’s 
Spring-Mate,” seemed at first glance to confirm that The Little Review was finally 
pursuing in earnest its no-quarter-given covenant between its readers and itself: 
“No Compromise with the Public Taste.” Foreshadowing what would later happen to 
Joyce’s text three times leading up to the “Nausikaa” trial, the District Court denied 
Margaret Anderson’s motion to restrain the postmaster of New York. According to 
Judge Augustus Hand, Lewis’s story addressed itself to readers’ bodies in ways that 
could not be contained through contemplation: “The young girl and the relations 
of the man with her are described with a degree of detail that does not appear 
necessary to teach the desired lesson, whatever it may be, or to tell a story which 
would possess artistic merit or arouse any worthy emotion.”1 What brought Hand 
up short were the excessive qualities of Lewis’s text. In its overmastering attention 
to salacious details and the striking development of those details into protracted 
descriptive passages, the story seemed committed to undermining the very sorts 
of moral and aesthetic designs to which it might otherwise lay claim. Hand thereby 
affirmed the postmaster’s administrative judgment that “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” 
was in fact “obscene, lewd, or lascivious” under the terms marked out by Section 211 
of the U.S. Criminal Code and therefore could not be mailed to The Little Review’s 
subscribers.2
 “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” remains one of the minor side attractions of mod-
ernist obscenity, seldom discussed in terms other than those that would present 
it as a negligible dress rehearsal for the later, more consequential trials of Ulysses.3 
By contrast, this chapter contends that there is more to Lewis and obscenity than 
Leopold Bloom, Gerty MacDowell, and the Litany of Loreto. Comparing represen-
tations of animality in Lewis’s story to the early popular comparative psychology 
essays of John B. Watson (the “father” of behaviorism), it demonstrates that 
“Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” not only expresses behaviorist assumptions regarding 
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obscenity considered as a reading practice but also anticipates Lewis’s subsequent 
critical and satirical engagements with behaviorism in the 1920s and 1930s. At least 
since 1954, when Hugh Kenner noted the “latent contradiction” between the attacks 
on behaviorism in Lewis’s criticism and the behaviorist premises nevertheless at 
work in much of Lewis’s fiction, the study of this obstinate modernist’s relation-
ship to behaviorism has proven quite generative.4 Even when they write against 
him, however, most critics since Kenner have tended to follow his lead and take as 
their focus Lewis’s behaviorist novel, Snooty Baronet (1932).5 Here I argue that the 
continuity of behaviorist preoccupations in Lewis’s fiction extends much farther 
back than has often been assumed and that such preoccupations get expressed in 
his writing through the complementary experiences of animality and obscenity.
 Equally important, however, “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” provided the first 
occasion for a United States judge to assess a modernist piece of writing in terms 
of legal obscenity, and as such it offers us a useful opportunity for reflecting on the 
horizon of legibility of modernism for its contemporaries. As this chapter demon-
strates, it was clear to Judge Hand that something new and untoward was happening 
in Lewis’s short story, but in 1917 there did not appear to be enough principled 
aesthetic or literary grounds on which to exempt “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” from 
proscription for obscenity, at least no grounds of the sort that protected the “clas-
sics” of literature at that time. Such grounds would not be forthcoming until the 
innovations of modernism became more intelligible to writers, readers, lawyers, 
and judges alike by the early 1930s, which makes Hand’s interpretation of Lewis’s 
story all the more valuable as a description of modernist writing at a historical 
moment in which modernism as such was far from appearing credibly artistic or 
literary to judges.
I
Lewis drafted “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” during the long period of waiting for his 
belated deployment to the front around the beginning of June 1917 as an officer 
in the Royal Artillery. Fittingly enough, the story focuses on waiting to go to war 
rather than on war itself. In fact, violent scenes of battle only intrude in the final 
two sentences, when the contemptuous Cantleman compares the “impartial malig-
nity” with which he beats a Hun’s brains out to the predatory sexual use he makes 
of his spring-mate, Stella, earlier in the narrative.6 In fact, Stella—and not the bru-
tally beaten German—comprises Cantleman’s principal antagonist and scapegoat 
throughout the story, and in many respects Lewis’s short story functions to provide 
a naturalistic alibi for Cantleman’s impartially malign treatment of her.
 The story opens with Cantleman overwhelmed by the literally steaming sexual 
energy given off by the animal life in the fields through which he is walking on his 
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way back to camp. Horses are appetizingly appraising the “masses of quivering 
shiny flesh” of the mares surrounding them (“CS-M,” 8). Female birds, though criti-
cal of the peeps and chocks making up the love songs of their partners, nevertheless 
admit that each of their male counterparts does indeed represent “a fluffy object 
from which certain satisfaction could be derived” (8). Even swine are getting in on 
the act:
The sow, as she watched her hog, with his splenetic energy, and guttural artic-
ulation, a sound between content and complaint, not noticing the untidy 
habits of both of them, gave a sharp grunt of sex-hunger, and jerked rapidly 
towards him. The only jarring note in this vast mutual admiration society was 
the fact that many of its members showed their fondness for their neighbor in 
an embarrassing way: that is they killed and ate them. But the weaker were so 
used to dying violent deaths and being eaten that they worried very little about 
it.=The West was gushing up a harmless volcano of fire, obviously intended as 
an immense dreamy nightcap. (“CS-M,” 8)
Perhaps even more so than the embarrassing expression of “this vast mutual admi-
ration society” in terms of homicidal and carnivorous violence, the last sentence 
sounds the passage’s jarring note, for it disrupts the salacious wildlife observations 
of the opening paragraph to resituate its enduring seasonal themes within a more 
urgent human framework. In noting Cantleman’s receptiveness to the fecundating 
activities of the animals around him, the end of the first paragraph reveals his 
ambivalence toward the war in which he is about to fight, insofar as death, or rather 
“the prospect of death” in battle, does indeed provide the “philosophic background” 
for his opening “cogitation on surrounding life” (“CS-M,” 8–9). Although he very 
well may die in action at the front, Cantleman insists that he is not naïve enough 
to believe that his death will thereby achieve anything like lasting significance. Far 
from representing an event of any historical consequence whatsoever, World War 
I is for Cantleman simply “a harmless volcano of fire” or “an immense dreamy 
nightcap” when compared to the timeless fucking, fighting, and feasting under way 
in the pressure-cooked fields he attentively traverses.
 In short, the free indirect discourse of the opening of “Cantleman’s Spring-
Mate” appears to subjugate the putative nonevent of World War I and its prospects 
of violent death to a vaguely registered but nevertheless overmastering law of nature. 
Another way of putting this would be to say that the hyperbolically aroused natural 
life seen in “the strenuous fields” surrounding Cantleman only superficially appears 
to be so many anthropomorphized projections of that soldier’s own spring-ignited 
lust (“CS-M,” 8). The matter of who projects what onto whom, however, becomes 
a good deal more vexed as the opening paragraph unfolds. Fredric Jameson has 
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usefully categorized the growing confusion of what constitutes cause or agency in 
this story as a peculiar instance of hypallage, according to which owner and prop-
erty relations get scrambled by the syntactical reorientation of the adjective.7 For 
Jameson, hypallage is not so much a rhetorical device in “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” 
as it is a stylistic modus operandi that can be found throughout Lewis’s fiction: 
“Lewis’ hypallage, where the attributes of actor or act are transferred onto the dead 
scenery, generates a kind of contamination of the axis of contiguity, offering a 
glimpse of a world in which the old-fashioned substances, like marbles in a box, 
have been rattled so furiously together that their ‘properties’ come loose and stick 
to the wrong places—a very delirium of metonymy of which, as we shall see, Lewis’ 
subsequent writings provide some stunning examples.”8 If, as Jameson argues, the 
adjective “strenuous” seems at first glance to mismodify the noun “fields” (for surely 
it is the walking of Cantleman that is strenuous here), then as the paragraph develops 
it becomes clearer and clearer that “strenuous” is the right word after all to describe 
the quasi-mechanistic couplings and steamy physical exertions that in fact constitute 
the fields. In other words, Lewis rattles his box of marbles not to achieve new figures 
thereby but rather to reorder both reality itself and one’s relationship to it.9 Therefore, 
a preexisting affective ferment within Cantleman does not motivate his engrossed 
interest in the animal orgy occurring around him; his figmentary “instincts” cannot 
be said to have been projected onto the field. Rather, the horses, the mares, the birds, 
the hogs, and the sows all rub their animal instinctual responses off on Cantleman, 
meaning his heightened libidinal state is no innately prescripted reaction to the 
green fuse of spring. The story’s founding move, then, is to counter Romanticism’s 
pathetic fallacy with a rigorously pursued antipathetic fallacy.10
 As it turns out, the paradoxical and estranging goal of Cantleman’s “cogitation 
on surrounding life” is to become something less than kin or kind to the human 
as such: “On the other hand, Cantleman had a little more human, as well as a 
little more divine, than those usually on his left and right, and he had had, not so 
long ago, conspicuous hopes that such a conjuncture might produce a new human 
chemistry. But he must repudiate the human entirely, if that were to be brought off. 
His present occupation, the trampling boots upon his feet, the belt that crossed his 
back and breast, was his sacrifice, his compliment to, [sic] the animal” (“CS-M,” 
10). World War I names the occasion not for a Zarathustrian flight into the wil-
derness but rather for a sacrifice of humanity’s “meagre stream of sublimity” to the 
animal by hazarding one’s very life (9). Nevertheless, if Cantleman has apparently 
developed beyond a passing youthful fancy for pseudo-Nietzschean theatrics, his 
disillusioned maturation still seems to have produced little more than an inverted 
fantasy image of Nietzsche’s most enduring popular myth, for his hopes here for “a 
new human chemistry” are frankly more underdog than Übermensch. It must also 
be kept in mind, however, that Cantleman’s is not a complete sacrifice, for what is 
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said to differentiate his animalistic acceptance of a world order governed by some 
sort of law of nature from the assent given by swine, birds, and horses is the fact that 
his is consciously granted and pursued, even though consciousness is said to be the 
very thing that makes being human so disgusting to Cantleman: “The newspapers 
were the things that stank most on earth, and human beings anywhere were the 
most ugly and offensive of the brutes because of the confusion caused by their con-
sciousness” (“CS-M,” 9). The problem of his own consciousness notwithstanding, 
Cantleman’s gambit remains that of stampeding recklessly and hilariously through 
the war as if he were nothing more than an animal used to dying a violent death, 
as if his consciousness did not stink like that of any other human being.
 Far from being “an immense dreamy nightcap,” World War I offers instead an 
absolute set of proving grounds for Cantleman’s drastic reorganization of life, for 
which Stella provides something of a war game. In this case, the carnal pleasures of 
coupling pursued as an end in itself are Cantleman’s implicit sacrifice to the animal. 
Moreover, he plays the part of the soldier-suitor for Stella because that is the sort 
of role to which she seems most susceptible. In fact, she presumably takes on the 
corresponding part of a game rustic mate with some alacrity: “The young woman 
had, or had given herself, the unlikely name of Stella” (“CS-M,” 12; emphasis added). 
Though the role-playing dimensions of their spring encounters are perhaps not lost 
on either of them, Stella and Cantleman still materially differ in the expectations 
they bring to their respective parts. While her response to Cantleman’s cynical gift 
of a ring is somewhat equivocal—“Her melting gratitude was immediately ligotted 
with long arms, full of the contradictory and offending fire of the spring” (“CS-M,” 
13)—Stella at the very least does seem to expect Cantleman to share responsibil-
ity for their child when she later begins inundating him with letters at the front 
regarding her pregnancy: “They came to Cantleman with great regularity in the 
trenches; he read them all through from beginning to end, without comment of 
any sort” (“CS-M,” 14). Cantleman’s response is effectively a nonresponse because 
all that Stella is to him is someone who once represented the most proximate means 
of partaking in the transferable libidinal intensities suggested to him earlier by the 
spring pursuits of the swine, birds, and horses:
In the narrow road where they got away from the village, Cantleman put his 
arm around Stella’s waist and immediately experienced all the sensations that 
he had been divining in the creatures around him; the horse, the bird and the 
pig. The way in which Stella’s hips stood out, the solid blood-heated expanse 
on which his hand lay, had the amplitude and flatness of a mare. Her lips had 
at once no practical significance, but only the aesthetic blandishment of a bull-
like flower. With the gesture of a fabulous Faust he drew her against him, and 
kissed her with a crafty gentleness. (“CS-M,” 12)
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Presenting himself to his spring-mate as if he were merely a diabolic lover cut to a 
ready-made pattern, Cantleman presses Stella’s body to his own and feels beneath 
her dress not the ruse of human flesh but rather “the amplitude and flatness of 
a mare” as the porously contiguous world produced by the narrative achieves a 
delirious climax here: the rustic fields are indeed strenuous, Stella is in fact little 
more than a palpably blood-warmed collage of horse-bird-swine, and Cantleman’s 
spring pursuits turn out at last to encompass so many thinly veiled acts of bestiality.
II
As drastic as this vision of the Übermensch in rout, beating a conscious retreat into 
the nearby sow in heat, may at first appear to be, it was no mere idiosyncrasy of 
Lewis’s soldier. Compare, for instance, Cantleman’s cogitations in an English field 
in the spring of 1917 with the following remarks made by a Johns Hopkins exper-
imental and comparative psychologist in a winter 1910 issue of Harper’s Monthly:
The point that I would make in all this is that there is no royal road to habit and 
knowledge. Man gets his first steps in exactly the same way as does the animal. 
Studies in animal behavior, while not fulfilling the hopes of the early students of 
evolution in showing that animals have exalted types of intellect, nevertheless 
are forcing us to reconsider our extravagant notions of the all-sufficiency of the 
human mind. Continuity between the mind of man and brute, the idea of the 
early students, will still be shown to exist, not by exalting the mind of the brute, 
but rather by the reverse process of showing the defects in the human mind.11
Though he was three years away from drafting what would become the behaviorist 
manifesto (“Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It”), John B. Watson can already be 
found here attempting to cut the Gordian knot formed by dualist conceptions of a 
mind independent of a body along with the mentalist assumptions of interiority as 
such. In particular, Watson undercuts those of his peers who were cussedly holding 
on to a more anthropocentric worldview by demonstrating that the experimental 
study and observation of behavior, whether human or animal, was the only way 
to make psychology a natural science. A debasing material contiguity between the 
human and the animal was to be the new order of the day:
How do we make a laboratory study of the mind of an animal? It is not possible 
to get into its mind and see for ourselves the drama of mental events which is 
taking place there, consequently how is it ever possible to get any clear insight 
into the workings of its mind? At first sight we seem to have here an insuperable 
obstacle to the study. A little reflection, however, will show that we are forever 
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debarred from studying the mind of our human neighbor in this direct way; yet 
surely no one in this day would be hardy enough to deny that we can and do 
get a very definite and scientific notion of the way our neighbor’s mind works.12
This further exemplifies the bottom-up nature of Watson’s radical reformulation 
of psychology in the early decades of the last century, insofar as the impossibility 
of studying states of animal consciousness entails not the discarding of animal 
psychology as a science but rather the overturning of human psychology as it had 
been hitherto investigated. In other words, states of consciousness were no longer 
the privileged objects of psychological study, because the laboratory study of ani-
mals had at last revealed consciousness itself to be the real obstacle in the way of 
contemporary psychological studies of human subjects. According to Watson, psy-
chology thus had to sacrifice consciousness to see at last what ultimately binds us to 
animals: observable behavior. Much like Cantleman, Watson’s article contemplates 
a momentous transvaluation of values by making the animal the measure of man 
rather than the obverse.13
 Lewis’s culture critiques in the 1920s and 1930s consistently anathematized 
behaviorism as an especially insidious factor in the mechanization of daily modern 
life. Yet the relationship of his fiction to contemporary versions of behaviorism is 
a good deal more complex than these later critical writings would seem to suggest 
on their face. While it would no doubt be spurious to take behaviorism, in a sort of 
historicist coup de main, as the “origin” of Cantleman or the “key” to his actions, 
I nevertheless do submit that early, exploratory formulations of behaviorism pro-
vide important contexts for assessing the obscene potentials of Lewis’s narrative, 
particularly how he inhabits a quasi-behaviorist point of view from within by way 
of free indirect discourse.
 This appears illogical at first sight, for interiority was precisely the sort of thing 
behaviorism was understood to be in the process of extirpating altogether, in psy-
chology as in life. It was in this connection, after all, that Watson tirelessly sought 
to undermine the reliability and utility of the types of introspective reports influ-
entially described and modeled by William James in The Principles of Psychology 
(1890).14 On the one hand, Watson argued, there is no way of eliciting introspective 
responses from pigeons or rats experimentally. On the other hand, at a method-
ological level, introspection necessarily fails to achieve intersubjective agreement 
among scientists because of its necessary lack of objectivity. On this count, Watson 
reminded his peers that they need only refer to the state of psychological research 
on emotions at that time to see that no meaningful consensus was then possible, 
because the terms in which psychologists had introspectively formulated the field 
were arbitrary and incommensurate: whereas James divided emotions into the 
coarse (e.g., grief, fear, love, rage) and the subtle (e.g., the moral, the intellectual, 
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and the aesthetic), William McDougall had taken to pairing every primary emotion 
with an instinct (e.g., fear was to be coupled with the instinct for flight, anger with 
that for pugnacity, subjection with that for self-abasement), and neither approach 
could be used to disprove or modify the other, because no common objective 
method guided either psychologist in putting together his respective schema.15 Were 
this mentalist line of inquiry to be pursued for much longer, there would eventuate 
as many theoretical accounts of emotion as there were psychology departments. 
According to Watson, experimental observations of behavior would be able to fare 
better because such observations are refutable and accordingly subject to the sorts 
of comparisons and verifications that make possible the objective grounding of 
psychology as a natural science.16 In thus placing the human and the animal on the 
shared plane of observable behavior, Watson strategically reduced the psychologist’s 
world to one consisting entirely of observable physiological processes. That is to 
say, it was to be a world of surfaces behaving.
 Considered simply as a methodology, then, behaviorism seems the ideal shell 
for Lewis’s brand of literary modernism. For one thing, his culture critiques tend 
to appear almost surgical in their treatment of impressionistic renderings of inte-
riorities and popular experiences, both of which Lewis operates on as if they were 
cancerous cysts. Perhaps the most productive structuring enmity in The Art of 
Being Ruled (1926), after all, is that of inside and outside, with Lewis relegating to 
the inside almost everything that he regards as an unnecessary impediment to the 
imminent restructuration of the world on socialist grounds, which he welcomes 
with more equanimity here than he was ever able to muster again for such projects. 
For instance, the putative impersonality of science, Bergsonian vitalism, psycho-
analysis, Gertrude Stein, Henri Matisse, and “the Small Man” (or entrepreneur) 
of capitalist competition are all shown by Lewis to prey upon and live irrationally 
within “the smoking-hot inside of things, in contrast to the hard, cold, formal skull 
or carapace.”17 Each of these diverse phenomena and figures comprises a forfeiting 
of “objective qualities” for “more mixed and obscure issues.”18 For Lewis, this forfei-
ture betokens not only the confusions that follow upon the privileging of emotions 
but also the annihilation of intellectual activity altogether: “All the meaning of life 
is of a superficial sort, of course: there is no meaning except on the surface. It is 
physiologically the latest, the ectodermic, and most exterior material of our body 
that is responsible for our intellectual life: it is on a faculty for exteriorization that 
our life depends.”19 Intellect, in this view, represents the pyrrhic maintenance of 
minimal distinctions in our lives, for to linger upon the ectodermic is to maintain 
one’s capacity to separate inside from outside along with subject from object. The 
chitinous skin-shell, in turn, functions as a shield against the outer object-world (a 
world increasingly difficult to differentiate from its passive consuming subjects) and 
against the affective threats posed by the intestines, by the interior and its leveling 
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peristaltic mechanisms: “Love, as we discursively understand it, can only exist on 
the surface. An inch beneath, and it is no longer love, but the abstract rage of hunger 
and reproduction of which the swallowing of an oyster, or the swallowing of the 
male by the female epira, is an illustration. And it is the existence of the artist that 
maintains this superficiality, differentiation of existence, for us: our personal, our 
detached life, in short, in distinction to our crowd-life.”20 The artist in this scheme 
acts to foreclose mechanisms and techniques of social identification (e.g., ritualized 
or mimetic forms of association, role-playing), which Lewis graphically conveys 
throughout The Art of Being Ruled by images of autopsied bodies (because on the 
inside we are all one big gut-cramped mass of viscera and torpidly secreting glands 
indistinguishable from each other). Against this broad cultural and sociopolitical 
drift in postwar life in the West toward the corruption of subject-object relations, 
Lewis’s antagonizing artist offers us the possibility of a world of calcified and non-
interpenetrating forms. The artist’s civic function, therefore, is to hold out the mere 
prospect of difference, or, more provocatively still, the possibility that to love and to 
eat are not commutative activities, despite what Cantleman’s cogitations reveal to 
him in the spring of 1917 (“many of [the animals in the field] showed their fondness 
for their neighbor in an embarrassing way: that is they killed and ate them”).21
 Moreover, the baleful gaze of the detached, quasi-behaviorist observer end-
lessly preoccupied with the surface life of things constitutes perhaps the formative 
compositional perspective adopted in Lewis’s satirical fiction. In fact, in the course 
of defending his idiosyncratic concept of nonethical satire in Men without Art 
(1934), Lewis explicitly counterposes introspective techniques to more shapely, 
exteroceptive forms: “To let the readers ‘into the minds of the characters,’ to ‘see 
the play of their thoughts’—that is precisely the method least suited to satire. That 
it must deal with the outside, that is one of the capital advantages of this form of 
literary art—for those who like a resistant and finely-sculptured surface, or sheer 
words.”22 What disqualifies stream of consciousness or interior monologue from 
possessing more deliberately secondhand, ironic use in Lewis’s satire is the fact that 
such devices tend to take subjectivity for granted, whereas Men without Art would 
insist not only that subjectivity as such has undergone a dangerous slackening in 
the early decades of the twentieth century but also that this reduced or dissolved 
subjectivity may now be said to constitute satire’s chief subject matter:23 “For what 
else is a character in satire but that? Is it not just because they are such machines, 
governed by routine—or creatures that stagnate, as it were ‘in a leaden cistern’—that 
the satirist, in the first instance, has considered them suitable for satire?”24
 If the generalized condition of man as a mimetically governed machine pro-
vides satire with its stock situation, then according to Lewis one of satire’s main 
functions is to break up the devious standardizing forces in contemporary life by 
exaggerating them to the point of riant agitation:
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But “men” are undoubtedly, to a greater or less extent, machines. And there 
are those among us who are revolted by this reflection, and there are those 
who are not. Men are sometimes so palpably machines, their machination 
is so transparent, that they are comic, as we say. And all we mean by that, is 
that our consciousness is pitched up to the very moderate altitude of relative 
independence at which we live—at which level we have the illusion of being 
autonomous and “free.” But if one of us exposes too much his “works,” and 
we start seeing him as a thing, then—in subconsciously referring back to our-
selves—we are astonished and shocked, and we bark at him—we laugh—in 
order to relieve our emotion.25
The agency, autonomy, and freedom we so casually ascribe to ourselves and our 
respective consciousnesses in daily life are wholly illusory. The truth of this obser-
vation, Lewis argues, frequently enough gets confirmed by our fellow humans, who 
cannot help but fail to keep up the elevating pretenses of their own unique beings 
because they recurrently and inadvertently expose how thoroughly routinized their 
every move is. They cannot help but reveal their ludicrous susceptibility to various 
mimetic modes of social identification, their “works” as it were. By focusing almost 
exclusively on the superficiality of people and their machinic actions, by treating 
them as so many things, the satirist can thereby offer to his readers the only real 
measure of agency, autonomy, and freedom left to any of us, for it is our alleviating 
barks of laughter that both confirm our thingness and our vestigial sense of self: 
“And yet [our deepest laughter] is non-personal and non-moral. And it enters fields 
which are commonly regarded as the preserve of more ‘serious’ forms of reaction. 
There is no reason at all why we should not burst out laughing at a foetus, for 
instance. We should after all only be laughing at ourselves!—at ourselves early in 
our mortal career.”26
 Lewis’s satire thus presents us with a kind of performative contradiction famil-
iar to readers of literary naturalism, in which depictions of closed worlds often 
have a tendency to call forth antithetical responses. As I discussed in the previous 
chapter, the determinist networks unveiled in literary naturalist texts only appear 
to bar the possibility of human agency and social reform so long as one treats these 
texts as autonomous artifacts. Yet in principled theoretical expressions of literary 
naturalism, the seemingly ruthless representation of coercive social powers is often 
the vehicle by which these same works communicate their vested interest in inter-
vening, through scientific and political means, into the administration of societies, 
bodies, and time. In addition, the apparent closures effected in works as seemingly 
diverse as Zola’s Les Rougon-Macquart (1871–93), Giovanni Verga’s I Malavoglia 
(1881), and Norris’s Vandover and the Brute prove to be provisional, insofar as the 
reader’s affective response must always be reckoned into the evaluations summoned 
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forth by a naturalist work. Thus, the violent morcellation of satiric laughter is said 
by Lewis to act as a paradoxical preservative (or as an “anti-toxin of the first order”) 
ensuring that a person yelping in hilarity is not yet completely machine-like, that 
he is not entirely subject to the osmotic forces of social identification that rule all.27 
As Tyrus Miller has succinctly put it, for Lewis satirical laughter represents a timely 
and potent rephrasing of the Cartesian thesis: “I laugh, therefore I (still) am.”28
 Satire in Lewis’s work is accordingly the form that behaving surfaces take when 
amplified to an unqualified degree, indicating that the worlds such satire presumes 
are those of an infernal behaviorist utopia. Watson himself began offering a sche-
matic Pisgah sight of such a utopia (minus the diabolism, of course) as early as 
1913: “In a system of psychology completely worked out, given the response the 
stimuli can be predicted; given the stimuli the response can be predicted. Such a 
set of statements is crass and raw in the extreme, as all such generalizations must 
be. Yet they are hardly more raw and less realizable than the ones which appear in 
the psychology texts of the day.”29 For Watson, the twin goals of behaviorism were 
nothing less than the prediction and control of behavior.30 Above all else, therefore, 
his formulations of behaviorism sought to reconstitute determinism solely as a 
problem of pedagogy and social management. Heredity and our genetic stock may 
contribute greatly to our variable ability to learn, function, or respond, but in his 
writings Watson was adamant in subordinating such matters to the more significant 
features of our environment, howsoever “natural” or constructed that environment 
may have happened to be: “Much of our structure laid down in heredity would 
never come to light, would never show in function, unless the organism were put in 
a certain environment, subjected to certain stimuli and forced to undergo training. 
Our hereditary structure lies ready to be shaped in a thousand different ways—the 
same structure—depending on the way in which the child is brought up.”31
 In this regard, Watson’s emphasis on the importance of animal psychology for 
human educational development in the 1910 essay in Harper’s becomes perhaps 
even more significant: “Educational systems dealing with that most precious article, 
the human child, are necessarily conservative, and are slow to introduce changes 
and to have resort to experiment. Fortunately, there is no such sentiment in regard 
to the courses of study prescribed for animals. We may vary the course of training 
ad libitum.”32 According to the behaviorist study of habit formation and learning 
under Watson, a rat potentially has more to tell us about the upbringing and edu-
cational organization of a human child than the child itself does.
 Watson’s behaviorist ideal (“given the response the stimuli can be predicted; 
given the stimuli the response can be predicted”) thus affirms the technocratic aims 
underlying his reconstitution of psychology on behaviorist grounds, for to see and 
describe complex organic matter simply as a function of stimuli and responses is 
to become restless ultimately with mere describing and seeing. Behaviorism’s real 
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value could only be realized by treating it as an applied science because the behav-
iorist “wants to control man’s reactions as physical scientists want to control and 
manipulate other natural phenomena.”33 One way of effecting this control in early 
behaviorist terms was both to study extensively and thereafter to shape the (male) 
role-playing of which everyday life seems to consist: “In general, we are what the 
situation calls for—a respectable person before our preacher and our parents, a hero 
in front of the ladies, a teetotaler in one group, a bibulous good fellow in another.”34 
According to Watson, behaviorism presents us with the latest way of making men 
be what the situation called for, and it was to be behaviorists who could best guide 
their making and decide upon the situations calling forth the desired behaviors 
from the subjects thereby fabricated. As he asserts at the end of Behaviorism (1924; 
revised 1930): “For the universe will change if you bring up your children, not in 
the freedom of the libertine, but in behavioristic freedom—a freedom which we 
cannot even picture in words, so little do we know of it. Will not these children in 
turn, with their better ways of living and thinking, replace us as society and in turn 
bring up their children in a still more scientific way, until the world finally becomes 
a place fit for human habitation?”35
 Watson’s behaviorism thus holds out the promise of making life and its social 
organization not just better over time, but so much better that our current world 
will eventually appear to our behaviorist-shaped grandchildren as a time and place 
that were positively inimical to human life itself. The principal rhetorical address 
of Watson’s Behaviorism is consequently interpellative: you, the present-day reader, 
can begin to ameliorate our current uninhabitable conditions by following my 
(Watson’s) conclusions regarding the conditioning of infants, by learning to ver-
balize accurately your visceral behavior, by exposing yourself to stimuli contrived 
by behavioristically trained educators to change your personality traits for more 
socially desirable ones, and so forth. Watson’s behaviorist ideal, therefore, is not 
devised to assuage men and women adrift in a universe entropically winding down; 
it is instead an exemplum out of a future in which everything will finally be set to 
rights: “I am trying to dangle a stimulus in front of you, a verbal stimulus which, if 
acted upon, will gradually change this universe” (B, 303).
III
Humans, in this view, are simply animals with complicated sets of learning sched-
ules, reflex arcs, and repertoires of behavior. To paraphrase Lewis’s Men without Art, 
they are potentially just machines governed by routine rather than ground down 
by thermodynamics. Consequently, any stress put upon the machine-like qualities 
of the (behaviorist) man in Watson’s work is little more than a figural move made 
to reduce these organized complexities to an order digestible by an educated lay 
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public. Watson’s behaviorism often constructs machines out of humans to make a 
point, but such analogies are themselves not the point they so often are in Lewis’s 
satirical fiction. For instance, when Watson describes how “the arms are levers built 
to permit wide excursive movements,” he would seem to demote our upper limbs 
to mere implements in the application of force (B, 201). Likewise, when he depicts 
how the “tongue, while bearing very delicate receptors, is on the muscular side a 
bulk organ for rolling our food around,” he apparently relegates that tissue-mass 
to the status of an imprecisely blunt aliment-mover (B, 240). In contrast, Lewis 
reassembles these disaggregated odds and ends into a fully functioning whole, as, 
for instance, happens in the final version of his postwar short story, “Bestre”:
With a flexible imbrication reminiscent of a shutter-lipped ape, a bud of tongue 
still showing, [Bestre] shot the latch of his upper lip down in front of the nether 
one, and depressed the interior extremities of his eyebrows sharply from their 
quizzing perch—only this monkey-on-a-stick mechanical pull—down the 
face’s centre. At the same time, his arms still folded like bulky lizards, blue 
tattoo on brown ground, upon the escarpment of his vesicular middle, not a 
hair or muscle moving, he made a quick, slight motion to me with one hand 
to get out of the picture without speaking—to efface myself.36
Bestre’s body is made up of a curious mixture of mechanical and animalistic com-
ponents: he is not an ape but “a shutter-lipped ape”; he does not give his eyebrows 
a mechanical pull but rather a “monkey-on-a-stick mechanical pull.” Yet, if his 
face presents the narrator, Ker-Orr, with the countenance of an ape-android, then 
Bestre’s arms are simply “bulky lizards” resting upon his chest. The effect of the 
passage is not so much the effacement of Ker-Orr as it is of Bestre himself. The 
reduction of Bestre to ape-monkey-machine-lizard calls into question the possi-
bility of human agency while recalling Cantleman’s mimetic self-assimilation to 
his encompassing environment at the beginning of “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate.”37
 The “Bestre” passage also evokes the behaviorist man-machine by way of the 
Cartesian animal. In the fifth part of his Discourse on Method (1637), René Descartes 
describes at length the ways in which animals already present us with so many 
“natural” automata, made up as they are of protomachinic assemblages of organs, 
arteries, bones, nerves, and muscles disposed to produce particular actions when 
placed in particular environmental arrangements. It is because of this disposition, 
Descartes contends, that we would be wholly unable to differentiate a real ape 
from an ape-android were the two displayed before us: “were there such machines 
exactly resembling in organs and outward form an ape or any other irrational 
animal, we could have no means of knowing that they were in any respect of a 
different nature from these animals.”38 Conversely, according to Descartes, were 
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we to be presented with a human-android, “capable of imitating our actions as far 
as it is morally possible,” we would nevertheless be able to detect the subterfuge 
because (1) such an android “could never use words or other signs arranged in 
such a manner as is competent to us in order to declare our thoughts to others,” 
and (2) this hypothetical human-android would prove wholly incapable of acting 
from knowledge or reason because its activities would be restricted “solely [to] the 
disposition of [its] organs.”39 The human-android would give the game away to an 
observing “real” human because it would out of necessity behave exactly like an 
animal; in other words, it would prove itself incapable of appositely communicating 
with other humans just as it would finally expose itself to be “destitute of reason.”40
 Watson’s behaviorism conforms to the Cartesian preoccupations within man’s 
relationship to animal and machine even as it nominally betrays that relationship 
itself. In making humans and animals equivalent by way of observable behavior 
and patterns of habit formation, Watson no longer makes Descartes’s distinctions 
between people and animals-machines qualitative. To argue in this way is to ques-
tion the sufficiency of speech and reason as the differentia specifica of being human. 
Since Watson disregards reason, he ends up throwing mind and consciousness out 
with the homunculus in the bathwater, castigating all talk of them as a regrettable 
heritage of our savage past.41 Against the superstitious legacy of linking mind and 
cogitation to metaphysics and the soul, “thought” for Watson is simply a term that 
encompasses the implicitly coordinated activities of the body as a whole, including 
visceral reactions and more organized verbal responses to stimuli.42
 We can also note here that human speech in Watson’s behaviorism represents 
something like an instance of economy or frugality, insofar as the principal func-
tion of words is said to consist of their capacity to act as time-saving replacements 
for objects. In a behaviorist world patterned after Watson, words are capable of 
“call[ing] out all of [the human being’s] manual activity. The words function in the 
matter of calling out responses exactly as did the objects for which the words serve 
as substitutes.”43 Though they may save us a considerable amount of time in our 
daily lives, there is nothing all that special or ennobling about words. They remain 
for Watson within the realm of observable behaviors, acting as and responding to 
stimuli, not at all unlike an ape lifting a branch threateningly at another ape, or a 
monolingual American gesturally directing a Romanian nurse’s attention toward a 
cupboard in which can be found a box of oatmeal and a matchbook.44
 Despite these differences, however, early behaviorism certainly remained 
within the Cartesian framework insofar as “Nature” is always already a machine 
for both Watson and Descartes.45 Watson’s sole “innovation” is to take man down 
a notch or two and put him back in his place among his ape, rodent, and android 
cohort, a feature that Lewis himself discerns in the cultural and social life of postwar 
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Europe with his characteristic mixture of marvel and disgust in Time and Western 
Man (1927):
Descartes called animals machines: they had not the rational spark. But men 
use their rational spark so unequally, and are so much machines too, that, on 
the face of it, that generalization is a very superficial one—one that you would 
expect in “the antechamber of Truth” (as Leibniz called cartesian philosophy), 
but not in Truth’s presence. Many animals, indeed most, are more dignified, 
much freer, and more reasonable than men, in the conduct of their lives: and 
the “language habit,” as the behaviourist calls it, is a servitude for those who 
are unable to use it, but have to be content to be used by it. It is not a thing to 
boast about that you talk, and that the elephant does not. It depends on what 
you say.46
Lewis more drastically upends Descartes’s oppositions here than Watson’s work ever 
expressly does. Descartes’s positive valuation of reason, for instance, gets moved to 
the animal-machine column of Lewis’s accounting ledger, whereas that of language 
stays put on the human side even as it receives a negative sign provisionally placed 
in front of it. In such a world as this, Descartes’s casual assurance that the human 
as such can easily be distinguished from the android becomes entirely ungrounded, 
as in fact we see occurring time and time again in works such as Lewis’s 1930 satire, 
The Apes of God, a novel populated with nothing but Cartesian human-androids 
(the titular apes), who endlessly mimic creativities and subjectivities they can never 
hope to embody or instantiate fully themselves. As the ever-absent Pierpont, who 
in the end is himself the very sort of ape he attacks, writes in his encyclical in 
that novel: “It is to what I have called the Apes of God that I am drawing your 
attention—those prosperous mountebanks who alternately imitate and mock at and 
traduce those figures they at once admire and hate.”47 In such a book and within such 
a worldview, it is the “real” artist and the “real” human who would give the game 
away to the hypothetical objective observer, and not, as Descartes would have it, 
the other way round.
 Yet if, as behaviorists like Watson contend, language leaves us more “done to” 
than “doing,” then at least one tactical way of maintaining a vestigial sense of ratio-
nal agency would seem to be “the dead and pulverizing silence” of a Bestre (“B,” 82), 
Ker-Orr’s most important instructor in the skirmishes waged upon the puppets of 
The Wild Body (1927).48 Bestre’s weaponry, for one thing, is strictly ocular:
It was a matter of who could be most silent and move least: it was a stark stand-up 
fight between one personality and another, unaided by adventitious muscle or 
tongue. It was more like phases of combat or courtship in the insect-world. The 
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Eye was really Bestre’s weapon: the ammunition with which he loaded it was 
drawn from all the most skunk-like provender, the most ugly mucins, fungal 
glands, of his physique. Excrement as well as sputum would be shot from his 
luminous hole, with the same certainty in its unsavoury appulsion. Every resource 
of metonymy, bloody mind transfusion or irony were also his. (“B,” 82–83)
Idly stirring up stray animosities with his pupillary discharges, Bestre stocks these 
silent blasts with all the noisome resources of scatological sound. Expectorated 
orts, feces, and mucus (“the most skunk-like provender”) unsavorily shoot out of 
his eyes (“his luminous hole”) in an even coarser version of hypallage perhaps than 
“Cantleman’s Spring-Mate.” Aiming and shooting out the waste of his other orifices, 
Bestre’s eyes attempt to avoid language altogether, for the mouth is no longer the 
organ of speech so much as it is a bronchial torpedo bay, the functions of which the 
eyes can perform just as well. In fact, the eyes arguably fulfill this office even better 
than does the mouth because Bestre’s sole weakness turns out to be his regrettable 
tendency to use his mouth in order to boast rather than to spit and spew forth still 
more filth at his auditors. Ker-Orr somewhat deflatingly ends his account of Bestre 
by observing, “I have noticed that the more cramped and meagre [Bestre’s] action 
has been, the more exuberant his account of the affair is afterwards. The more 
restrictions reality has put on him, the more unbridled is his gusto as historian of 
his deeds, immediately afterwards. Then he has the common impulse to avenge 
that self that has been perishing under the famine and knout of a bad reality, by 
glorifying and surfeiting it on its return to the imagination” (“B,” 87). It is, in other 
words, as storyteller of his own silent misdeeds and antagonisms that Bestre fails 
ultimately to do justice to their admittedly scanty—but nevertheless, for Ker-Orr 
at least, exemplary—violence.
 Furthermore, it is in this regard that we can begin to understand why Ker-Orr 
is convinced that Bestre’s best last word remains his terminal offensive assault on the 
wife of a “pretentious peppery Paris Salon artist,” to whom Bestre one day exposes 
the bestial expressiveness of his eye along with that of his genitals (“B,” 84): “The 
eye was his chosen weapon. Had he any theory, however, that certain occasions 
warranted, or required, the auxiliary offices of some unit of the otherwise subor-
dinated mass? Can the sex of his assailant give us a clue? I am convinced in my 
own mind that another agent was called in on this occasion. I am certain that he 
struck the death-blow with another engine than his eye” (“B,” 85). Comparing this 
account of Bestre’s silent victory with that of his subsequent defeat by way of speech 
and storytelling, we can see that, despite Watson’s aforementioned claims, words 
do not in the end merely constitute substitutes for the objects they propositionally 
name in Lewis’s fiction. A lewd man necessarily remains more lewd than a lewd 
story or report of that same lewd man’s lewd actions. Consequently, though Lewis’s 
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far-from-silent satires may presume the operative existence of so many behaviorist 
worlds and utopias, the very words they use do not therefore necessarily ventrilo-
quize the assertions of Watson’s behaviorism.
IV
We must be careful, however, not to read too much of Lewis’s postwar culture 
critiques and compositional methods back into his prewar fiction without making 
some effort at explanation. World War I not only interrupted Lewis’s grand designs 
on single-handedly building up a British avant-garde culture in his own image but 
also left him adrift as to what to do once it ended, and he found himself among 
those passed over by the war itself. It was, as he points out in his first autobiog-
raphy, Blasting & Bombardiering (1937), the great event in his generation’s life, by 
which all previous and subsequent time was thereafter to be measured: “The War 
is such a tremendous landmark that locally it imposes itself upon our computa-
tions of time like the birth of Christ. We say ‘pre-war’ and ‘post-war,’ rather as we 
say b.c. or a.d.”49 At a more personal level, Lewis used this autobiography to offer 
a singular and defensive view of the strange turns his life as an artist and writer 
had taken following the war. If he was a one-man British avant-garde unto himself 
before 1914, then he would have us see him now (in the post-postwar period) as 
a one-man self-advertising agency, tirelessly recasting and buffing his career on 
the model of a resurrection man: “I started as a novelist and set a small section of 
the Thames on fire. My first book Tarr was a novel (1918). Then I buried myself. 
I disinterred myself in 1926, the year of the General Strike—but as a philosopher 
and critic. This was considered very confusing.”50 What exactly took place between 
the end of the Great War and the onset of the General Strike in Britain—the book-
ends of Lewis’s “post-war” period—is never directly confronted by him. As he 
remarks early in Blasting & Bombardiering, “1918–1926 is a period marked ‘strictly 
private.’”51 Instead, he only obliquely approaches this momentous interlude in his 
life by way of metaphors, such as the sacrilegious one he makes in comparing him-
self to Jesus, though Lewis would have us know that he was buried for eight years 
(no measly three days would do for him) before exhuming an utterly transformed 
version of himself in the mid-1920s. Should we misunderstand Lewis’s impiety here 
as insincerity, however, we need only look at the material remainders of his trans-
formation to disabuse ourselves: during the off-limits postwar phase of Lewis’s life, 
almost all of his prewar literary output—including, most significantly, the stories in 
The Wild Body, the Vorticist prose drama Enemy of the Stars (1914/1932), and Tarr 
(1918/1928)—underwent revisions that markedly changed the style and in some 
cases the content of these pieces. With Lewis’s new self came a new (because entirely 
rewritten) literary past as well.
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 A notable exception to Lewis’s postwar revisionary frenzy, however, was 
“Cantleman’s Spring-Mate,” which began reappearing in the second edition of 
Blasting & Bombardiering released by the University of California Press in 1967 
without any alterations save a minor substitution of em dashes (—) for Lewis’s “=,” 
an idiosyncratic punctuation mark characteristic of his prewar writings. While 
I am not interested in Lewis’s motivations or intentions in neglecting to revise 
“Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” along the lines of Tarr or the narrative cycle in The 
Wild Body, I do think that the story’s uncastigated integrity through and beyond 
the postwar period tends to justify its juxtaposition with the strategies and concerns 
evinced in the final version of “Bestre.” Perhaps most importantly, although these 
two pieces face each other across the putatively insurmountable partition set up by 
the Great War and the postwar, both narratives are structurally homologous insofar 
as they concern themselves principally with the representation and critique of failed 
(or otherwise fatally flawed) comportments toward hostile milieus.
 As we have seen, the problem with Bestre’s strategy has little to do with his 
spectacular antagonisms in and of themselves. If anything, Ker-Orr’s story expresses 
bemused wonder at the subtle blows and pains one can deliver solely with the aid 
of one’s own eyes as well as at the scrupulous dedication Bestre brings to his role in 
these mute quayside brawls: “The key principle of his strategy is provocation. The 
enemy must be exasperated to the point at which it is difficult for him to keep his 
hands off his aggressor. The desire to administer the blow is as painful as the blow 
received. That the blow should be taken back into the enemy’s own bosom, and that 
he should be stifled by his own oath—that Bestre regards as so many blows, and 
so much abuse, of his, Bestre’s, although he has never so much as taken his hands 
out of his pockets, or opened his mouth” (“B,” 84). In their repetitiousness, their 
calculated coordination of stimuli and responses, and their reliance on nothing 
more than a balefully steady gaze, Bestre’s campaigns resemble crude behavior-
ist experiments, with Bestre doing triple duty as observer, stimulus, and lab rat. 
What in turn makes Bestre’s revisionary version of behaviorist experimentation so 
instructive for Ker-Orr and (presumably) Lewis is that it reduces the world not so 
much to behaving surfaces as to badly behaving surfaces. Bestre’s eyes act to break 
up the socially scripted complacencies and roles of those they malign through the 
act of observation itself; they work by singling someone out from the herd and 
fixing him or her with a confrontational stare, thereby disrupting the mimetic lures 
to which this particular person’s public life may be otherwise susceptible. Against 
the standardizing tendencies of Watson’s behaviorist machine, Bestre operates by 
aggressively drawing out his opponents’ singular identities over against those forces 
(advertising, cinema, books, etc.) that tend to dissolve such identities into one big 
undifferentiated mass. As argued previously, however, the signal failure of Bestre’s 
approach occurs when he stops staring and starts to open his mouth to speak, for 
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it is then that he gives in, along with his contingently encountered enemies, to the 
sorts of “common impulse[s]” governing all and against which he otherwise dog-
gedly hurls the waste matter of his body, if only by way of his nauseating glances 
(“B,” 87).
 Cantleman, in this regard at least, would appear to turn himself to account 
better because he manages to remain silent. An occasional sidelong reference is 
made to conversations he has with Stella, but the story never gets around to report-
ing his speech directly. Instead, the narrative emphasizes his stratagems in gaining 
the attention of the young woman, which looks an awful lot like what those of a 
novice Bestre might be: “At the village he met the girl, this time with a second girl. 
He stared at her ‘in such a funny way’ that she laughed. He once more laughed, 
the same sound as before, and bid her good evening. She immediately became 
civil” (“CS-M,” 10). What of course sets Cantleman’s funny stare apart from that of 
Bestre’s, however, is that the former aims to seduce in order to covertly antagonize. 
That is to say, Cantleman’s sacrifice to the animal and, correlatively, to nature has 
all the doubtful efficacy of a performative contradiction:
In the factory town ten miles away to the right, whose smoke could be seen, life 
was just as dangerous for the poor, and as uncomfortable, as for the soldier in 
his trench. The hypocrisy of Nature and the hypocrisy of War were the same. 
The only safety in life was for the man with the soft job. But that fellow was 
not conforming to life’s conditions. He was life’s paid man, and had the mark 
of the sneak. He was making too much of life, and too much out of it. He, 
Cantelman [sic], did not want to owe anything to life, or enter into league or 
understanding with her! The thing was either to go out of existence: or, failing 
that, remain in it unreconciled, indifferent to Nature’s threat, consorting openly 
with her enemies, making a war within her war upon her servants. In short, 
the spectacle of the handsome English spring produced nothing but ideas of 
defiance in Cantleman’s mind. (“CS-M,” 13)
Consequently, Cantleman’s retreat into putatively lower life-forms is tactical; he 
gives in to the natural world around him in order to wage war against that world, 
just as he plays the part of suave soldier-suitor in order to take out his aggressions 
on Stella. Like the dangling feet of the bacillary Phasmidae, the excrement-smeared 
Chrysomelid larvae, and the magic rituals of primitive civilizations later described 
by Lewis’s younger contemporary Roger Caillois in “Mimicry and Legendary 
Psychasthenia” (1935), Cantleman’s mimetic self-assimilation into his immedi-
ate surroundings acts to derange spatial perception and to achieve his apparent 
depersonalization.52 Persisting illusions of velleity, however, are precisely what 
Cantleman continues to believe separate him from tribal magicians and insect 
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larvae. Cantleman’s wager is that the merest of intentions distinct from one’s actions 
have the potential to transform utterly the significance of those actions by the bare 
force of will itself. In other words, to act as if one has depersonalized oneself by 
retreating into pigs, birds, and horses is understood by Cantleman to perform the 
function of a sort of modern-day moly that ensures that he remains consistently 
himself despite this drastic assimilation. Angling ultimately to play the part of a 
modern-day Odysseus, Cantleman casts himself as Circe and as Odysseus’s meta-
morphosed shipmates in order to rail at both. Yet, what Cantleman cannot see 
without becoming Lewis, Bestre, or the narrator of “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” is 
the degree to which there is no way to distinguish as if from as in nature or life: 
“And when [Cantleman] beat a German’s brains out, it was with the same impartial 
malignity that he had displayed in the English night with his Spring-mate. Only 
he considered there too that he was in some way outwitting Nature; he had no 
adequate realization of the extent to which, evidently, the death of a Hun was to 
the advantage of the animal world” (“CS-M,” 14).
V
Upon hearing of the U.S. Post Office’s decision to confiscate the October 1917 issue 
of The Little Review, Margaret Anderson quickly took out a motion to restrain 
the postmaster of New York, and at trial the inimitable modernist art collector, 
patron, and lawyer John Quinn “brilliantly and . . . humorously” defended The Little 
Review, much as he would do four years later when the journal again faced charges 
of obscenity for publishing the “Nausikaa” episode of Ulysses.53 As would happen 
in these later legal ordeals surrounding the serialization of Joyce’s novel, however, 
Quinn’s defense did not prevent the little magazine from being found “obscene, 
lewd, or lascivious” under Section 211 of the U.S. Criminal Code.
 Manifestly ambivalent about affirming the postmaster’s decision, Judge Augustus 
Hand remarks at some length in his opinion as to the uneven merits of “Cantleman’s 
Spring-Mate” considered both as a piece of art and as a moral tale. After briefly 
describing the circumstances surrounding the case as well as quoting the relevant 
portions of the statute at issue, Hand’s brief opinion begins by offering a pretty astute 
summary of the story’s plot in which he emphasizes both its deterministic milieu and 
the rebellious reactions that this milieu occasions in young Cantleman:
The publication which is particularly objected to by the Postal Authorities 
is a short story about a soldier in the British Army who reflects upon the 
topsy-turvy condition of the world and feels that gigantic forces, which he 
is pleased to call those of nature, are arrayed against the individual—forces 
that in most cases will overpower him. He regards his own destruction in the 
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present European conflict as more than likely, and under all these conditions 
feels at war with the world. With satirical satisfaction he seduces a young girl 
and disregards her appeals when she becomes a mother. In his revolt at the 
confusion and injustice of the war he feels justification at having wreaked his 
will and obtained his satisfaction—thus, as he says, outwitting nature.54
Hand admits that a number of reassuring morals can be glimpsed in all of this, 
whether these be understood as the demonstration either of “the wickedness of 
selfishness and indulgence” or of “the degradation of camp life and the demoral-
izing character of war.”55 In particular, he readily concedes that Lewis’s narrative 
“naturally causes a reflecting mind to balance the heroism and self abnegation that 
always shines forth in war with the demoralization that also inevitably accompanies 
it. The very old question suggests itself as to the ultimate values of war.”56
 Hand’s qualms about ultimately acceding to the putatively conventional moral-
ity of “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate,” however, have to do with what he regards to be 
the untenable assumption that the story is aimed at those with reflecting minds like 
his own. After all, what is perhaps most objectionable about “Cantleman’s Spring-
Mate,” he argues, is the relish with which it addresses itself to readers in ways that 
cannot be contained or mastered through contemplation: “But no outline of the 
story conveys its full import. The young girl and the relations of the man with her 
are described with a degree of detail that does not appear necessary to teach the 
desired lesson, whatever it may be, or to tell a story which would possess artistic 
merit or arouse any worthy emotion. On the contrary it is at least reasonably argu-
able, I think, that the details of the sex relations are set forth to attract readers to the 
story because of their salacious character.”57 The first thing to note here is the degree 
to which Hand’s comments in the first Little Review trial anticipate the holistic test 
for obscenity most famously articulated sixteen years later in John Woolsey’s favor-
able opinion in United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses.” In that case, it will be 
remembered, Woolsey held that “reading ‘Ulysses’ in its entirety, as a book must be 
read on such a test as this, did not tend to excite sexual impulses or lustful thoughts 
but that its net effect on them was only that of a somewhat tragic and very powerful 
commentary on the inner lives of men and women.”58 For many interpreters of this 
test, aesthetic judgments on the model of something like form-content relations 
could hereafter be used to mediate the application of obscenity statutes to works 
with literary or artistic pretensions. Understandably, liberalizing jurists and literary 
critics have tended to present Woolsey’s holistic test as an unequivocal victory in 
the fight of artistic expression against its suppression. Within the terms such a test 
sets out, after all, it seems possible in theory to see any and all troubling content in 
a book as passing, negligible moments of an integral and nonobjectionable whole.59 
In this view, United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses” was understood to have 
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set an important and incontrovertible precedent for the deproscription of book 
obscenity, and to cite and make use of its test from here on out was to be as good 
as deproscribing book obscenity through piecemeal judicial effort.
 This is all well and good, save for the fact that it shuts its eyes both to history 
and to Woolsey’s holistic test itself. For one thing, judges in the 1940s who scrupled 
giving “literary” books a free pass when it came to obscenity proved more than 
adept at regrounding their proscriptions in aesthetic terms and concepts. To insist 
that art required more of judges than the technocratic application of statutory and 
precedential standards alien to art itself did not in turn require courts to cede the 
field of obscenity altogether to aesthetic autonomy. This proved especially true in 
those cases where the charged book, when judged as a whole, arguably did tend or 
aim to excite sexual impulses or stir up lustful thoughts. At the very least, to deny that 
such aims and tendencies in fact predominate in works such as William Burroughs’s 
Naked Lunch (1959) or John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (1748–49) is to 
risk inadvertently admitting that one has read neither text. Moreover, in its explicit 
separation of the one from the other, the Ulysses holistic test would disqualify sexual 
excitation and lust from artistic production altogether, resulting in what one critic 
has charitably described as Woolsey’s “well-intentioned lies” regarding the imma-
nent differences separating art from obscenity or pornography.60 Such a distinction 
seems illegitimate, however, if we consider at all closely the mutually interdependent 
development of aesthetic taste and the pornographic book trade since the eighteenth 
century.61 Burroughs, for his part, impishly forces the issue by putting a protracted 
graphic description of a snuff film at the center of his novel.
 Rereading Hand’s opinion on Lewis’s story in light of the Ulysses case thus 
reveals the merely formal nature of Woolsey’s test, which now appears as the val-
ue-neutral device it always was. Hand has no problem admitting that a compelling 
argument can be made for the conventionality of “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate,” for 
taken as a whole it is indeed an artfully written narrative pointing out the timely 
return of a “very old question” pertaining “to the ultimate values of war.” What 
keeps him from giving Lewis’s text a pass, however, is the pointed attention it pays 
to salaciously developed details. Hand’s own holistic test for obscenity is there-
fore more forthright in confronting the discomfiting possibility that there might 
now exist artistic practices that give the lie to hoary old assumptions regarding 
form-content relations. What, after all, is one to do with those texts whose parts not 
only evade being assimilated into a totalizing whole but also address themselves to 
the body more explicitly than does that same text taken as a whole? How does one 
adjudicate the potential for obscenity of a work whose net effect fails to stimulate 
the lustful thoughts and sexual impulses of its readers but whose parts may be quite 
efficacious in doing precisely that? In short, what defense can aesthetics offer to art 
if it cannot guarantee the separability of art from pornography or obscenity?62
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 Because he is willing to face up to the possibility that these questions and the 
problems they partly circumscribe cannot be thought away with the reverent incan-
tation of the words “aesthetics” and “art,” Hand’s opinion seems the more insightful 
piece of literary criticism than does Woolsey’s celebrated affirmation of a master-
work of literary modernism. At the very least, Hand entertains the possibility that 
something was happening to and within art. While this “something” may have not 
been specified at the time (for an educated lay audience at any rate), it nevertheless 
did appear to “reflecting minds” that clichés and commonplace notions about the 
integral relations of form and content could no longer adequately grasp these “new” 
developments in art. Hence Hand’s reluctance to countermand the decision of the 
postmaster of New York and his judgment that the October 1917 issue of The Little 
Review could not be mailed. Because he was unable to articulate what Lewis’s preoc-
cupation with sordid details had to do with his story considered as either literature 
or moral pedagogy, Hand had to concede that the postmaster had not abused his 
administrative duties: “While it has been urged with unusual ingenuity and ability 
that nothing under consideration can have the tendency denounced by the Statute, I 
do not think the complainant has made out a case for interfering with the discretion 
lodged in the Postmaster General, whose ‘decision must be regarded as conclusive 
by the courts, unless it appears that it was clearly wrong.’”63 In 1917 something may 
have been changing in art, but artists had not as yet gotten around to explaining 
themselves with sufficient persuasiveness as to be heard in official quarters.
 In her article in The Little Review responding to the suppression of “Cantleman’s 
Spring-Mate,” Margaret Anderson is quick to grant that something indeed was 
happening to art, but she was by no means going to be the broadcaster of its secrets. 
Lewis, she argues in that essay, is incontrovertibly a writer of prose, by which she 
means “that he is master of the mysterious laws by which words are made into 
patterns or rhythms, so that you read them for the spirit contained in the rhythm,—
which is the only way of getting at the context; which in fact is a thing of distinct 
and separate entity, existing above and beyond the context. Many fairly good writers 
and critics do not understand these laws. It is not surprising that the Postoffice 
[sic] department does not understand them.”64 Distinct from the law of obscenity 
are the “mysterious laws” of prose, which Anderson says lift all such writing from 
its transient milieu and hence beyond the reach of postmasters and Societies for 
the Suppression of Vice. Anderson avoids explaining of what exactly these laws of 
prose may be understood to consist, beyond a fleeting glance toward the spiritual 
metamorphosis of mere words “into patterns or rhythms.” Her willfully mystifying 
commentary is calculated to advance a much more ambitious agenda to change 
public policy, to have art’s claims of autonomy registered by courts of law, a goal 
that would eventually be given (as we have seen) its most memorable expression 
in the form of Woolsey’s “well-intentioned lies.”
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 Courts after Woolsey’s Ulysses decision were even more firmly persuaded that 
they must directly confront the challenges and problems that art posed to their atten-
tion, with the result that respecting art’s autonomy increasingly meant integrating 
its principles into the more pressing matter of how to correctly apply the statutory 
and precedential standards regulating book obscenity. One conspicuous effect of this 
developing receptivity to art’s difference as the century progressed was a growing 
willingness in many courts to accede to the testimony of experts, particularly in 
the field of literature. Woolsey himself had set an informal precedent for just such 
a procedure in the Ulysses case when he confessed to having two friends—“literary 
assessors” he calls them—separately read Joyce’s novel and then casually compare 
their impressions with the present-day legal definitions of obscenity.65 It must be 
stressed, however, that the mere fact that a Norman Mailer or an Allen Ginsberg was 
later allowed to defend the literary or social merits of an “obscene text” in a court of 
law did not entail that their opinions would thereafter be dispositive. Famously, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Besig v. United States (1953) had little difficulty 
in affirming a judgment of obscenity despite granting the literary merits of Henry 
Miller’s Tropic of Cancer (1934) and Tropic of Capricorn (1939) based on the “volu-
minous affidavits and exhibits” filed on the behalf of various literary experts in that 
case.66 Ultimately, to admit that a book was “literary” or “artistic” did not thereby 
make it any less obscene in the decades separating Woolsey’s decision from the U.S. 
Supreme Court obscenity cases between 1957 and 1973.
 Nevertheless, the year following United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses,” the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals ended up affirming Woolsey’s decision. Though 
doubtful of the claims made by “Joyce’s laudators” as to the lasting value of the novel 
in literary history, the presiding circuit judge insisted that art should be given a 
chance to develop new techniques out of itself without the infringement of court 
supervision in matters such as obscenity:67 “Art certainly cannot advance under 
compulsion to traditional forms, and nothing in such a field is more stifling to 
progress than limitation of the right to experiment with a new technique. . . . We 
think that Ulysses [sic] is a book of originality and sincerity of treatment and that 
it has not the effect of promoting lust. Accordingly it does not fall within the stat-
ute, even though it justly may offend many.”68 With seventeen years of modernist 
art production and criticism separating this case from the first Little Review trial, 
the inability of a judge to account for the unsettling quality of an experimentally 
“obscene” text no longer seemed to matter much—for the time being, at least. 
Something may have happened to art, and judges may never be given the training 
needed to grasp quite what that “something” was in time to have this competence 
guide their decisions; nevertheless, by 1934 they could most likely trust in artists to 
pursue “originality and sincerity of treatment” without intruding upon the grounds 
of obscenity for the sake of obscenity. Contemporary art worthy of the name had 
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proven itself to be a disciplined and disciplining project, meaning that offenses 
occasioned by it were “just” and should be allowed to pass without proscription. 
According to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, such art could be trusted to 
treat “obscenity” as a technique like any other, as a means to ends greater than the 
mere promotion of lust. Lies such as these were not only well intentioned but also 
exigent. The circuit judge who ensured that Woolsey’s decision and holistic test 
would stand as landmark precedents in U.S. obscenity case law? None other than 
Augustus Hand.
VI
If I have exhumed and reviewed the relationships between Hand’s reluctant sup-
pression of “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” and his subsequent affirmation of Ulysses’s 
nonobscenity, then it has been to resituate the temporal and public dimensions of 
modernism in terms of broader applicability than the idiosyncratic periodizations 
(prewar, postwar, post-postwar) Lewis develops in Blasting & Bombardiering. For 
one thing, the organs of Anglo-American modernist publicity (particularly its little 
magazines) had made their mark on popular consumer culture to such an aston-
ishing degree in the 1920s that by 1933 (the year of the Woolsey decision) Gertrude 
Stein had moved from the pages of transition (1927–38) to the best seller list with 
The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas. The following year, one could read about the 
“fad” of Gertrude Stein in Vanity Fair; see productions of her opera, Four Saints 
in Three Acts (written 1927–28), in either Hartford or New York; hear Stein herself 
lecture in numerous cities across the country; and buy The Making of Americans 
(written 1902–11; first published 1925) in a mass-market edition.69 Moreover, by the 
end of the 1920s, modernism and its public forums appeared to young struggling 
writers such as Erskine Caldwell to be vitally important to their professionaliza-
tion, even if the work these writers produced had little overt relationship to the 
projects, forms, and devices usually ascribed to literary modernism as such. No 
longer regarded as desirable venues of publication in and of themselves, significant 
little magazines such as transition, New Masses, Blues, and Pagany instead appeared 
to writers such as Caldwell to encompass so many way stations along the road to 
bigger and better things, such as Scribner’s Monthly, Esquire, and (eventually) the 
lucrative mass-market paperback boom of the 1940s. Hereafter, modernism could 
be treated as an artifact of one’s aesthetic self-formation.
 Consequently, the Woolsey decision must be understood first and foremost 
as indexing the absorption of modernism into commercial mass culture. For one 
thing, by accentuating the artistic merits of Ulysses, Woolsey gave credence to those 
who sought to defend modernist literature as a legitimate form of aesthetic expres-
sion, howsoever strange or disturbing it may have once appeared to contemporary 
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minds and sensoria. In turn, by maintaining that art in and of itself was not at all 
reducible to obscenity, Woolsey exempted from proscription any claims “new” art 
made on the body. Such works were to be excepted from obscenity on grounds 
similar to those used in defending the “classics,” so long as one could reliably dis-
count the possibility of their unreflective reception, which seemed a reasonable 
assumption provided these texts made a point of compositionally sublimating their 
pleasures—even if, as in Ulysses, these pleasures were scatological, masturbatory, or 
sadomasochistic. Crucially, Anderson’s essay on Augustus Hand’s ruling against the 
October 1917 issue of The Little Review also calls into question the claims modernist 
writing makes on bodies. For her, to read literature—or rather “prose”—involves 
our gaining access to spiritualizing laws superior to those of our temporal insti-
tutions. Ideally, then, reading provides both the means of contemplative escape 
from the vulgarity of prevailing conditions as well as the occasion for consorting 
with that select group of contemporary readers and writers who share our tastes, 
biases, and experiences regarding art and its superiority to life as it is now lived. 
The emphasis in Anderson’s account is not only on subordinating life to art but also 
on building a select community constituted by refusing access to the many (e.g., 
the masses, the public). Indicative of both these points are Anderson’s conclud-
ing remarks in her response to Hand’s opinion: “Any life that is capable of being 
destroyed, in the popular sense of the term, should be destroyed. It might then take 
on that tragic significance which would make it material for Art. That these argu-
ments may still be regarded as childish or immoral by the majority of the world is 
the supreme human joke. That I could be called an ‘iconoclast’ for making them 
is a measure of contemporary fatuity.”70 In the end, it is on grounds such as these 
that Anderson “can see nothing brutal in ‘Cantleman’s Spring-Mate.’ [She] can see 
no warning or lesson in it.”71 Lewis’s story can neither be reduced to a function nor 
proscribed for its loose moral economy. To judge it in terms other than those called 
for by the self-reflexive and ineffable standards of art is simply to mark one out as 
the fatuous Other against whom journals such as The Little Review and their readers 
partly constituted their social identities.
 Despite Anderson’s protests, however, it takes an awful lot of mental acrobat-
ics to deny that Lewis’s story is brutal or that its brutality derives in no small part 
from its willingness, unlike Anderson, to depict reading as a potentially hazardous 
activity. On the third page of the narrative—but diegetically before Cantleman’s 
salacious experience in the field—Lewis reveals an unlikely motivating force for 
Cantleman’s prewar all-out assault on nature: Thomas Hardy. Contrary to one’s 
likely expectations, however, the specific model for Cantleman’s carnal and car-
nivorous rampage is revealed not to be Jude the Obscure (1895), Hardy’s “obscene” 
novel; instead, the relatively minor (and most certainly unwarlike) historical novel, 
The Trumpet-Major, instigates the soldier’s premature martial pursuits. At those 
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regrettable times when he finds himself stuck in camp, Cantleman avoids all social 
intercourse with his roommates (whom the narrator gives letters—A., B., C., and 
D.—rather than names) by voraciously digging into a copy of Hardy’s novel that 
he has stolen from one of these very same roommates:
[Cantleman] had even seemed to snatch Hardy away from B. as though B. had 
no business to possess such books. Then [Cantleman’s roommates] avoided his 
eye as though an animal disguised as an officer and gentleman like themselves 
had got into their room, for whom, therein, the Trumpet-Major and nothing 
else exercised fascination. He came among them suddenly, and not appearing 
to see them, settled down into a morbid intercourse with a romantic abstrac-
tion. The Trumpet-Major, it is true, was a soldier, that is why he was there. But 
he was an imaginary one, and imbedded in the passionate affairs of the village 
of a mock-county, and distant time. Cantleman bit the flesh at the side of his 
thumbs, as he surveyed the Yeomanry Cavalry reveling in the absent farmer’s 
house, and the infantile Farnese Hercules, with the boastfulness of the Red, 
explaining to his military companions the condescensions of his infatuation. 
Anne Garland stood in the moonlight, and Loveday hesitated to reveal his rival, 
weighing a rough chivalry against self-interest. (“CS-M,” 11–12)
On its face, Cantleman’s encounter with Hardy’s text here would seem to hew 
closely to Anderson’s argument, at least so long as his responses confine them-
selves to reflective and contemplative reactions that protectively lift him up from 
and beyond the reach of his degraded camp surroundings. Lewis’s “imaginary” 
soldier likewise more happily consorts with Hardy’s “imaginary” soldier, who is 
unsuccessfully courting an “imaginary” woman in “the village of a mock-county” 
existing in a “distant time.” The characters of Hardy’s Wessex at the time of the 
Napoleonic wars, thus, appear to provide Cantleman with a more consequential 
set of companions, interlocutors, and models for approaching his own time’s great 
war than do the persons with whom he must have daily, but meaningless, contact.
 Yet the passage quoted just now also intimates a relationship between reader 
and text excluded entirely from Anderson’s account, for in reading of John Loveday’s 
quaint dilemma when faced with the opportunity of revealing the drunken state of 
his rival to their mutual object of affection, Cantleman bites (satirically? amorously? 
jadedly?) the fleshy sides of his thumbs. Later, Lewis describes in even greater 
detail Cantleman’s boisterous reactions to Hardy’s novel: “[Cantleman] chuckled 
somewhere where Hardy was funny. At this human noise [his roommates] fixed 
their eyes on him in sour alarm. He gave another, this time gratuitous, chuckle. 
They returned with disgust at his habits, his peculiarity, to what he considered their 
maid-servant’s fiction and correspondence. Oh Christ, what abysms! Oh Christ, 
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what abysms! Cantelman [sic] shook noisily in the wicker chair like a dog or a 
fly-blown old gentleman” (“CS-M,” 12). In part, Cantleman’s superfluous chuckles 
reproduce Anne’s own hilarity at Festus’s advances as well as the “fly-blown” state 
of old Benjamin Derriman, the elderly property owner whose role in The Trumpet-
Major depends principally upon his paranoiac and comically lame attempts to 
keep his final will and testament out of the hands of his good-for-nothing nephew, 
Festus.72 Yet mimetic parallels such as these between the behaviors of “imaginary” 
characters and those of one of their “imaginary” readers are negligible when com-
pared to the spectacular effects Hardy’s text seems to have on Cantleman’s body 
more generally. Reading for Cantleman, as it turns out, is a thoroughly corporeal 
activity and performance: he reads with his whole body (letting loose a chuckle 
when Hardy earns it) for the benefit of others (“He gave another, this time gra-
tuitous, chuckle”). An adequate account of his reception of The Trumpet-Major 
thus has to address the effects of that text on his body, be it in the form of gnawed 
fingertips, palsied fits of chortling, and, as it happens, even more violent modes of 
physical expression.
 As much as he may enjoy reading, Cantleman’s “morbid intercourse” with 
Anne, Festus, and the Loveday brothers ultimately demands more than immedi-
ately achieved gratification with Hardy’s words and their ticklish aftereffects on his 
diaphragm. What simply reading Hardy’s text leaves wanting, in fact, is a wider 
scope for action in the here and now: “In [Cantleman’s] present rustic encounter, 
then, he was influenced by his feelings towards his first shepherdess [i.e., Stella] by 
memories of Wessex heroines, and the something more that being the daughter 
of a landscape-painter would give. Anne, imbued with the delicacy of the Mill, 
filled his mind to the injury of this crude marsh-plant. But he had his programme. 
Since he was forced back, by his logic and body, among the madness of natural 
things, he would live up to his part” (“CS-M,” 12). What catches Cantleman’s eye 
and guides his plan for action is neither the plot of Hardy’s historical novel nor 
the ironic defense of decorum and chivalry it nostalgically proffers but rather the 
arousing figure that Anne Garland cuts. If Augustus Hand suppressed the October 
1917 issue of The Little Review because he was reluctant to ignore the vividly descrip-
tive parts that do not quite make a whole out of “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate,” then 
that reluctance finds its indirect confirmation in Cantleman’s habits as a reader of 
Victorian historical novels. In particular, the attraction of reading for one such as 
Cantleman appears to be the attention one can devote to desirable parts without 
concerning oneself at all with the compositional functions and forms of the whole, 
and this is true even if such parts do not in and of themselves seem all that libid-
inally suggestive. Compare, in this instance, Cantleman’s aggressive sexual desire 
for Anne (desire that makes her the physical superior in every way to the “real” 
body of Stella, that “crude marsh-plant”) and the sorts of descriptions of her in The 
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Trumpet-Major that occasion it. Hardy’s narrator observes that “Anne was fair, very 
fair, in a poetic sense; but in complexion she was of that particular tint between 
blonde and brunette which is inconveniently left without a name. Her eyes were 
honest and inquiring, her mouth cleanly cut and yet not classical, the middle point 
of her upper lip scarcely descending so far as it should have done by rights, so that at 
the merest pleasant thought, not to mention a smile, portions of two or three white 
teeth were uncovered whether she would or not. Some people said that this was very 
attractive.”73 Except for the detail regarding her faulty upper lip, Hardy’s description 
of Anne is pointedly nondescript, and upon cursory reflection, it appears in keeping 
with the overdeveloped irony of Hardy’s novel taken as a whole. Even if one were 
to consider this passage in all of its specificity (with modes and claims of address 
of its own), this initial descriptive account of Anne’s person would still continue 
to operate so as to take the wind out of any presumptive claims to beauty a reader 
might come to expect of the heroine in a novel such as this: “Some people [not the 
narrator, surely] said that this was very attractive.” Yet walking home with Stella 
after his transformative experience with the horses, birds, and pigs in the field, 
Cantleman refers directly to this passage from The Trumpet-Major: “He wished that 
[Stella] had been some Anne Garland, the lady whose lips were always flying open 
like a door with a defective latch” (“CS-M,” 10). Anne Garland’s “defective latch” 
lips are not a blemish to ignore; instead, they are a feature to seek out and lament 
the absence of in those rustic mates who happen to be around and very much game 
for a roll in the hay. Amazingly, Cantleman is able to muster and then sustain his 
lust for the composite Anne/Stella not despite but because of the ironic and critical 
narration of Hardy’s text. Notwithstanding Augustus Hand’s certainties about such 
things, Cantleman’s implacably reflecting mind makes Anne all the more arousing.
VII
“Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” thus presents obscenity to us as a violation of the rules 
of use, whereby reading—and not writing—more appositely forms the crux of the 
problem obscenity names. In this view, Lewis’s story does not demonstrate that 
Hardy pulled a fast one on the Victorian authorities but instead discloses that he 
who finds Anne Garland not merely attractive but literally fuckable is potentially a 
very, very dangerous sort of reader. In this respect, “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” can 
be seen to take its rightful place alongside Joyce’s “An Encounter” (1905) as one of 
the great early twentieth-century short stories in which the onus of obscenity shifts 
conspicuously from production to reception. In Joyce’s story, it will be remembered, 
though the narrator and his boyhood schoolmates get rebuked by their instruc-
tor for reading “chronicles of disorder” such as westerns and American detective 
fiction, it turns out that the “classics” upheld as exemplary by Father Butler end 
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up corrupting readers even more completely than do the dregs of contemporary 
popular commercial publishing.74 While playing hooky from school, the narrator 
and a friend (Mahony) meet an old bookworm who tries to draw them out on the 
subject of their reading habits as well as their interactions with girls before he moves 
away from them to engage in a bit of public masturbation while viewing—and in 
full view of—them. The man is physically grotesque, and from his twitching fore-
head down to his gapped yellow teeth and his generally shabby attire, he provides 
the narrator with a living image of the sort of fellow Father Butler describes when 
referring slightingly to the hypothetical writer of detective and cowboy narratives 
as “some wretched scribbler that writes these things for a drink.”75 Yet in his con-
versation with the boys, the old bookworm reveals himself to be well versed not in 
penny dreadfuls but in the “classics,” by which he would have the boys understand 
him to mean the works of authors such as Sir Thomas More, Sir Walter Scott, and 
Edward Bulwer-Lytton. In fact, it is on these figures that Joyce’s narrator dwells in 
order to make the point that no matter how lofty Father Butler’s standards may 
appear to his terrorized pupils, “An Encounter” places them on the same level as 
the old bookworm’s overworked genitalia.
 If we take obscenity law and its enforcement as comprising an important con-
text for these two narratives, then both Cantleman and the old bookworm emerge 
as oblique—if nevertheless tendentious—responses to what is arguably the most 
infamous decision in Anglo-American obscenity case law, Regina v. Hicklin. As we 
saw earlier, Lord Chief Justice Alexander Cockburn had held that the proper test 
for obscenity simply involved the determination of “whether the tendency of the 
matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open 
to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may 
fall.”76 Though subject to numerous criticisms in the decades to come, Cockburn’s 
test proves upon closer inspection to offer a more nuanced approach to obscenity 
than many of the liberalizing judges and jurists were willing to admit in the first 
half of the twentieth century.77 For one thing, in drawing attention to the uneven 
demographics of the state’s literate population, Cockburn does not comfort himself 
with illusions of such a thing as a universalized (aesthetic) subject. Unlike Woolsey’s 
l’homme moyen sensuel or the converging opinions of his “literary assessors,” the 
depravable, corruptible minds in Hicklin are not presented as absolutes.78 Cockburn 
is careful instead to mark these minds and their corruptive reception of a given 
“obscene” work as thoroughly exceptional, though in doing so he further attests as 
to why they pose such a problem for state management and regulation. Therefore, 
anticipating developments in obscenity case law that would not occur in the United 
States until the 1960s, the Hicklin test presents obscenity as exceedingly variable: it is 
not so much a quality of a text or object but rather of the shifting relations between 
channels of distribution and targeted audiences.79 As some critics have described 
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it, Cockburn’s nascent formulation of variable obscenity “was [not] a sign of mid-
dle-class hypocrisy. It simply meant—as literary theory is now claiming to have 
discovered—that a book is not the same across different contexts of consumption 
and use.”80 The problem with the Hicklin ruling, however, of course remained that 
while Cockburn was able to conceptualize the relativity of textual reception, he was 
far too comfortable with constructing a test for the total proscription of obscene 
books based on this differential distribution and formation of cultural capacities. 
Whereas his premises refreshingly avoid absolutes, his conclusions nevertheless 
insist on them.
  “An Encounter” comprises a noteworthy intervention into the field of obscen-
ity as delimited by nineteenth-century legal discourses such as Hicklin. For one 
thing, as we have seen, it puts the “classics” and ephemeral cultural matter such 
as The Apache Chief on a level playing field: neither the artistic qualities of the 
former nor the supposedly gauche artlessness of the latter guarantees their socially 
normative reception once they are out in the world. As a result, despite the tacit 
hierarchies underwriting Woolsey’s holistic test, high/low distinctions in literary 
production appear to be of no use when it comes to dealing with obscenity, and it is 
in this regard that the elliptical lapses in Joyce’s story’s narration start to accrue an 
added significance. Somewhat notoriously, the narrator proves to be so squirrelly 
about revealing what exactly happens in “An Encounter” that Grant Richards, the 
eventual publisher of Dubliners (1914), did not realize what the old bookworm was 
doing in the story until Joyce made the unwise decision of telling him. Thereafter, 
six years of struggle between Joyce and Richards ensued before Richards finally 
agreed to publish the story collection with “An Encounter” included.81 The reasons 
for this initial oversight by Joyce’s publisher are not incidental failings on his part, 
however, because the narrator treats the story he tells as if it were in fact an “elabo-
rate mystery.”82 While the old bookworm publicly masturbates, the narrator ensures 
that his retrospectively presented boyhood self keeps his eyes looking elsewhere so 
that all he can report of it are Mahony’s elliptical exclamations:
  
  After a silence of a few minutes I heard Mahony exclaim:
  —I say! Look what he’s doing!
  As I neither answered nor raised my eyes Mahony exclaimed again:
  —I say . . . He’s a queer old josser!83
What Joyce’s story presents is a narrator who would make a piece of detective 
fiction out of public masturbation and the threat of pederasty, thereby reducing 
the threats both acts pose to a simple matter of epistemological nonrecognition.84 
Despite Richards’s worries, in other words, “An Encounter” came before its public 
already precensored, insofar as the story’s narrator uses popular genre forms to 
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depict his boyhood self as the product of outdated ways of organizing subjectivity, 
whereby obscenity appeared to be a pathological matter in need of juridico-medical 
policing.85
 If Joyce’s story looks backward with a great deal of criticism, then Lewis’s 
Cantleman shows the budding head of the behavioristically constituted subject, 
replete with hideous zoomorphic pedigrees, finding happiness in its states of 
absorption in sexual activity and raising merry hell on its way into a hideously 
blank and violent future. Rather than take stock of inherited forms of subjectivity, 
Lewis has Cantleman read the work of an influential late Victorian in order to 
reveal a historical mutation in the field of cultural reception. For in the end what 
Cantleman constitutes a prelude to is the imminent extirpation of subjectivity as 
such by a variety of convergent social forces. In his exhaustively developed cultural 
critiques of the 1920s and 1930s, Lewis seeks to reveal to the lay European’s sight the 
multiform and impending threats undermining the stability of subjective identity in 
the early decades of the twentieth century. Because it often seems that these threats 
assail the resisting subject equally from everywhere at once, even Lewis’s best works 
in this vein of cultural criticism can strike one as the insights of an exceptionally 
gifted paranoiac for whom every popular trend and every cultural figure plays a 
malignant part in a totalizing conspiracy whose object is the erasure of the para-
noiac’s very self.86 After all, to see Henri Bergson, Albert Einstein, and Anita Loos 
as interchangeable agents in an all-encompassing cultural project aiming to rub out 
the stable self root and stock does indeed strain the present-day reader’s credulity.87 
Yet precisely because Lewis is so insistent on detecting a consistent ideological 
undertow in widely divergent cultural phenomena, his essays and fiction can be 
understood as ultimately comprising so many complementary reinscriptions of 
the classic naturalist problematic. His fictional and satirical works depict, estrange 
us from, and beset lifeworlds in which one’s actions prove to be hopelessly more 
determined than determining. As a result, this evocation of a faintly registered but 
nevertheless omnipresent sense of control by outer forces makes his work natural-
istic if not strictly naturalist.
 Given the invidious short- and long-term effects ascribed to forces such as rel-
ativistic physics, behaviorist advertising, and childishly stammering literature, such 
naturalistic depictions could no longer trust that the descriptive monographs of 
nineteenth-century naturalism were at all equal to the representational challenges 
this spectacular and cyclopean modernity posed. It seems reasonable, therefore, to 
view Lewis’s uncommon facility with a host of modernist styles—which he discards 
almost as soon as he evinces a passing mastery of them—as the symptomatic reflux 
of his critical projects as social diagnostician and surgeon. If the threats to the 
integral self were in fact as variable and parlous as Lewis believed them to be, then 
there was no hope in approaching them with a single ready-made mode of writing, 
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least of all one left over from the last century. On the one hand, the cultural field had 
developed so expansively that it now contained and made use of hitherto separate 
spheres of human activity to such a degree that likely would not have been conceivable 
to the likes of a Zola. On the other hand, the category of the new, whether deriving 
from avant-garde or modernist practices, had been so successfully assimilated by the 
broader culture that any attempt to embody social critiques like Lewis’s in fictional 
forms had to keep up with what happened to be in fashion, whether intellectually, 
artistically, or popularly. Making manifest the psychic pressures then being exerted 
by the vulgarization of Bergson’s flux-philosophy, for instance, may have demanded 
Finnegans Wake (1939) parodies and Steinian stream-of-consciousness stutters in The 
Childermass (1928) but not necessarily the gestural puppet show machinations of The 
Apes of God, which attacks instead the increasingly indiscernible boundaries porously 
separating artist from public and patron.
 Keeping this in mind, we can finally approach “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” as 
a first take in Lewis’s representation of the sociocultural assault on individuality 
and the self. In particular, this suppressed story confronts the behaviorist func-
tions of just such an assault, meaning that the relationship between writing and 
reading has as much thematic weight as the relationship between humans and 
animals in the text. After all, as Lewis would later contend in a characteristically 
ironic passage included in both The Art of Being Ruled and Time and Western Man, 
words comprise the major obstacle to the smooth functioning of Watson’s projected 
behaviorist utopia:
We live largely, then, in an indirect world of symbols. “Thought” having been 
substituted for action, the word for the deed, we live in an unreal word-world, 
a sort of voluminous maze or stronghold built against behaviour, out of which 
we only occasionally issue into action when the cruder necessities of life compel 
us to. Some of us live in this world more than others, of course. Some of us 
actually like it. And (a democratic note) what sort of person do you suppose 
enjoys living in this word-world? Words are symbols of ideas, as the old psy-
chology would put it—some people “have ideas,” are “theorists,” “highbrows,” 
and so forth: and some (like you and me) are just plain people who prefer 
deeds to words! (that’s us—that’s our way!) What’s the use of a word-world to 
us? We’re not brilliant conversationalists, or anything of that sort! Speech is of 
silver, silence is of gold. And this is the age of iron, the age of action. We may 
not have much to say for ourselves, but we can hit a ball or turn a screw with 
the best. To hell with mere words! Up behavior!88
This lengthy, duplicated passage foregrounds the performative contradictions 
required of Lewis in his fictional and satirical depictions of behaviorism, from 
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“Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” onward. No matter how faithful Cantleman-the-
behaviorist-reader may appear to be in his aggressive responses to literary stimuli, 
Lewis’s logorrhea continues to stand in the way so long as words in and of them-
selves resist reliably eliciting behaviorist responses from their readers. Yet this 
assumes of course that the technocratic aims and goals of behaviorist projects and 
educational theories have not yet produced a fully operational mechanistic world, 
crass and raw in the extreme, in which words function just as well as any other stim-
uli to move the ganglionic action masses that were threatening to replace people.
 That such theories and projects remained a preoccupation of Lewis’s well 
into the 1930s attests to their enduringly menacing influence, however. In lighter 
moments, he remains capable of comically reducing the problem of behaviorism 
and obscenity to ridiculously literalized expressions. For instance, in his libelous 
and suppressed 1936 novel, The Roaring Queen, Lewis refers many times to the failed 
attempts of the young Honorable Baby Bucktrout to bed a member of her family 
estate’s staff, despite her reliance on the estimable models provided a woman of her 
class in Lady Chatterley’s Lover.89 Such easy levity, however, all but disappears in 
the behaviorist defense of murder cunningly and disturbingly unfolded in Snooty 
Baronet, Lewis’s “fictionist essay in Behavior.”90 That text cycles through a prolifer-
ating set of literary stimuli to get at the conditioning functions novels perform for 
the social personae assumed to be increasingly replacing individual selves in the 
face of new historical pressures on modern subjectivity. It is as if Lewis sought in 
Snooty Baronet to demonstrate that Watson was right and that in general men are 
in fact what the situation calls for—a Samuel Butler over dinner with their lover, a 
D. H. Lawrence in the bedroom, a white whale in a world of Ahabs, a dangerously 
maladroit Ernest Hemingway in the bullring, and an expert assassin patterned after 
Eastern adventure stories when presented with the distant form of their superflu-
ously chinny literary agent.
 What The Roaring Queen and Snooty Baronet cumulatively describe, there-
fore, is a world overrun with readers who behave like Cantleman and not at all 
like the consumers once found in the pages of The Little Review’s “Reader Critic” 
section. As a result, we err considerably if we take the animality depicted early on 
in “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” to be little more than the degradation of the human 
as such. In the end, the experience of animality in that story serves the more con-
sequential function of clearing the ground for new forms of social identity and 
sociability patterned after acculturated behaviorist theories and methods, whereby 
the masses were to be reduced to a well-oiled stimulus-response mechanism. So 
long as behaviorism continued to comprise a substantial social force, therefore, 
the problem of obscenity would persist because for Lewis the problem of the 




 This is to read obscenity in Lewis as the representation of something like ironic 
embodiment, and what keeps it from swinging uncontrollably over into embodi-
ment as such is repetition. Cantleman’s second rip-roaring chuckle while reading 
Hardy for the benefit of his fellow officers, Kell-Imrie’s second shot at Humph in 
Snooty Baronet, and even the second iteration of the lengthy passage on behavior-
ism from The Art of Being Ruled in Time and Western Man—all of these second 
takes exist to assert a barely subsisting will independent of one’s reflexes or habit-
uated actions.91 They are meant to ensure that the words one reads are held at a 
distance and not treated as so many coordinated stimuli demanding proximate 
action. Obscenity for Lewis is merely a content like any other; it does not have to 
get embodied like laughter does in his satirical and fictional works.
 Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to let the matter rest there and present a 
Lewis for whom the paired representations of obscenity and behaviorism might 
appear as satisfactory responses to a world less and less livable with each passing 
year in the run-up to World War II. Nor, for that matter, does irony provide an easy 
escape hatch, for as we have demonstrated throughout this chapter, irony tends 
to take the form of performative contradictions in Lewis’s work, both critical and 
fictional. That is to say, it is far from certain that Lewis (like Cantleman before 
him) can play a role without losing part or all of himself. To revise ourselves a bit, it 
appears that what Lewis cannot see without becoming the narrator of “Cantleman’s 
Spring-Mate” is the degree to which there is no way to distinguish as if from as in 
nature or life: “And when [Cantleman] beat a German’s brains out, it was with the 
same impartial malignity that he had displayed in the English night with his Spring-
mate. Only he considered there too that he was in some way outwitting Nature; he 
had no adequate realization of the extent to which, evidently, the death of a Hun 
was to the advantage of the animal world” (“CS-M,” 14). “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” 
comes down to us and should be read as an early posted warning, marking off the 
types of pitfalls and traps in modern life that Lewis’s subsequent fiction and critical 
writing would assay in ever more daredevil fashion: “Beware: whoever pretends to 
be a ghost will eventually turn into one.”92
3. Erskine Caldwell, Smut, and the Paperbacking  
 of Obscenity
[Erskine Caldwell] shows surprisingly naïve delight in all the possible ram-
ifications of the thought that girls may be without panties, and he seems 
to have searched the length and breadth of the country for new situations 
whereby some significant part or parts can be exposed to us.
—kenneth burke, “CaldWell: maker oF Grotesques,” 1935
Women are frequently a hindrance to sexual gratification, but as such are 
erotically exploitable.
—karl kraus, sprüche und Widersprüche, 1909
I didn’t say that.




Let’s begin in medias res! In the early 1950s, having just completed his self-styled 
“cyclorama” of novels depicting the contemporary South, Erskine Caldwell took 
time from his abidingly prolific production of fiction to draft and publish Call It 
Experience (1951), the first of two autobiographies he would compose in his lifetime.1 
Described by Caldwell as “an informal recollection of authorship,” Call It Experience 
details his apprenticeship, early travails, and hard-won successes as a storyteller 
whose stories eventually came to pay his way in life.2 Somewhat surprisingly, how-
ever, Caldwell does not celebrate his incredible popularity as a writer in this work so 
much as defend his celebrity in the face of mounting criticisms of his writing and its 
stature in contemporary U.S. fiction. His remarkable book sales were increasingly 
becoming the occasions for both his isolation from other writers (with whom, to 
be sure, Caldwell never had much meaningful or sustained intercourse anyhow) 
and his exclusion from both academic criticism and the nascent canons of Anglo-
American literary modernism as well.3 Emblematic here is Edward Wagenknecht’s 
gruff assessment of Caldwell’s work in Cavalcade of the American Novel (1952): “At 
the moment, indeed, Caldwell seems destined for survival only in the mansions of 
subliterature. His sales continue enormous—largely in twenty-five cent, paper-cov-
ered editions, decorated with crude pictures of half-naked women—but his critical 
stock is now so low that it is difficult to believe he ever enjoyed the acclaim which 
was given to him only a few years ago.”4 For the most part, Wagenknecht’s eviction 
notice has proven normative in the critical reception of Caldwell’s fiction.5 In turn, 
Caldwell’s animus toward critics and his reluctance to join a community of writerly 
peers can be detected in his choice to end Call It Experience with his chilly recep-
tion at a writers conference at the University of Kansas, the description of which 
immediately follows a lengthy account of a successful publicity stunt in Kansas City 
involving Caldwell, the mayor, a motorcade, and the key to the city.6 The authors 
attending the conference, which notably featured Katherine Anne Porter and Allen 
Tate, were evidently “displeased” with Caldwell because they felt he had “brought 
disrepute to the profession of authorship—and to the cause of higher education, as 
well—by participating in such an undignified publicity scheme in Kansas City, and 
by autographing twenty-five-cent books in a drugstore” (CIE, 227).
 With the exception of the epilogue, in which he snappily responds to fan mail 
and pan mail, these are the final words of Call It Experience, and their strangely 
neutral presentation helps bring into focus his motivations in drafting such a work 
at this time in his life. Though Caldwell does not directly respond to the charges of 
his peers at the end of the text, the entirety of Call It Experience acts to preempt the 
criticisms of those who would scruple his reasons for participating in the adver-
tising of the paperback reprints of his works. Rather than bringing disrepute upon 
the profession of authorship, Caldwell would have us understand his work as an 
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attempt to disenchant the writing of fiction for a mass public. Asked by a woman 
at one point in the book about what it is he sells for a living, Caldwell laconically 
responds: “Paper—with words on it” (CIE, 94). Characteristically, then, many of the 
unattributed questions fielded by Caldwell in the epilogue to Call It Experience have 
to do with advice concerning the pursuit of fiction writing as a profession:
I have written several short stories in my spare time. How can I get them pub-
lished? (CIE, 234)
I have submitted short stories to all the leading magazines but I still haven’t 
been able to get one published. I’m beginning to get discouraged. What should 
I do? (CIE, 236)
Will I be able to learn how to write short stories and novels by taking a course 
in a school or university? (CIE, 236)
I want to be a short-story writer. Will working as a reporter on a newspaper be 
helpful or harmful? (CIE, 237)
What do you consider the most important steps in learning to write? (CIE, 239)
These questions have a rhetorical force in context that controverts their apparently 
tangential relationship to Call It Experience’s downer of an ending. In the face of 
an increasingly institutionalized modernist myth predicating value on aesthetic 
autonomy, Caldwell’s first autobiography refutes such claims by reminding authors 
and readers that writing was simply a means of pushing paper, something to make 
a living by, if one could.
 Consequently, in one of the opening chapters of Call It Experience, Caldwell 
offhandedly tells the story of how he came to be an “authentic kind of writer”—that 
is to say, “a writer who sees his stories in print” (CIE, 47). In the summer of 1929, 
heartened by the first acceptance letter of his career as a short-story writer, Caldwell 
packed a suitcase full of manuscripts (including short stories, novellas, chapters 
from incomplete novels, poetry, essays, and jokes) and took a bus from Maine to 
New York City. “I had twelve dollars, a round-trip bus ticket, and a copy of the first 
edition of Sister Carrie [1900], by Theodore Dreiser, when I left Portland,” Caldwell 
writes. “I had hopefully saved the book, for which I had paid thirty-five cents in a 
secondhand bookshop in Atlanta and which was said to have a value several times 
its original published price, for just such an occasion, and I planned to sell it to help 
pay my expenses in New York” (CIE, 72).
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 New York proved to be more expensive than Caldwell had anticipated, however, 
and after only one day and night in the city, he decided to take his copy of Dreiser’s 
first novel to an East 59th Street bookdealer specializing in first editions. After 
equivocating as to its value, the dealer was able to convince Caldwell to leave his 
copy of Sister Carrie with him overnight so as to have time to show it to a prospec-
tive buyer on Long Island. When Caldwell, “optimistically hopeful of receiving ten 
or twelve dollars for the book,” returned the next day, the dealer pretended not to 
recognize him:
As soon as I spoke to him, he disclaimed any knowledge of me or of what I was 
talking about. Furthermore, the dealer said that he had never seen me before 
in his life. I reminded him of the conversation we had had the day before, I 
described the book I had left with him, and I even remembered well enough 
the tie he had been wearing to describe that, too. He angrily claimed that I was 
trying to make trouble of some sort and threatened to call the police if I did not 
leave immediately. I had no way of proving my story, and there was nothing I 
could do but go. I remained slightly hungry the remainder of the time in New 
York. (CIE, 73–74)
The tacit homology between text and life here almost strains credulity: the act of 
selling Sister Carrie provides an occasion for living out a scene comprising a vivid 
inversion of the opening pages of that book. As opposed to the magnetic desires of 
Carrie Meeber for frilly luxury goods beyond her means during the Chicago pas-
sages of Dreiser’s first novel, Caldwell appears here as the victim of the more timely 
pangs and impulsions of hunger, which he ultimately does not satisfy because he 
is unable to sell the one luxury item he has been able to acquire despite his subsis-
tence-level existence in Portland. The initial indifference of high-quality consumer 
goods to Carrie’s desire for them becomes, in Caldwell’s autobiography, the crim-
inally dispossessive interests of one bookseller regarding the property rights of 
another. The systematicity and structural concerns of Dreiser’s text—deriving from 
a mélange of discourses running from chemistry to sociology and (more broadly 
still) on to Spencerian evolutionary theories—contract to the anecdotal dimensions 
of a particularized case of petty theft in Caldwell’s.
 Notwithstanding these facets of his rather allusive experience involving the 
sale of Sister Carrie, Caldwell’s encounter with the duplicitous bookseller primar-
ily underscores his lifelong disenchantment of the literary by way of economic 
and vocational concerns. For a bookshop owner from Maine, which Caldwell had 
recently become, a first edition of Sister Carrie was simply a special type of com-
modity whose relative scarcity and perceived cultural worth accrued to it a value 
that could be realized in exchange with a savvy buyer.7 Accordingly, the fact that 
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the dealer involved in this particular exchange cheated Caldwell does not change 
the material status of Dreiser’s novel as a commodity circulating, as Lawrence 
Rainey has concisely described it, “in that intangible yet perceptible social space 
where aesthetic value became confused with speculation, collecting, investment, 
and dealing.”8 Simply put, Sister Carrie was a rare, durable commodity that had 
appreciated over time; whether it was a book one actually read remains an unan-
swered—because unposed—question in Call It Experience. In any case, beyond 
suggestively identifying an unfortunate experience in his life with the underclass 
experiences in Dreiser’s fiction, Caldwell does little to indicate whether he has in 
fact read Sister Carrie. What this passage makes abundantly clear, however, is that 
Caldwell does not risk confusing the market value of Dreiser’s book with its aes-
thetic value, because aesthetics simply never enters into the matter.
 Nor did Caldwell fail throughout his life to make a similar distinction with 
regard to his own work as a writer of fiction, for as his autobiographical writings 
emphasize over and over again, the only thing worth writing is work that is capable 
of realizing a socially recognized value.9 Unable to secure a meeting with an editor 
anywhere in the city during his trip to New York, Caldwell randomly selected a 
literary agent from the phone book and made an appointment: “When I got there 
with my suitcase of manuscripts, the agent, whose name I have forgotten, took a 
long hard look at the contents and told me that I would have to leave everything 
for him to read at a later date. The later date was so indefinite that I decided that 
it was not something I wished to do” (CIE, 73). Curiously, Caldwell inserts this 
encounter before the description of his return to the unscrupulous bookdealer, 
suggesting that his wariness here is not at all the behavioral by-product of a pain-
fully learned lesson in the rare books trade. In fact, it is independent of any such 
lessons, for it does not qualify Caldwell’s self-presentation of naïveté so much as 
point out the difference between texts one buys and those one writes to sell. The 
former are a matter of speculation, so getting cheated out of a rare book altogether 
is simply a risk one runs. The latter, however, are subject to a more straightforward 
calculation that Caldwell emphasizes here. Though perhaps willfully a waif among 
forces in the rare book trade, Caldwell retrospectively presents a firm enough grasp 
of intellectual property here.
 Cash poor and hungry, Caldwell ultimately did manage to turn his 1929 trip 
to New York to account. After two meetings in taxicabs (presumably because he 
had no office), Erich Posselt agreed to bring out an edition of one of Caldwell’s 
novellas through a small publishing concern of his called The Heron Press. “When 
the contract was signed for the novelette,” Caldwell writes, “it was then that Erich 
let it be known that he was going to publish the book under the title of The Bastard 
[1929]. It seemed to me to be an unusual title for a book of fiction, but I assumed 
that Erich knew the business of publishing far better than I” (CIE, 74–75). At the 
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beginning of November, The Bastard appeared in a pricey edition. The Heron Press 
published eleven hundred numbered copies of the novella in Caslon Old Face font. 
The first two hundred copies were printed on American Handicraft and bound in 
balloon cloth. These copies were also signed by Caldwell and Ty Mahon, the artist 
who contributed six full-page illustrations to the volume. The remaining copies 
were printed on Mellow Book and bound in Holliston Cloth.10
 In its first published version, The Bastard appeared in a material form we 
have come to recognize as distinctly modernist: the limited edition.11 Along 
with the little magazines, limited editions constituted a tenuous institutional 
compromise throughout the 1920s as Anglo-American modernist writers and 
their patrons tried to cope with the incursions of commodity relations into areas 
of culture and art long held to be autonomous. By making the modernist text a 
means of drawing distinctions within commodity cultures between consumer 
commodities and unique investment opportunities, costly limited editions both 
gave in to and obliquely resisted the commodification of modernist writing. A 
canonical example: by arbitrarily choking off the number of available copies of 
the first edition of James Joyce’s Ulysses, Sylvia Beach’s Shakespeare and Company 
submitted to capitalist exchange even as it sought to manufacture an artificially 
achieved inapproachability for the published form of Joyce’s text. In essence, 
what the modernist practice of publishing limited editions sought to do was to 
make rare, auratic commodities despite the age of mechanical reproducibility. 
Consequently, though both were commodities, the first edition of Ulysses was 
ultimately different in kind from the modes of publication and distribution of 
something like the first trade edition of Dreiser’s An American Tragedy. Whereas 
the latter, published by Boni and Liveright, was priced so as to circulate among 
booksellers and those who presumably bought books for consumption’s sake—
that is to say, for reading—the former was an object of speculation primarily 
for bookdealers and export agents, who purchased it with the hopes of realizing 
considerable profits sometime in the future.12 The limited edition both presup-
posed that the text would endure beyond immediate consumption and utilized 
its relative scarcity to extort an economic value subsequently understood to 
confirm that same text’s aesthetic value. At first glance, then, it would appear 
that The Heron Press published Caldwell’s first long work in the institutional 
space carved out by Anglo-American modernist publishing practices earlier in 
the decade. Like Shakespeare and Company’s Ulysses or the 1923 Hogarth Press 
edition of T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922), The Bastard was an object one 
tended to invest in rather than read, meaning it was more likely to be found 
on the shelves of Caldwell’s cozening East 59th Street bookdealer than in the 




 However, by the end of November 1929, Black Tuesday had followed Black 
Thursday, and the modernist publishing practice of releasing texts through limited 
editions more or less came to an abrupt end.14 Whether The Bastard managed to sell 
well despite the onset of the Great Depression remains unclear because, as he often 
complained in letters and interviews in later years, Caldwell received no money from 
the sale of his first major publication; Posselt, it seems, had run off with whatever 
proceeds there might have been.15 Call It Experience, however, makes no mention 
either of the stock market crash that month or of how The Bastard went the way of 
Caldwell’s first edition of Sister Carrie, perhaps indicating a pair of occasions for his 
subsequent embrace of mass-market trade paperbacks over residually modernist 
avenues of publication and distribution. In any case, the ending Caldwell chooses 
instead to give to this episode in his first autobiography remains suggestive. Rather 
than describe how he was cheated out of the money from his first book-length pub-
lication, Caldwell alludes in passing to a problem that would in many ways come to 
define him as an immensely popular figure of mass culture in the decades to come: “A 
few weeks [after the publication of The Bastard] in Portland I received word from a 
county official that, although he made no claim to being a literary critic, he did know 
what he saw when he looked at pictures, and consequently considered it his duty to 
declare that the book should not be offered for sale in Portland” (CIE, 75). Caldwell 
could not sell his first novella in his own bookshop because the county attorney had 
deemed it obscene without trial before either a judge or jury. Furthermore, he came 
to his decision without even reading Caldwell’s words because the obscenity of Ty 
Mahon’s illustrations was self-evident enough.
II
Although his reference to the official suppression of The Bastard in Maine acts 
almost as an epigrammatic flourish to what is otherwise a self-deprecating account 
of his literary wanderings around New York City in the late 1920s, the immediate 
effects of the obscenity charges on Caldwell were in fact a good deal more violent 
than he lets on in Call It Experience. In addition to drafting a short, vitriolic (and 
still unpublished) Künstlerroman depicting the struggles of Fritz Mann, a young 
writer who confronts the hypocrisies of a repressed, but sex-obsessed, Maine com-
munity, Caldwell quickly published a one-page broadside, “In Defense of Myself,” 
in which he justified both The Bastard and his intentions in writing it.16 Denied 
due process, Caldwell nevertheless sought to get The Bastard a public hearing in 
Portland and Cumberland County:
Not having the opportunity to defend myself or my novel, [sic] means that 
with the consent only of County Attorney Ingalls himself The Bastard contains 
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an impure word, or words. No attempt was made to isolate these words in my 
hearing by the county attorney and neither was the offer made to permit my 
defense of them as being thought necessary in the construction of the story. 
With this comedy of justice bowing from the stage, the novel was blanketed 
with this brand of obscenity and hustled out of town. In the City of Portland 
and in the County of Cumberland, one superimposed upon the other in the 
State of Maine, The Bastard is obscene, lewd and immoral; likewise the author, 
by command of County Attorney Ingalls, is obscene, lewd and immoral in the 
City of Portland and in the County of Cumberland, all imposed upon the State 
of Maine. Therefore, it is a crime in this county to sell the novel, give it to my 
friends and, tomorrow perhaps, read it.
  All of which gives me an involuntary urge to vomit profusely.17
Pointing out repressive features of legal obscenity beyond proscription, Caldwell 
describes how the effects of obscenity charges tend to move well beyond the pro-
scribed texts themselves into all sorts of interpersonal relationships presupposed 
in a text’s production and sale, if not necessarily in its reception. Perhaps alluding 
to the treatment of Hester Prynne, the “brand of obscenity” initially applies to The 
Bastard as textual artifact in the broadside. The book itself allegedly contains “an 
impure word, or words,” making the work as a whole “obscene, lewd and immoral.” 
Notably, all of these terms (“impure,” “obscene,” “lewd,” “immoral”) comprised 
synonymous parts in the hazy and often tautological definitions of obscenity found 
throughout the early twentieth century in U.S. statutory and case law.
 With seemingly negligible concern for the broader discursive shifts in the 
strategies for legalizing obscene books, however, Caldwell does not question the 
equating of obscenity with impurity, lewdness, or immorality in his broadside. In 
fact, he seems willing to ascribe these properties to particular words; obscene texts 
apparently are classifiable as such because they in fact use these “impure” words. 
Caldwell thus accepts the legitimacy of obscenity and its prosecution. What he 
strenuously objects to, however, is having this opprobrious “brand” affixed to his 
own words and himself without an opportunity for a writerly defense. If Caldwell is 
willing to grant such a thing as obscenity, he nevertheless would have the Portland 
community and government recognize a distinction between obscenity as such and 
compositionally necessary obscenity. Consequently, the concerns of “In Defense of 
Myself ” have not so much to do with the legitimacy of obscenity as law but rather 
with the artistic and technical grounds for producing a text that potentially makes 
use of obscenity, if not as an end in itself, then as a means. To be sure, such an 
attempt to subordinate a practice proscribed by case and statutory law to nominally 
aesthetic ends would have likely had little effect in a court of law in 1929 or 1930. 
Under Lord Chief Justice Cockburn’s test in Regina v. Hicklin, which continued to 
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comprise the obscenity standard at this time, distinctions based on authorial intent 
had no legal standing in the adjudication of obscenity. Compositional necessity was 
simply no defense against obscenity.
 Because his fiction had a great impact on the young Georgian writer, the work 
of D. H. Lawrence on censorship bears brief consideration in connection with 
Caldwell’s first brush with obscenity. The target of a variety of purity-movement 
protests and obscenity prosecutions both in the United States and Great Britain, 
Lawrence was himself a vehement supporter of the censorship of pornography, 
if not obscenity. Terminological issues are a matter of no small importance here 
because Lawrence was careful, particularly in “Pornography and Obscenity” (1929), 
to distinguish the one from the other. He understood obscenity to come down to 
particular offensive words (“shit” and “arse” are his two implied examples in that 
essay) and their socially determinate, if endlessly fungible, meanings. In particu-
lar, Lawrence proposed that all words principally evoke a mob meaning and an 
individual meaning. Subject to all sorts of demagogic uses, mob meanings were to 
Lawrence’s eyes suspect elements in the interpretation of words and texts. Under 
their influence, he argues, the masses became considerably easier to control, manip-
ulate, and dispossess than those few individuals able to distinguish between their 
own idiosyncratic responses and the stereotypical responses instilled in them by 
mob meanings. Effectively, mob meanings evoked a concern about the power of 
words to manipulate people through their bodily reactions that we have already 
seen at work in the critical writing of Wyndham Lewis, John B. Watson, and I. A. 
Richards. For Lawrence in particular, however, “the public, which is feeble-minded 
like an idiot, will never be able to preserve its individual reactions from the tricks 
of the exploiter. The public is always exploited and always will be exploited. . . . The 
mass is for ever vulgar, because it can’t distinguish between its own original feelings 
and feelings which are diddled into existence by the exploiter. The public is always 
profane, because it is controlled from the outside, by the trickster, and never from 
the inside, by its own sincerity. The mob is always obscene, because it is always 
second-hand.”18 Despite the concluding imprecation aimed at the obscenity of the 
mob, obscene words in Lawrence’s view are no bad thing in and of themselves “if the 
use of a few so-called obscene words will startle man or woman out of a mob-habit 
into an individual state.”19 In conspicuous contrast to Lewis’s assumptions about the 
behaviorist undertone of obscene reading practices, obscenity potentially serves 
the function of ideological awakening for Lawrence by way of its violent capacity 
to interrupt stubbornly persisting thoughts and habits. Conversely, pornography 
is said to pose a real threat to life and health because it “is the attempt to insult sex, 
to do dirt on it.”20 Moreover, pornographers and their clientele “have a disgusting 
attitude towards sex, a disgusting contempt of it, a disgusting desire to insult it.”21 
More particularly, pornography for Lawrence results from the willful—if often 
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unexamined—confusion of sexual and scatological functions in pornographers 
themselves, and in order to impede the contagious appeal and spread of this con-
fusion to the masses, he “would censor genuine pornography, rigorously.”22
 Critical responses to Lawrence’s defense of censorship have been notably dis-
missive. In the course of discussing Lady Chatterley’s Lover in his book-length 
celebration of Lawrence, Henry Miller is even forced to concede: “It is a pity, how-
ever, that Lawrence ever wrote anything about obscenity, because in doing so he 
temporarily nullified everything he had created.”23 Somewhat more strikingly, in 
her exemplary attempt to approach the study of European and U.S. obscenity com-
paratively, Elisabeth Ladenson remarks: “Lawrence provides an exceptionally ripe 
example of an author who does himself (if not the profession as a whole) harm with 
virtually every word he writes about censorship. Lawrence the essayist is remarkable 
especially in the extent to which he is willing to assume seemingly self-annihilating 
positions.”24 Nothing less than an act of outright literary suicide, Lawrence’s writing 
on censorship would seem to pose the problems of obscenity and pornography in 
terms radically incommensurate with his own creative practices and work.
 As a counterpoint to this dismissive view of Lawrence’s support of censorship, 
we should turn briefly to Caldwell’s own reworking of the Lawrentian obscenity/
pornography distinction.25 In Writing in America (1967), a brief quasi-ethnographic 
collection of essays on the craft of writing published late in his career, Caldwell dis-
tinguishes obscenity from pornography in terms roughly congruent with Lawrence’s 
own. In the course of arguing that institutional forms of censorship increasingly 
appear to be outmoded in the United States, Caldwell expresses a timely rejoinder 
to those who would construe such a relaxing of pressures as a public danger:
People themselves are the qualified judges of what is right by tradition and what 
is wrong by custom. Obscenity and vulgarity are matters of bad taste and are 
not welcomed where decorum and propriety exist. Pornography is something 
else. It is a condition of psychic malady that can be alleviated by prescribed 
doses of erotic laxative. The pornographic has the curative properties of a pre-
scribed drug, when taken as directed, and serves a moral purpose when it 
purges the mind of latent aberrations. The purification of the mind serves this 
moral purpose by eliminating harmful reactions. It is for this same reason that 
static electricity is grounded and discharged at periodic intervals to prevent 
dangerous explosions.26
Obscenity, for both Caldwell and Lawrence, only appears as such against the 
screen of custom and tradition. However, whereas Lawrence is willing to ascribe 
potentially revolutionary capacities to obscene words, Caldwell sees in them only 
“bad taste,” indecorum, and impropriety. Obscenity, he argues, seems hardly 
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capable of startling men and women out of their habitual modes of thought 
or patterns of behavior because at most it betokens underdeveloped cultural 
capacities or poor manners. Furthermore, and in pointed contradistinction 
to Lawrence, Caldwell presents pornography not at all as a disgusting travesty 
of sexuality but rather as a way of homeopathically tamping down otherwise 
explosive impulsions. Part prescription laxative and part electrical ground, por-
nography acts on the mechanomorphically conceived mind by discharging it of 
its “latent aberrations.” Caldwell effectively depicts pornography as the oppo-
site of Lawrentian obscenity. Rather than rousing one from ideological slumber, 
Caldwell’s pornography ensures that one continues to sleep without interruption. 
In effect, from his perspective at the height of the worldwide student, sexual, 
and political movements of the late 1960s, Caldwell soberly recasts Lawrentian 
sexual liberation into a model that implicitly recognizes the insidious possibility 
of something like repressive desublimation.27
 Such distinctions notwithstanding, however, it was the Lawrentian conception, 
and not its Caldwellian revision, that impacted a variety of reformulations of legal 
obscenity in the United States. Though seemingly unconnected to properly juristic 
defenses of his own works, Lawrence’s remarks on pornography and obscenity even-
tually proved probative in subsequent case law involving obscenity. For instance, in 
Kingsley v. Regents (1959) the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of 
the Regents of the University of the State of New York to deny a license for exhibi-
tion to the distributors of a French film adaptation of Lady Chatterley’s Lover (1955, 
dir. Marc Allégret). While the court opinion by Justice Potter Stewart overturned 
this decision on the grounds that the New York Education Law unconstitutionally 
prevented the advocacy of an idea (not only did the Regents object to those scenes 
in the film that could be construed as promoting adultery, but also they did so 
precisely because those scenes promoted adultery), Justice Felix Frankfurter drafted 
an opinion that both concurred in the result and objected to the scope of Stewart’s 
opinion. Citing “Pornography and Obscenity” with approval, Frankfurter reminded 
the court that “even the author of ‘Lady Chatterley’s Lover’ did not altogether rule 
out censorship, nor was his passionate zeal on behalf of society’s profound interest 
in the endeavors of true artists so doctrinaire as to be unmindful of the facts of 
life regarding the sordid exploitation of man’s nature and impulses. He knew there 
was such a thing as pornography, dirt for dirt’s sake, or, to be more accurate, dirt 
for money’s sake.”28 By the late 1950s and early 1960s, therefore, Lawrence had gone 
from comprising a target of obscenity trials to being yet another source one could 
marshal in the service of justifying the continuing applicability of obscenity statutes 
to media such as film. Consequently, while authorial intention and compositional 
necessity counted for little at the time of The Bastard’s suppression in Portland 
and Cumberland County, such concerns would come to play a significant part in 
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the increasingly contentious field of obscenity jurisprudence across the next four 
decades.
 In addition to The Bastard and Erskine Caldwell himself, however, “In Defense 
of Myself ” alleges that the county attorney branded one other party with obscen-
ity by proscribing the sale of Caldwell’s novella in Portland and Cumberland 
County. After describing the novella as an attempt to write about “an important 
and untouched phase of American mores,” Caldwell offers an impassioned defense 
of the people and identities represented in The Bastard:
But I have not finished what I have to say about the people in this novel that 
has been suppressed: I have an intense sympathy for these people. I know them 
and I like them. I have slept with them in jails, I have eaten with them in freight 
cars, I have sung with them in convict camps, I have helped the women give 
birth to the living, I have helped the men cover up the dead—but I have said 
enough. I have said that I know these people, that I love them. That is why I 
could not stand silent while the story of their lives was branded obscene, lewd 
and immoral; because this story belongs to them even more than it does to me. 
It is of no concern to me that I, too, have had this same brand placed upon me 
by Cumberland County. But these friends of mine—I shall defend them until 
the last word is choked from me.29
The branding of The Bastard with obscenity is said to mark its characters as well, 
and in this passage Caldwell comes tactlessly close to identifying these characters 
directly with their real-life models. In fact, his Whitmanesque embrace of entire 
swaths of the American underclasses is said to be so expansive that disciplinary 
divisions between fiction and the social sciences seem no longer to hold. In this 
view, The Bastard’s obscenity brands not so much the text or its author but rather 
the social types the text ventures to represent. Caldwell appears to defend his 
novella—and himself, ultimately—on anthropological and sociological grounds 
in an attempt to deflect the stigmatizing effects of legal discourses surrounding 
obscenity by relinking his own obscene text back to contemporary U.S. society. In 
this view, the brand of obscenity finally comes to mark the milieu in which obscen-
ity is to be found. Obscenity, Caldwell finally argues, was very much the case in U.S. 
popular life of the late 1920s.
III
Yet it is hard to deny that The Bastard makes for sordid reading. Implicitly on the 
trail of his harlot mother, Gene Morgan (the titular bastard) meets a stranger who 
has a photograph of a scarred prostitute with a nipple-less left breast who may or 
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may not be Gene’s mother. This stranger goes on to tell Gene some stories involving 
a stunted pony, twenty-seven men, and a woman who also may or may not have 
been Gene’s mother. We learn that Gene remembers having seen his mother only 
twice before in his life, and that during the first such encounter he picked her up “in 
a burlesque theatre in Philadelphia: in a hotel on Twelfth Street he spent the night 
with her, but she did not know he was her son, or if she did know she didn’t care.”30 
After arbitrarily murdering the stranger and disposing of his body in a nearby river, 
Gene goes on a binge in an undisclosed city. Subsequent chapters follow his return 
to Lewisville, the not-so-sleepy Southern cotton town of his birth, where Gene gets 
work at the cottonseed oil mill, sleeps with or rapes a number of local women (black 
and white), befriends and moves in with the sheriff ’s son, aids and abets the sheriff ’s 
son in the murder of a black worker at a local sawmill, murders the night watchman 
at the cottonseed oil mill while in the midst of bedding that night watchman’s wife, 
and falls in love with a young woman loitering outside the Lewisville high school. 
This woman, Myra, shares a last name with Gene, and throughout the novella the 
narrative refers in passing to the possibility that they are in fact half siblings. Soon 
after their first meeting, the two leave Lewisville and strike out for the North. In 
Philadelphia, Gene settles down and finds work as a truck driver to support his new 
family. They eventually have a son who is physically deformed and developmentally 
challenged to a monstrous degree: “Little Leon was now nearly two years old, and, 
while his body had lengthened, his skin was still loose and dry and, most important 
of all, he could not coordinate the movements of his body. Still he required the same 
attention from his mother as he did when he was a week old. He was horrible to 
look upon, even through the eyes of his mother and father” (TB, 169–70). Gene and 
Myra subsist fitfully for a time before The Bastard concludes with Gene drowning 
their son (although this scene is not directly represented) and abandoning his wife.
 In its awkward fascination with gruesome acts of violence and coerced sex 
pursued by the socially dispossessed, as well as in its feigned neutrality in present-
ing characters with an apparently innate predisposition for brutality and rapine, 
The Bastard evinces nothing so much as atavistic naturalism. What differentiates 
Caldwell’s novella from earlier novels by Frank Norris or Jack London, however, is 
its studious subtraction of those two hoary old coordinates of literary naturalism, 
milieu and familial history, from the composition of Gene Morgan’s story. The 
Bastard instead presents Gene as a hereditary case through the accumulation of 
increasingly sordid incidents and actions rather than through details pertaining 
to family background or setting. The frequent violence of Gene’s actions indicates 
a compulsive predisposition in his character, yet the novella’s narrator obstinately 
refuses to “explain” Gene through either environmental conditions or hereditary 
pressures. In fact, so little effort is made to account for Gene and his behavior that 
the barest intimations of a lurid family history given in the book’s first chapter 
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start to accrue an unlikely explanatory weight by the middle of the narrative. In 
short, Caldwell dramatizes adverse hereditary forces by evading direct statements 
as to their determinate powers as such. The Bastard self-reflexively invites natural-
ist explanations for atavistic behaviors even as it reduces them to rumor, hearsay, 
and intimation. In the course of presenting his readers with a series of character 
reactions utterly incommensurate with their accompanying stimuli, Caldwell thus 
composes a naturalist world shorn free of the discourses and theories that would 
seek to motivate it causally.
 The Bastard offers a striking version of this in a brief interlude at the Lewisville 
cottonseed oil mill. Fairly early in the novella, a carnival comes to town, and the 
men working the night shift at the mill engage a performance by a “hooch dancer” 
for their midnight lunch hour. When the break whistle blows, Gene hurries along 
with the other men to a shed on the mill property:
Already a dozen men were perching themselves on the seed oval, already impa-
tient at the delay. Down in the mouth of the crater, where the cotton seed had 
been scraped from the floor, stood the woman who was to furnish the body for 
the dance and the body for the men. Standing there in the centre of the circle 
of men she was the target for handfuls of cotton seed and the vulturous words 
from their mouths. Over her body she wore a thin cloth of orange silk. Under 
the garment rose swelling thighs and unstillable breasts. She was talking to one 
of the several men beside her, her words broken under the pelting shower of 
flying cotton seed. (TB, 52)
After collecting a dollar from each of the gathered men, the woman begins her hip 
dance on the floor of the cottonseed crater: “Even before she was nude the shed was 
in an uproar, and by the time she had thrown the garment beside her pocketbook 
the din was headsplitting. She smiled forcedly around the circle and began her hip 
dance. The motions and effect were purely sensual, studiously calculated to inflame 
the lust of the men. The woman was an accomplished dancer it was quite evident, 
and placed amidst finer surroundings she would no doubt have achieved with the 
motions of her hips and breasts an effect not quite as crude and obscene” (TB, 53). 
Following the dance, which climaxes with small photographs of her child falling 
from an unclasped locket hanging from her necklace, the woman retires to the shed 
where the men line up to pay her another dollar to sleep with her, and the chapter 
ends as this “line closed up” (TB, 55).
 Despite the surprise and disgust feigned by Caldwell in his broadside, the 
hooch dancer episode in The Bastard already offers a pointed elucidation of her 
potential for obscenity and the novella’s as well. Characteristically, little effort is 
made in the passage to represent the woman’s dance beyond direct statements as 
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to its abstract coordination of cause and effect. “The motions and effect [of the hip 
dance] were purely sensual” because the one is assumed to be capable of fully (i.e., 
sensually) determining the other; the art of inflaming “the lust of men” is subject 
to studious calculations that can be embodied in imagined performance, if not by 
the novella’s text itself. At the very least, The Bastard attempts neither to imitate the 
hip dance nor to strive for its effects in the meaning or form of its words. Instead, in 
keeping with the novella’s critical instantiation of naturalist methods and premises, 
the dance itself is merely the occasion for asserting a fairly crude determinism (these 
motions lead to these effects) without the exhaustive presentation of the causal 
networks that presumably make the operations of that determinism possible in the 
first place.
 Moreover, the narrator complicates this assertion as to the strong determinism 
of obscenity by insisting that it is subject to its audience. The same dance “placed 
amidst finer surroundings” than that of a cottonseed pit supporting twenty-five to 
thirty riotous men “would no doubt have achieved . . . an effect not quite as crude 
and obscene.” There is no such thing as obscenity in and of itself, it would appear. 
Instead, there is only potential obscenity, which depends upon situation and class 
because obscene effects are not something that can be readily achieved “amidst 
finer surroundings” than those afforded by a cottonseed oil mill pit.31 Contexts of 
production as well as those of reception are thus vital for recognizing obscenity, a 
term the narrator of The Bastard defines as the creation “of beauty or rhythm . . . 
by the actual indulgence of artificially generated lust” (TB, 53).
 The hooch dancer comprises more than just a verbally represented emblem of 
The Bastard as a text that was proscribed on grounds of obscenity. In The Heron Press 
edition of the novella, Ty Mahon’s illustration of her hip dance at the cottonseed oil 
mill appears on the leaf facing the title page (see fig. 1), highlighting the significance 
of the scene for those apt to read The Bastard for its obscene potentials. Lazily angling 
bare calves, torso, arms, and head, the hooch dancer in Mahon’s visualization of the 
episode appears at first glance to be more luridly posed than artfully arrested in 
“purely sensual” motion. Unlike the men whose split-pea eyes leer from the circle 
around her, she is free of excessive shading. Whereas the cartoonish features of these 
men gathered about her seem to be seen indistinctly through a curtain of hasty verti-
cal and diagonal marks (perhaps an attempt to visualize Caldwell’s spermatic “shower 
of flying cotton seed”), the predominant feature of her illustrated version is arguably 
the virtual absence of features: musculature, jaw, chin, belly button, and digits appear 
indistinctly on the page. Mahon also excludes not only the dancer’s pubic hair but 
also her locket, a detail that preoccupies Caldwell enough for him to momentarily 
violate the novella’s point of view, which until this point has been third person lim-
ited to Gene.32 Within the white space expelling the murky torrential shadings of the 
millhands, the hooch dancer emerges as if from the nub end of an eraser, and the 
Literary Obscenities
110
ultimate effect of Mahon’s illustration is arguably less qualified than the ones pursued 
by Caldwell’s text. The surroundings of the hooch dancer do not seem as open to 
variability in this visual representation of the hip dance as they do in Caldwell’s verbal 
account, because the halo of white space draping her nude body demarcates not so 
much a zone of inapproachability as a covering to be punctured, either by the grasping 
paw of the millhand reaching toward her hips from her right or by the keenly staring 
man to her left, whose right arm and hand dip suggestively toward his own crotch. 
Poised literally between rape and the voyeuristically achieved self-pleasures of ogling 
men on the leaf facing The Bastard’s title page, the illustrated hooch dancer appears to 
promise unmixed pleasures that the text itself either estranges us from or evades alto-
gether. If Caldwell cannot make it through the scene without including digressions 
as to the mere potential of female bodies, given the right circumstances, to promote 
“the actual indulgence of artificially created lust” in men, Mahon’s illustration seeks 
instead to interpose no such impediments beyond the depiction of a female body and 
what that body is to be used for by men (i.e., coerced sex or masturbation). The body 
for the dance can be nothing other than the body for the men in Mahon’s drawing, 
and it would seem that viewing this and other illustrations in the novella in this way 
caused the Cumberland County Attorney to declare the book obscene. Anticipating 
the infamous pronouncement of Potter Stewart in Jacobellis v. Ohio, he quite simply 
knew obscenity when he saw it.
 Yet Mahon’s illustration is arguably as estranging as the coordinated causes 
and effects described by Caldwell’s narrator in the hooch dancer episode. Though 
momentarily warding off the imminent threat of a millworker’s hand, the halo of 
whiteness surrounding the dancer’s nude body also indicates the potential transpos-
ability of that body. More than just a tenuous protective covering to her body when 
surrounded by a crowd of aroused night laborers, the negative space encircling the 
woman also implicitly facilitates the provisional cutting and pasting of her body 
into entirely different scenes and surroundings altogether. Consequently, the illus-
tration of the hooch dancer also represents the reduction of her body to an occasion 
for “the actual indulgence of artificially created lust” in this particular case; despite 
the fact that the drawing arrests the scene just before the moment this will no longer 
be the case—another second or two, and the hand of the millworker will seize the 
body of the woman—setting, dance, and dancer do not necessarily reinforce each 
other in Mahon’s drawing. That is to say, the depicted uses of the hooch dancer’s 
body are contingent and subject to self-reflexive (and possibly self-canceling) ges-
tures that complement similar representations in Caldwell’s text.
 The mere placement of this particular illustration on the leaf facing the title 
page, however, is still another turn of the screw regarding the obscene potentials of 
The Bastard. Though plausibly supporting more complex interpretations than those 
given or presumed by the Cumberland County Attorney, Mahon’s visual emblem 
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for Caldwell’s novella indicates a different genealogy for its mode of publication 
than the ones that most studies on modernist publishing practices have tended to 
offer. In fact, Rachel Potter’s recent work on modernism and the trade in salacious 
books productively ambiguates the significance of modernist limited editions and 
subscription lists for readers and state authorities in the 1920s and 1930s by asking 
us to reconsider what these authorities and readers actually saw when presented 
with works like Shakespeare and Company’s Ulysses. Rather than follow the influen-
tial arguments in Lawrence Rainey’s Institutions of Modernism (1998) regarding the 
myriad uneven processes of commodification that modernist texts and publishing 
practices underwent in this period, she stresses instead legal and social features men-
tioned only in passing in his account. In addition to providing the means by which 
publishers in the 1920s could present Anglo-American modernist works to wealthy 
1. Ty Mahon, illustration from The Bastard, 1929 
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patrons as opportunities for speculative investment, subscription lists and limited 
editions were also publishing practices long associated with pornography. Since at 
least the nineteenth century, the use of limited editions and subscription lists had 
been a common practice in the publishing of pornographic texts that vexed legal 
distinctions between public and private. By pricing texts beyond the reach of those 
with low-to-average incomes and making such works available solely to those on 
a mailing list, publishers intended to remove potentially suppressible texts from 
public spaces and resituate them in presumably more private realms, helping to 
ensure that these texts would be safe from purity groups and nosy customs offi-
cials.33 According to Potter, “if Rainey sees Beach’s use of subscription lists as part 
of an attempt to create Ulysses as a special, luxury commodity, he downplays the 
fact that such means of dissemination had a long and complex history. It is only in 
retrospect that the distinctions between Ulysses and pornographic texts, and the 
literary market and the pornography trade, are straightforward. It did not look so 
clear-cut to some lawyers, judges, vice crusaders, publishers, customs officials, or 
others at the time.”34
 Consequently, The Bastard must have seemed a strange object indeed to patrons 
of Caldwell’s Longfellow Square Bookshop in Portland. Though priced and pub-
lished in a way potential buyers would have associated with the pornographic book 
trade, Caldwell’s novella nevertheless appeared for public sale in a bookstore, and 
not for a more confidential exchange via the supposed privacy of a subscription list. 
Furthermore, though Caldwell defended the naturalist pretenses of its words, The 
Bastard incurred the censorious attentions of the Cumberland County Attorney 
because of Ty Mahon’s illustrations of women in various stages of undress and 
arousal. It is these illustrations that confirmed the pornographic implications of 
the edition’s scarcity and price, neither of which were sufficient in themselves to 
connote modernist publication practices of the sort commonly associated with 
either Shakespeare and Company’s Ulysses or the Hogarth Press’s The Waste Land. 
In short, Caldwell’s public sale of The Bastard frustrated both the modernist and 
the pornographic implications of its mode of publication.
IV
The hooch dancer scene in The Bastard also prompts questions that are worth 
asking of Caldwell’s writing more generally. What do we in fact get to see when 
his anecdotal narratives appear to stall and groups of people stare at a couple in 
flagrante delicto or at the figure of a young woman said to be so attractive that she 
makes “you just ache to get down and lick something”?35 To what extent is “the 
reader . . . inscribed into sexualized scenes in the form of another character who 
watches the erotic action unfold” in Caldwell’s fiction?36 More plainly, just how 
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consequential are representations of voyeurism to Caldwell’s potential obscenity? 
I would like to make a start at providing some answers to these questions by offer-
ing readings of two texts. The first is a passage from the last of Caldwell’s novels in 
the 1930s, and the second is one of the most famous illustrated book covers in U.S. 
paperback publishing history. Articulating the interrelationships between these two 
texts should help to give us a better sense of the complex and variable functions 
performed by visuality in Caldwell’s work as it lucratively underwent paperback 
republication throughout the latter half of the 1940s.
 The most remarkable instance of voyeurism in all of Caldwell’s published fiction 
occurs about halfway through Journeyman (1935), which tells the story of the myste-
riously charismatic influence of a sinful traveling lay preacher (given the provocative 
name of Semon Dye) on both a family and a small community in the Depression-era 
South. After cuckolding Clay Horey as well as conning him out of his car, a watch, 
and one hundred dollars, Semon takes a trip with Clay to view the schoolhouse in 
which he will be delivering a sermon to the residents of the dirt-poor agrarian town 
of Rocky Comfort on the following day. Along the way, they stop at a neighbor’s 
property to drink some corn whiskey and pass the time before driving on to the 
schoolhouse. They find the neighbor, Tom Rhodes, alone in a cowshed, in which 
he sits “perched on a stool, looking through a crack in the wall of the shed. He had 
not seen them.”37 Semon and Clay startle Tom and begin to interrogate him: “‘What 
in thunder are you doing peeping through that crack, Tom?’ Clay said, stepping 
inside and stopping to look closely at Tom” (J, 169). Tom ineffectually tries to hide 
his embarrassment by laughing off their questions, but Semon and Clay press him 
further. The crack in the cowshed wall has piqued their interest.
Semon went across the shed and bent over at the crack. He peered through it 
for a few minutes, shutting one eye and squinting the other.
 “I don’t see a thing but the woods over there,” Semon said, standing erect 
and looking at Tom. But he was still wondering what it was that could be seen 
through the crack.
 Tom did not try to explain.
 “What in thunderation’s going on over across there, Tom?” Clay asked. He 
bent over and looked through the crack in the wall. He shut one eye, squinted 
the other one, but he could still see nothing except the pine trees. (J, 169)
Semon asks Tom about his corn whiskey, and the men start to take long drafts from 
it in turn. Once the whiskey passes to Clay and Tom, Semon takes a stool over to 
the cowshed wall and bends his head to the crack there.
He sat there, looking through it with his eye squinted for several minutes. After 
that he raised his head and looked at the others rather sheepishly.
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 “See anything?” Clay said.
 “Not much.”
 “Move over, then, and let me take a look through it.”
 Clay sat down and looked through the crack. There was nothing much to 
be seen except the trees on the other side of the pasture. The fence over there 
that bordered that side of the pasture was barbed wire, and the posts were 
split pine. He saw all that in a glance, and there was nothing else to see, but he 
continued to look through the crack as though he saw something that he had 
never seen before in his life. (J, 171)
Tom and Semon talk for a spell about the Rocky Comfort schoolhouse before Tom 
starts to get anxious and demands his turn at the crack in the cowshed wall.
[Tom] pushed Clay away from the stool and sat down to press his face against 
the wall where the crack was. He moved his head slightly to the left, then low-
ered it a fraction of an inch. After that he sat motionless.
 “See anything, coz?” Semon said.
 Tom said nothing. (J, 172)
Semon drinks deeply from the corn whiskey jug and admits to Clay there is not 
much sense in their seeing the schoolhouse before his revival the next day after 
all.
Semon walked nervously around the cow shed. He came to a stop behind Tom.
 “Don’t hog it all the time, coz,” he said, pushing him. “Let a white man take 
a look once in a while.”
 Tom got up and looked for the jug.
 “I can’t seem to remember when I liked to look at a thing so much as I do 
now,” Semon said, adjusting his eye to the crack. (J, 172–73)
Clay cleans his harmonica of the tobacco flakes embedded in it and starts to play a 
tune (“I’ve Got a Gal”) while Semon, an eye still pressed to the crack in the cowshed 
wall, “began keeping time with his feet on the bare earth” (J, 173).
 At this point, Tom starts to soliloquize about the unaccountable attractions of 
the crack in the cowshed wall:
“That’s the God-damnedest little slit in the whole world,” Tom said. “I come 
down here and sit on the stool and look through it all morning sometimes. 
There’s not a doggone thing to see but the trees over there, and maybe the fence 
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posts, but I can’t keep from looking to save my soul. It’s the doggonest thing I 
ever saw in all my life.”
 Semon settled himself more comfortably on the stool.
 “There’s not a single thing to see,” Tom said, “and then again there’s the 
whole world to look at. Looking through the side of the shed aint like nothing 
else I can think of. You sit there a while, and the first thing you know, you can’t 
get away from it. It gets a hold on a man like nothing else does. You sit there, 
screwing up your eye and looking at the tree or something, and you might start 
to thinking what a fool thing you’re doing, but you don’t give a cuss about that. 
All you care for is staying there and looking.” (J, 173–74)
 Clay’s harmonica-playing and Semon’s bare-feet timekeeping are now joined 
by Tom’s intermittent singing and humming: “She wore a little yellow dress— . . . —
those eyes were made for me to see. . . . In the night-time is the right time—” (J, 174). 
An eye still pressed to the crack in the cowshed wall, Semon starts to reach for the 
corn whiskey: “His hand was searching in a circle for it, but it was beyond his reach. 
He would not stop looking through the crack for even a second to see where the 
jug really was” (J, 174). Tom tells Semon to get up and away from the crack in the 
cowshed wall if he wants any more corn whiskey. Semon lingers, and Tom pushes 
him away from the crack in the cowshed wall.
Semon sat down on the other stool, rubbing the strain from his left eye. He 
blinked several times, resuming the tapping of his feet.
 He took a long drink and put the jug down at Clay’s side.
 “That’s the God-damndest slit I ever saw in all my life,” Semon said. “You 
can look through there all day and never get tired. And come back the next day, 
and I’ll bet it would look just as good. There’s something about looking through 
a crack that nothing else in the whole wide world will give you.” (J, 175)
After Clay has problems making himself quit his harmonica-playing, the song 
somehow manages to climax finally, and he takes a break. Semon offers Clay two 
turns instead of one at the crack in the cowshed wall if he starts playing “I’ve Got a 
Gal” again. He also manages to convince Clay to give up his next turn at the crack 
in the cowshed wall. Clay resumes the song.
With his head pressed tightly against the shed wall, Tom started humming 
again. He patted his feet on the ground, swinging into rhythm with the tune 
Clay was playing.
 “There’s never been but one gal like that in all the world,” Semon said. The 
tears welled in his eyes and dripped against the backs of his hands. “If I could 
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just look through the crack and see her, I wouldn’t ask to live no longer. That 
crack is the God-damnedest thing I ever looked through. I sit there and look, 
and think about that gal, thinking maybe I’ll see her with the next bat of my 
eye, and all the time I’m looking clear to the back side of heaven.”
 He strode to the wall and pushed Tom away. Without waiting to sit down 
first, he pressed his eye to the slit in the wall. After that he slowly sat down on 
the stool. (J, 176)
Tom takes his turn at the corn whiskey and puts the jug at Clay’s feet, but Clay is 
too involved in playing the song to stop.
“When I’m loving you, I’m telling you—”
 Semon put his hand to his face and wiped the tears from his cheeks.
 “I don’t know what I’d do without that crack in the wall,” Tom said. “I 
reckon I’d just dry up and die away, I’d be that sad about it. I come down here 
and sit and look, and I don’t see nothing you can’t see better from the outside, 
but that don’t make a bit of difference. It’s sitting there looking through the 
crack at the trees all day long that sort of gets me. I don’t know what it is, and 
it might not be nothing at all when you figure it out. But it’s not the knowing 
about it, anyway—it’s just the sitting there and looking through it that sort of 
makes me feel like heaven can’t be so doggone far away.” (J, 177)
With this, the chapter comes to an end, and the narrative shifts jarringly on the 
next page to midafternoon the next day at the Rocky Comfort schoolhouse, where 
Semon’s revival is about to get under way.
 At least two things are notable about the scene at the crack in Tom Rhodes’s 
cowshed wall. First, there is the almost compulsive deployment of repetition at the 
levels of action, character, and narrative voice. Dialogue and behavior seem to be 
comprised of a few simple units of action that the narrative voice establishes within 
a page or two (Tom starts to soliloquize about “the God-damndest little slit,” Semon 
closes one eye and squints the other, Tom pushes Clay away from the crack in the 
cowshed wall, etc.). The text then successively recombines them with a changing 
cast of subjects (Semon starts to soliloquize about “the God-damndest slit,” Clay 
closes one eye and squints the other, Semon pushes Tom away from the crack in the 
cowshed wall, etc.) until Tom’s monologue about feeling closer to heaven somehow 
comes to constitute an end to the chapter, if not to the men’s experience at the crack 
in the cowshed wall that day.
 Though its functions in Caldwell’s fiction are variable and complex, in this 
particular passage repetition does seem to capture something of the development 
of ideologies of modernization in the early twentieth-century United States.38 As 
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represented by way of repetition here, individual autonomy dissolves in the behav-
iors and speeches shifting and misfiring between Caldwell’s characters, whom it is 
often quite difficult to distinguish from one another without the punctual inser-
tion of their proper names to designate who speaks a particular group of words 
or performs a given set of acts. Just as Lewis’s cultural criticism of the 1920s and 
1930s warned, one’s deeds and very speech here become drastically alienable, and 
it is this alienability as mediated by repetition in Caldwell’s fiction that potentially 
bears the marks of a radically transformed social existence in the early decades of 
the last century in the United States. Rather than marking out a space for ironic 
embodiment and the bare possibility of agency, as it does in the creative work of 
Lewis, repetition in Caldwell merely confirms that characters are all of a piece, 
adopting each other’s words as well as taking up each other’s gestures and actions. 
To the extent that it is at all proper to speak of subjectivity in Caldwell’s fiction, 
then, the terms in which one does so should be collective or communal rather than 
individual.
 What paradoxically holds together this collectively conceived subject in 
Caldwell’s work, however, is the radical delinking effected by its compulsion to 
repeat itself. In the course of exploring binding and unbinding tendencies in psy-
chic structures, Sigmund Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) introduced 
the possibility that those very structures could come undone, as is famously said 
to happen in the chaotic disorder of the death drive and its potential to actual-
ize itself in the compulsion to repeat.39 Although such a repetition can possibly 
invest libidinal energy in painful affects, in doing so it also prevents those affects 
from becoming part of an integral ego. Impeding the interconnections of inner 
life, repetition compulsions therefore ensure that these affects and their associated 
behaviors remain fragmentary, iterative, stagnant.40 In this view, then, what binds 
Clay, Tom, and Semon in the scene at the crack in the cowshed wall (their repe-
titious actions and speech) would appear to foreclose any future for their shared 
behaviors. Caldwell thus abruptly cuts off the chapter because the scene in princi-
ple has no end in sight. Unlike Gertrude Stein’s The Making of Americans and its 
interminably ramifying examples of the differential intensities of repetition (e.g., 
the vital repetition of repeating vs. the repetition without difference that Stein des-
ignates as mere copying), the Journeyman passage instead repurposes repetition as a 
mode of free indirect discourse.41 That is to say, Caldwell’s text enacts the bafflement 
that is occurring inaudibly at a visual level by mimicking it within the undertones 
of its banally repetitive narration, which regressively circles around an unintelligible 
“seen” figure.42
 Closely related to this use of repetition, the hole itself clearly suggests that the 
object of compulsive looking in Caldwell’s fiction is absence itself. As represented 
in his work, gaps and laterally viewed blurs in the voyeur’s field of vision precipitate 
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both an overmastering compulsion to look again and a spreading confusion about 
how to rationalize this seemingly unmotivated behavior. Voyeurism here is hence 
defined by disruptions of its conventions of use. There certainly is Schaulust in his 
fiction, but we as readers are not invited to partake of it; instead, we are merely 
invited to oversee or overhear the distorted traces of its enactment and the strange 
effects it has on Caldwell’s characters, if not on us as well. His prose does not attempt 
to visualize erotic scenes of looking but uses such scenes instead to help depict 
characters’ desires and fantasies of presence by means of something that remains 
unseen or is but poorly glimpsed within the illegible tableau on display.43
 Journeyman’s scene at the crack in the cowshed wall can thus be said to antici-
pate the response of some major twentieth-century visual artists to the self-reflexive, 
formalist “opticality” famously espoused by Clement Greenberg, who stressed the 
purity not only of artistic mediums but also of visual experience itself. In con-
trast to Greenberg, Caldwell’s hick voyeurs embody both visuality and its effects 
in conspicuously prosaic discourse, all while calling into question the separability 
of naturally occurring perceptual elements such as visuality and tactility, or eyes 
and the mobile body in space.44 Not unlike minimalist critiques of Greenbergian 
modernism such as Robert Smithson’s Enantiomorphic Chambers (1964) or Marcel 
Duchamp’s invitation/frustration of voyeurism in Étant donnés (1946–66), the scene 
at the crack in the cowshed wall objectifies pure “opticality” through the frustration 
of sight.45 Caldwell does little to make appear before his readers’ eyes the objects of 
his characters’ fantasies or even the gap-filled visions onto which these fantasies are 
projected. In general, this is what makes matters of sight and visuality structural—
but not representational or interpellative—in his work. Strictly speaking, there is 
very little content that can be or in fact is shared in the erotics of Caldwell’s looking. 
His supernumerary voyeuristic scenes do not function as invitations to pleasure 
so much as demonstrations that there is voyeuristic looking in these imagined life-
worlds and that such looking is itself marked by a field of vision dotted with blurs, 
sties, and blind spots. In short, the obscene potentials of Caldwell’s texts depend 
upon entirely different circuits than those provided by the problems of representa-
tional space or visuality alone.
V
Here is a second text with which we can further assess the obscene potentials 
of Caldwell’s work (see fig. 2). In the mid-1940s, Caldwell’s agent (Max Lieber) 
and hardback publisher (Duell, Sloan and Pearce) sold North American paper-
back reprint rights to all of his fiction to the U.S. branch of Penguin Books, and 
these rights were subsequently transferred to the New American Library of World 
Literature (NAL) and its Signet imprint after Victor Weybright and Kurt Enoch 
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left Penguin to start their own paperback company later in the 1940s.46 Notably, 
the midcentury rise of paperback publishing, distribution, and advertising was 
instrumental in driving Caldwell’s book sales to unprecedented heights even as 
the quality of his later cyclorama fiction was said by most critics to be diminishing 
markedly with each new novel.47 U.S. sales of the Penguin God’s Little Acre reached 
three million copies within two years of the first paperback edition, and those of 
Tobacco Road reached one million copies within nine months of the first Penguin 
edition.48 In addition to the aggressive use of advertising, which included Caldwell’s 
personal involvement in the promotion of the Penguin/Signet reprints of his work 
at drugstores across the country, the remarkable success of the first Penguin edition 
of God’s Little Acre has traditionally been attributed to Robert Jonas’s pop-Magritte 
peephole cover for that book. As Robert L. Bonn notes in his historical overview 
of the American mass-market paperback industry, God’s Little Acre “became a 
2. Robert Jonas, cover illustration for 




runaway bestseller, and the knothole cover that promised forbidden insights into 
Southern comforts was credited with stimulating much of the sales. The peephole 
device, placed within the rather rigid front-cover frame design, gave birth to lit-
erally hundreds of paperbound keyholes, wall chinks, and assorted spyholes. For 
many readers the Jonas knothole has become a symbol of paperback publishing.”49
 While Jonas’s illustration appears to be covering the wrong Caldwell novel—
its peephole looking out onto a rural landscape free of people recalls the scene at 
the crack in the cowshed wall in Journeyman more than it does any voyeuristic 
encounter in God’s Little Acre—the cover to the first Penguin edition God’s Little 
Acre is nevertheless consistent with the structural functions ascribed to Caldwellian 
voyeurism earlier. As in Journeyman, the object of sight here is an absence wait-
ing to be filled with libidinal projections that the “object” itself (in this case, the 
hole-dotted field and rural house) does not offer beyond the barest hints provided 
by the frame: the arrows piercing the heart carved below the vaguely heart-shaped 
knothole. On its own, then, the Jonas cover to God’s Little Acre seems a fit emblem 
for the representation of visuality in Caldwell, withholding as it does the referents 
(women in various stages of undress and/or arousal) stereotypically ascribed to 
such peephole devices. Yet Bonn’s account of the influence of Jonas’s illustration 
on subsequent paperback covers claims that this influence was predicated on the 
“forbidden insights into Southern comforts” that the cover was understood to be 
promising with regard to the contents of God’s Little Acre itself. Given Caldwell’s 
typical frustration of clearly visible representations of voyeuristic peeping, how-
ever, the illustration itself appears to be subject to the sorts of projections and 
fantasies alluded to in Journeyman. Therefore, the Jonas peephole cover should 
not be interpreted without taking into account subsequent Penguin and Signet 
editions of Caldwell’s work to see the kinds of visions and projections to which it 
did in fact give rise.
 Looking at a chronological sampling of covers to the paperback reprints of 
Caldwell’s work from the late 1940s, we find the following (see figs. 3–7). That these 
illustrated covers comprise so many repetitious revisions of Jonas’s peephole cover 
to God’s Little Acre goes without saying. If Jonas’s first Caldwell illustration man-
aged to get at how vision and voyeurism appear to function in Caldwell’s novels by 
evacuating the object in sight of anything remotely arousing in and of itself, then 
the following Signet editions of Caldwell’s fiction acted to project onto the screen 
of Jonas’s famous peephole cover the fantasies of sexual difference and desire that 
that illustration pointedly avoided depicting. In fact, it is these later paperback 
covers—and not the words they enclosed—that increasingly support the view that 
Caldwell’s fiction and potential for obscenity depend upon fairly simplistic repre-
sentations of Schaulust in which the reader/viewer gets himself “inscribed” into or 
otherwise hailed by the desiring men and desirable women on display.
Caldwell and Obscenity
121
 The strategies for this interpellation and inscription are mixed: in some cases, 
a foregrounded male voyeur is shown to be watching the suggestively clothed and 
posed body of a woman through a frame, as in the Journeyman cover (fig. 3) and 
the cover to The Sure Hand of God (fig. 7). In others, such as the cover to Tragic 
Ground (fig. 4), foreground and background relations are reversed, with the prof-
fered libidinal object of view moved to the near side of the peephole device.50 Jonas’s 
cover to the Signet edition of A House in the Uplands (fig. 5) plays on a number of 
features in his illustration for God’s Little Acre (the columns of a Southern mansion 
replace the clapboard structure in the earlier cover, the lush hillocks substitute for 
the pockmarked fields on the Waldens’s property, etc.) even as it inserts the sort of 
object for sight that that cover had famously withheld. The sleeve of her form-fit-
ting dress sliding down her left shoulder, a woman leans against the frame of a 
door functioning as the peephole in the illustration. She both obscures the putative 
object of view (the Southern mansion and its surrounding property) and reveals the 
dormant libidinal potentials inhering in that object when seen focalized through 
the opening provided by the doorframe. Save for her hair color and some details of 
dress, she bears a remarkable resemblance to the woman in the Journeyman cover. 
In particular, the cover to A House in the Uplands studiously copies the form-fit-
ting red dress, the sliding left cap sleeve, and the pose of the woman used in the 
earlier illustration. By the time of the Signet publication of A Woman in the House 
(fig. 6) in February 1949, the variability of the earlier covers in their deployment of 
bodies, apertures, objects, and male viewers had seemingly resolved itself into the 
facile singularity of a literal keyhole through which a young woman can be seen 
(un)dressing. While certainly less than generous, it would not be entirely unfair to 
understand this particular cover as expressing the truth of Jonas’s God’s Little Acre 
illustration for the paperback industry, revealing as it does the sorts of objectifica-
tions and asymmetrical relationships to which the peephole device readily lends 
itself. Over and over again, the paperback illustrations covering Caldwell’s work 
in the 1940s attempted to fill in the absences in the field of vision upon which he 
bases his voyeurism. At the very least, it is here, if anywhere, that the aggressively 
crude male gaze is to be more properly located in Caldwell’s work.51
 Yet we miss something about how these covers converge with Caldwell’s own 
optical apparatuses if we insist on simply reading them as so many attempts to 
neutralize the disruptive indeterminacies in the Caldwellian field of vision. If we 
bracket for the moment the screen-without-depth quality of Jonas’s God’s Little Acre 
cover, that illustration can be seen to offer us a vantage point of one interior out onto 
an exterior (the clapboard structure) containing yet another interior into which we 
are not yet close enough to see. If we frame the relationship of this illustration to 
the one covering A Woman in the House as one marked by a transit into that distant 
interior sketched by Jonas, then it is as if we have somehow made it through Jonas’s 
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3. (above left) Robert Jonas, cover illustra-
tion for the first Penguin/Signet edition of 
Journeyman, 1947 
4. (above right) Robert Jonas, cover illustra-
tion for the first Penguin/Signet edition of 
Tragic Ground, 1948 
5. (left) Robert Jonas, cover illustration for 
the first Signet edition of A House in the 
Uplands, 1948 
6. (opposite left) Unknown illustrator, cover 
illustration for the first Signet edition of A 
Woman in the House, 1949 
7. (opposite right) James Avati, cover illustra-
tion for the first Signet edition of The Sure 
Hand of God, 1949 
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knothole, crossed the hole-dotted field, and gotten up close enough to the house 
to take a peek through the keyhole only to find . . . another covered hole.52 In this 
view, we end up not so much with a totalizing male gaze but rather with an infinite 
regress of interiors that frustratingly appears to shift the obscene potentials of the 
paperback book cover onto the words it encloses.
 The paperback branding of Caldwell’s novels as a popular literary commodity 
bringing forbidden sights into view also helps a great deal in our understanding why 
the historical record of the attempts to proscribe his work on grounds of obscenity 
is so uneven and sporadic. After the unsuccessful prosecution of God’s Little Acre 
on charges of obscenity levied by the New York Society for the Suppression of 
Vice in 1933, thirteen years passed before purity groups, cities, and nations started 
prosecuting or banning the book in earnest. For instance, only in 1946 did the city 
of St. Paul start to enforce a municipal ban of God’s Little Acre. The following year, 
the Penguin twenty-five-cent edition of Caldwell’s novel was banned in Denver 
because of a concern in that city about the potentially adverse effects of the book on 
teenagers. Boston seized and tried God’s Little Acre in 1950, and in 1953 the National 
Organization of Decent Literature in Chicago included the novel among its list of 
disapproved works. Also in 1953, the National Newsagent, Bookseller, Stationer in 
England put God’s Little Acre on a list of published books that local magistrates 
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had singled out for destruction. That same year, Ireland banned both Tobacco Road 
and God’s Little Acre.53 It would seem that the strange delay in the prosecution 
and proscription of Caldwell’s 1930s novels (and of God’s Little Acre in particular) 
depended upon contemporary developments in the paperback industry. At the 
very least, without our first taking into account paperback publishing practices and 
their reception in the 1940s and 1950s, the lag time in the proscription of Caldwell’s 
novels on grounds of obscenity otherwise appears to be arbitrary.
 The signal innovations of American paperback publishing in the 1940s were not 
only the considerable reductions in the price of books that publishers managed to 
implement and then sustain but also the opening of new markets that they achieved 
by altering substantively what were then the standard models of distribution in 
the book publishing industry.54 Rather than distribute their products in tradi-
tional trade bookstores, paperback publishers followed the example set by Robert 
DeGraff ’s Pocket Books and shifted their products to unconventional outlets such 
as newsstands, drugstores, and grocery stores by way of independent wholesale 
distributors.55 Due in part to conditions arising from this change in distribution and 
reduction in price, the incredible sales and popularity of paperbacks at this time 
tended to hinge principally upon the successful targeting of demographics (e.g., 
various youth markets) and classes (especially the lower socioeconomic strata) 
hitherto not expressly catered to by bookstores or hardcover book publishers in the 
United States. When coupled with the physical appearance of these volumes, which 
often seemed intent on outdoing each other in terms of sensationalized covers 
depicting salaciously posed and often barely clothed female bodies, the nature of 
the threats posed by paperbacks in the 1940s called forth a coordinated system of 
public concern in which categories of youth, class, and sex found their place.
 It is in this changed and charged world of mass-market paperback readership 
that Caldwell’s reputed obscenity finally became visible to a large number of his 
contemporaries. In hardcover, God’s Little Acre had occasioned a single obscen-
ity trial upon its release in 1933.56 It was only following its immensely successful 
paperback reprinting in 1946 that the novel came to be commonly viewed as posing 
the sorts of obscene threats to which courts, cities, and even nations needed to 
react proscriptively. Determining whether Caldwell’s work itself or mass-market 
paperbacks in general were the problem, then, is no small matter in discussing the 
obscene potentials of his fiction, for it complicates the very time and site of what 
literary critics have taken to calling “obscene modernism” or “modernist obscenity.” 
To take but one striking example in this respect, I would note that the prosecu-
tion of William Faulkner’s Sanctuary and The Wild Palms on grounds of obscenity 
did not begin until 1948, respectively seventeen and nine years after their initial 
dates of publication, but roughly contemporaneous with the initial release of their 
Caldwell and Obscenity
125
paperback reprint versions. Accordingly, mass-market paperback publishing would 
seem to be worthy of study alongside limited-edition modes of distribution as well.
 As a mode of book publishing, marketing, and distribution, paperbacks 
comprised such a distinctive public threat at the time that they were subjected 
to intense federal scrutiny. In 1952 a Select Committee on Current Pornographic 
Materials (dubbed the Gathings Committee in the press) began holding hearings 
in the United States House of Representatives in order to assess the editorial and 
marketing procedures of the paperback publishing industry. The chairman of the 
committee, Representative Ezekiel Gathings (Democrat-Arkansas), initiated the 
investigative hearings because he was deeply troubled by the paperbacks, mag-
azines, and comic books he saw displayed in plain view on newsstands and in 
drugstores on his daily walks to the House of Representatives. With the authori-
zation of House Resolution 596, the Gathings Committee undertook “a full and 
complete investigation and study (1) to determine the extent to which current lit-
erature—books, magazines, and comic books—containing immoral, obscene, or 
otherwise offensive matter, or placing improper emphasis on crime, violence, and 
corruption, are being made available to the people of the United States through 
the United States mails and otherwise; and (2) to determine the adequacy of exist-
ing law to prevent the publication and distribution of books containing immoral, 
offensive, and other undesirable matter.”57 In the report issued on December 31, 1952, 
a majority of the Gathings Committee acknowledged that the scope of obscenity 
in the paperback industry was indeed cause for considerable alarm, even though 
“obscene” paperbacks themselves comprised only a small proportion of the overall 
output of any given paperback publisher. To combat the effects and influence of 
obscene paperbacks, the committee offered three recommendations to the House 
based on the results of their investigation: 
(1) Congress should enact legislation making it “a Federal offense to knowingly 
transport in interstate or foreign commerce for sale or distribution certain 
specified articles and matters, including books and pamphlets of an obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, or filthy character.”58
(2) Congress should enact legislation permitting the Postmaster General “to 
impound mail pendente lite which is addressed to a person or concern 
which is obtaining or attempting to obtain remittances of money through 
the mails in exchange for any obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy, or 
vile article, matter, thing, device or substance.” The committee also recom-
mended that Congress should exempt “the Post Office Department from the 
provision of the Administrative Procedure Act,” which included a number of 
routinized steps that apparently gave the putative pornographer both time 
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and opportunity in which to continue to profit from the dissemination of 
obscene materials while the bureaucratic wheels slowly turned.59
(3) The paperback industry should “recognize the growing public opposition 
to that proportion of its output which may be classified as ‘border line’ or 
‘objectionable,’ and take the steps necessary to its elimination on its own 
initiative, rather than to allow this opposition to increase to the point where 
the public will demand governmental action.”60
An accompanying minority report strenuously objected to the first two recom-
mendations by noting that obscenity was already a heavily legislated problem at 
the federal and state levels—only New Mexico did not have an obscenity statute on 
the books in 1952—and that the abrogation of the Administrative Procedure Act 
on behalf of the U.S. Post Office was not within the powers of the committee itself 
to recommend.61
 Suggestively, the split in the committee between the authors of the Report and 
those of its highly critical minority report hinged upon which parts of the increas-
ingly contentious body of U.S. case law on obscenity each group felt possessed 
precedential force in the current discussion and investigation of paperbacks. In 
its opening pages, the official Report of the Gathings Committee positions itself 
against those recent lower and appellate court cases (e.g., United States v. One Book 
Called “Ulysses” and Commonwealth v. Gordon et al.) that had attempted to nullify 
the provisions of the Cockburn test by arguing instead for holistic readings of those 
texts charged with obscenity:
[The Woolsey test] held with reference to alleged obscene books that in deter-
mining whether or not a particular book is obscene, the yardstick is that the 
pertinent theme is controlling and that if the obscene contents are only for the 
purpose of delineating character, it will not necessarily cause the book to be 
held obscene, particularly if otherwise the literary character is such as to place 
it in an acceptable category. It is as elastic as rubber in its interpretive suscep-
tibility and supplies the purveyors of obscenity with an excuse regardless of 
what is the degree of obscenity involved and requires each and every book to 
be judged separately, an almost impossible task.
The Woolsey test is subsequently described as a “revolutionary” overturning of 
“a long-existing principle of law [i.e., the Cockburn test] dealing directly with 
obscenity in literature,” and the Report goes on to contend (ungrammatically) that 
because of it, “the judicial viewpoint on the subject of obscenity in literature today, 
establishing [sic] a new legal philosophy in that field but one so elastic that it serves 
as the basis for excuse to print and circulate the filthiest most obscene literature 
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without concurrent literary value to support it, ever known in history. Referred 
to constantly by every publisher of obscene literature whenever approached on 
the subject, a layman finds it difficult to successfully counter the argument of the 
publishers citing the Ulysses [sic] case.”
 As for Judge Curtis Bok’s attempts to deproscribe and altogether unsettle 
legal formulations of obscenity in Commonwealth v. Gordon et al., the Gathings 
Committee spends most of its discussion of that case looking at circumstantial evi-
dence in order to suggest that Bok’s views on the matter of obscenity and books 
were unavoidably biased (Report, 6). Rather than read and analyze the opinion in 
Commonwealth v. Gordon et al., the Report simply notes that Bok is the grandson of 
the founder of the Curtis Publishing Company, the acting vice president and director 
of which at that time was Bok’s brother. Moreover, Bok’s mother sat on its board of 
directors, and the company owned 42.5 percent of the stock of Bantam Books, Inc., 
“one of the largest producers of pocket-size books of the type of those referred to 
in the committee hearings.” Immediately after offering this information, the com-
mittee hastens to disavow any intention of calling Bok’s “honesty or integrity as a 
judge” into question in any way. The Report, however, does go on to assert that it is 
“reasonably possible that having been associated so closely with the publishing busi-
ness that [Bok] became inherently imbued with a liberal conception of the tradition 
founded upon the constitutional provision guaranteeing the freedom of the press” 
(Report, 7). Against the unduly influenced views of Judge Bok in Commonwealth v. 
Gordon et al., the Gathings Committee devotes the next six pages of the Report to 
the extensive quotation from and interpretation of an opposing precedential body of 
case law on obscenity, namely one in which the proscriptive force and applicability 
of contemporary obscenity laws to books had been consistently reaffirmed despite 
the corrosive effects ascribed to the Woolsey and Bok opinions (Report, 7–13). Not 
surprisingly, the attached minority report simply reverses the Report’s evaluations 
as to which legal precedents ought to be followed within the terms set by the House 
for the committee’s investigative hearings (Report, 122–23). Against the authors of 
the Report, the minority report prizes and defends the Woolsey and Bok opinions as 
estimable and authoritative attempts “to separate the realm of obscenity from what 
amounts to legitimate written expression” (Report, 122).
VI
Not simply because it comprises a landmark of sorts in the efforts of liberaliz-
ing lower court and appellate judges in the twentieth century to deproscribe the 
obscenity of books in this country, Judge Bok’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Gordon 
et al. will occupy us for the remainder of the chapter, as will God’s Little Acre, one of 
the books charged with obscenity in that case. In 1948, following a Fundamentalist 
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minister’s complaint, the chief inspector of the Philadelphia Vice Squad had a 
patrolman purchase and read a number of books sold in the area. This patrolman 
focused initially on twenty-five books, in which he marked passages containing 
obscene or otherwise objectionable descriptions and words. Based on these find-
ings, a raid—for which no warrant was secured—took place on the premises of 
fifty-four Philadelphia booksellers, during which the police seized about two thou-
sand putatively obscene texts. Officers subsequently got warrants for the arrest of 
five of these booksellers, who were charged for the possession and intent to sell 
nine allegedly obscene books: William Faulkner’s Sanctuary and Wild Palms, James 
T. Farrell’s Studs Lonigan trilogy and A World I Never Made, Calder Willingham’s 
End as a Man, Harold Robbins’s Never Love a Stranger, and Erskine Caldwell’s God’s 
Little Acre.62 While there is no mention made in accounts of the raids or in the trial 
opinion itself as to the format in which the seized and charged books were found 
(hardcover or paperback), all of these texts either had recently appeared as paper-
backs (God’s Little Acre [Penguin/Signet 581, March 1946], Sanctuary [Penguin/
Signet 632, April 1947], Young Lonigan [Penguin/Signet 643, September 1947], and 
The Wild Palms [Penguin/Signet 659, January 1948]) or were soon to be republished 
in that form (End as a Man [Avon 240, January 1950], The Young Manhood of Studs 
Lonigan [Signet 810, September 1950], Never Love a Stranger [Bantam A814, 1950], 
Judgment Day [Signet S875, January 1951], and A World I Never Made [Signet D926, 
January 1952]).
 A trial without jury began in the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County 
later that year, and on March 18, 1949, Judge Curtis Bok delivered a lengthy opinion 
in which he held that the books at issue in the case of Commonwealth v. Gordon et al. 
were not obscene as alleged by the district attorney. In the course of reaching this 
decision, Bok’s opinion extensively reviewed the precedential histories of legal 
obscenity in England and America; relativized concepts of decency, censorship 
standards, and moral codes; argued that obscene books can only be proscribed 
provided they have a dominant effect of erotic allurement that poses a clear and 
present danger to the community; and suggested that the marketplace, and not the 
courts, was “the best crucible in which to distil an instinctive morality” (Gordon, 66 
Pa. D.&C., at 127). According to Bok, neither did the books in this case possess “a 
calculated and effective incitement to sexual desire” as an end nor could the reading 
of them be said to lead to the commission or to the imminence of the commission 
of criminal behavior (Gordon, at 151 and 155). Subsequently, both the Superior and 
Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania upheld Bok’s decision. Sanctuary, The Wild Palms, 
the Studs Lonigan trilogy, God’s Little Acre, and the other allegedly obscene books 
were hereafter free to circulate in Pennsylvania bookshops and drugstores.
 The question guiding Bok in Commonwealth v. Gordon et al. may be posed 
simply as “What is obscenity?” To which Bok gives the categorical answer, “Not 
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books.” After reviewing the Pennsylvania statute at issue in the prosecution of these 
particular booksellers, Bok refuses to grant any immediately apparent or transhis-
torical significance to the term “obscenity”: “I assume that ‘obscenity’ is expected 
to have a familiar and inherent meaning, both as to what it is and as to what it 
does. It is my purpose to show that it has no such inherent meaning; that different 
meanings given to it at different times are not constant, either historically or legally; 
that it is not constitutionally indictable unless it takes the form of sexual impurity, 
i.e. ‘dirt for dirt’s sake’ and can be traced to actual criminal behavior, either actual 
[sic] or demonstrably imminent” (Gordon, at 104). There are two prongs to Bok’s 
test for obscenity here: to be indictable as obscenity, the putatively obscene object 
itself must be sexually impure and demonstrably linked to manifestly criminal acts. 
That is to say, one must be able to translate the sexual impurity of the text itself 
to the indictable—and apparently sexually impure—behaviors of those who have 
encountered that text in the world. This would appear to assume that “sexual impu-
rity” is any more definable than “obscenity,” though Bok soon enough ventures a 
definition: “Sexual impurity in literature (pornography, as some of the cases call it) I 
define as any writing whose dominant purpose is erotic allurement—that is to say, a 
calculated and effective incitement to sexual desire. It is the effect that counts, more 
than the purpose, and no indictment can stand unless it can be shown” (Gordon, 
at 151). For Bok, “sexual impurity” is synonymous with a successful seduction that 
would lead to a sexual act proscribable under criminal law. The tautology of the 
test is quite obvious: “sexual impurity” names an effective cause just as the criminal 
behavior linked to it must reveal itself to be the caused effect of that effective cause.
 Furthermore, Bok’s test seems on its face to be as useful for those seeking to 
strengthen and expand the scope of the proscriptive powers of obscenity laws as 
it would be for liberalizing judges and jurists. That is to say, there seems to be a 
considerable haze of uncertainty concerning how one is supposed to apply the 
cause-and-effect machinery of this test to indicted books in obscenity proceedings. 
Bok spends the remainder of his opinion attempting to foreclose any indefinite 
interpretation of his test by arguing that books cannot be obscene, because they do 
not fall within the purview of  “sexual impurity” as defined by him and consequently 
cannot lead to criminal behavior (Gordon, at 117). A book “cannot be a present 
danger unless its reader closes it, lays it aside, and transmutes its erotic allurement 
into overt action. That such action must inevitably follow as a direct consequence of 
reading the book does not bear analysis, nor is it borne out by general human expe-
rience; too much can intervene and too many diversions take place.” Against the 
diversions and indeterminacies involved in regulating how books relate to or bear 
upon physical acts, Bok counterposes laws proscribing public lewdness, understood 
by him to be far less dubious, since a person “who is publicly lewd is in himself an 
open and immediate invitation to morally criminal behavior” (Gordon, at 153). By 
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refusing to specify the mediations involved in transmuting printed textual matter 
into bodily responses, Bok expresses a radical doubt as to their possibility in the 
first place. The mediations that may take place between book texts and corporeal 
acts cannot be regulated like public lewdness, the clear and present danger of which 
Bok does not question but rather directly opposes to the weak, perhaps illusory, 
threats said to be posed by books. In Commonwealth v. Gordon et al., the danger of 
lewdness is its immediacy, while representations of lewdness, such as those appear-
ing time and time again in God’s Little Acre, are so mediated that they pose little 
direct harm. As Lewis’s critiques of Watsonian behaviorism pointed out earlier, 
words would continue to gum up the functioning of stimuli-response reactions so 
long as the world failed to be governed by behaviorist principles. Commonwealth 
v. Gordon et al. thus reveals that Lewis was far too quick to take the eventual vic-
tory of behaviorism for granted because by the 1940s people were becoming less, 
not more, responsive to the sensory content of words on the page. He had greatly 
overestimated how many potential Cantlemans were out there incubating among 
the literate masses.
 Resistant to theorization and regulation though they may be, the claims books 
make on bodies nevertheless remain what is at issue in obscenity case law from this 
period. Accordingly, it is a signal failure of Bok’s opinion that it renders unprob-
lematic a set of arrangements and encounters in the world that continued to be 
problems. More particularly, however, his opinion does not simply miss something 
about the effects books can have on their readers; it also completely disregards the 
reflexive staging of the specific effects for which Caldwell’s novel strives.
  A brief detour through Sigmund Freud’s Jokes and Their Relation to the 
Unconscious is needed if we are to form a clearer sense of how this reflexive staging 
takes place. In that work, Freud argues that smutty exchanges generally occur among 
the relatively uninhibited and thus do not arise to the level of jokes proper. Smut 
(Zote) appears as a marginal case in Freud’s book, as do the people from among the 
lower social strata who pursue such exchanges. Unlike that of the joke proper, the 
typical smutty encounter requires the presence of three people: a speaker—always a 
man in Freud’s account—who uses his sexually explicit words as a way of seducing 
a woman—and it is always a woman—in front of another man. The function of the 
other man is crucial because his presence helps ensure the graphic wooing speech 
attains the condition of smut: if the woman were to yield too quickly to the speaker’s 
words, then we would not have smut but rather a successful seduction.63 According 
to Freud, the presence of the other man means that “an immediate surrender by the 
woman is as good as out of the question,” thereby guaranteeing her (temporary) 
intransigence, which is the first condition of smut.64 Without this intransigence, the 
sexually exciting speech would not come to be an aim in itself and thereby become 
smut. This is a crucial point: smut becomes a pleasurable end as such in the face of 
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the hindrances thrown in its way by the woman. This woman is now taken to be 
the object of sexual aggression as the speaker turns to the other man, originally an 
impediment to his wooing speech, now his ally. In fact, one of the possible results 
of the smutty encounter is the satisfaction of the other man’s libido by exposing 
to his imagined sight the woman’s nudity.65 It must also be kept in mind, however, 
that the intransigence of the woman in the face of smut is not understood by Freud 
to be implacable; instead, “it seems merely to imply a postponement and does not 
indicate that further efforts will be in vain.”66 When smutty words do not lead to 
sexual actions, they can become an autonomous pleasure, albeit one thereafter 
primed to rouse one into sexual action with a change in circumstances.67
 Many of these features of Freudian smut are relevant to understanding the 
formal structures of God’s Little Acre, the events of which often depend on the 
susceptibility of male characters to the multiple attempted verbal exposures of 
women. More than the Waldens’s fruitless search for gold on their land or the inef-
fective seizure of the mill in Scottsville by Will and his proletarian cohort, smutty 
encounters in God’s Little Acre offer continuity between episodes and the means 
for accounting for that continuity. The book’s narration does little beyond describe 
actions and physiological reactions. Save for striking moments of free indirect dis-
course, such as Will’s vivid reverie of the ivy-covered mills run by women and the 
bloody-lipped men spitting their lungs out on the street (GLA, 68–75), the novel’s 
attention to how objects and people look is mediated by what its characters say. For 
example, it is because Darling Jill says so that we know that Pluto Swint’s eyes look 
like watermelon seeds (GLA, 29). Likewise, it is because of Ty Ty Walden’s repeated 
verbal exposures of her before other men that we get a sense that his daughter-in-
law, Griselda, has creamy skin, gold in her hair, pale blueness in her eyes, and “the 
finest pair of rising beauties a man can ever hope to see” (GLA, 30–31).
 This last example perhaps registers the degree to which dialogue in Caldwell’s 
novel has ends independent of interpersonal communication or neutral description. 
In fact, the typical smutty encounter in God’s Little Acre consists of the exposure 
of Griselda by Ty Ty to other men: first to Pluto Swint (GLA, 29–31); then to Will, 
the millworker husband of Ty Ty’s daughter, Rosamond (GLA, 88–90); and finally 
to Jim Leslie, Ty Ty’s estranged son (GLA, 117–20, 125–27). The result of Griselda’s 
exposure in front of Pluto Swint is relatively benign. When Ty Ty’s smutty descrip-
tion of her reaches a peak—“The first time I saw you, when Buck brought you 
here from wherever it was you came from, I felt like getting right down there and 
then and licking something” (GLA, 30)—Pluto finds himself putting his hand on 
Griselda’s legs and leaning against her. Griselda slaps him, and the Walden family 
laughs heartily at Pluto. We should note here that the roles in Freud’s normative 
account of the smutty triad prove transitive in Caldwell’s novel: the first man’s 
speech, meant to incite the woman to sexual action, ends up goading the other man 
Literary Obscenities
132
to cop a feel. Subsequent smutty exposures bear this transitive quality out, insofar as 
Ty Ty’s verbal exposures of her do not end up seducing Griselda so much as they do 
other men. In the case of Will—to whom Ty Ty again repetitively presents Griselda as 
having a pair of breasts so “pretty it makes me feel sometimes like getting right down 
on my hands and knees like these old hound dogs you see chasing after a flowing 
bitch. You just ache to get down and lick something” (GLA, 88)—the verbal exposure 
proves too effective, since Will goes on to sleep with Griselda before his death at the 
mill (GLA, 155–57). In the final case, Ty Ty’s smutty speech concerning Griselda leads 
indirectly to Jim Leslie’s murder at the hands of Buck, his brother and Griselda’s hus-
band, as he tries to take her away from the Walden farm for good. Whereas verbally 
exposing Griselda before other men is a pleasure in and of itself for Ty Ty, it does 
not satisfy his male listeners, for whom hearing and seeing in imagined sight are 
ultimately no substitutes for touching. They are aroused but not satisfied with mere 
arousal or with releasing that arousal through laughter, and it is conspicuously Ty Ty 
who arouses the men around him and gives the novel’s readers a suggestively gap-
filled and hard-to-visualize object for that arousal. Without Ty Ty’s exposing speech, 
at least, Griselda would be as undifferentiated in the Walden family as Rosamond 
because there is little in the narration itself to set either woman apart.
 What we thus find in God’s Little Acre is a tissue of smutty encounters in which 
the functions of the Freudian smutty triad stay put, but the people and genders 
to whom those functions were originally attached do not. Ty Ty verbally exposes 
Griselda for the pleasure verbal exposure itself, and not the hope of sex with her, 
gives him. Hence his repetition of phrases in whole or in part (“finest pair of rising 
beauties,” “makes you want to get down and lick something”) to describe Griselda 
every time he strips her bare in words before other men. These phrases are saturated 
with the imagined nudity and sexual activities of Griselda; for him these particu-
lar words have all the affective force of Griselda’s nude body itself, much like the 
repeated phrases used in the scene at the crack in the cowshed wall in Journeyman. 
They are the charged formula of an elusive pleasure that can be expressed and 
repeated, giving a pointed intensity to the novel’s vast and belabored repetitious 
extension.
 The transitive quality of the smutty encounter in Caldwell’s novel is perhaps 
better illustrated, however, by looking at how women and the narration itself come 
to fill and fluctuate between these roles. There are at least two times in the novel 
when Darling Jill verbally exposes a man in front of Griselda. In the first instance, 
that man is Pluto Swint (GLA, 40–43), while in the second it is her father, Ty Ty 
(GLA, 109–13), and in both cases the exposure does not lead to sexual advances but 
to explosive laughter. Pluto is the one man with whom Darling Jill will not sleep, Ty 
Ty a man she presumably cannot, and Griselda’s relative passivity in these scenes 
is of a piece with her role as the slightly intransigent object of verbal exposure 
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elsewhere. Women in the novel thus appear to engage in smut with no other seduc-
tive ends in view; they use and respond to smut like a Ty Ty Walden.
 However, this is not as straightforward as it might sound at first. Compare, for 
instance, the degree to which women’s use of smut in God’s Little Acre resonates 
with the most notable scene of verbal exposure in all of Southern literature: Janie 
Crawford’s smutty unveiling of her husband, Joe Starks, before the residents of 
Eatonville in Zora Neale Hurston’s Their Eyes Were Watching God (1937). Though 
Joe has constantly depicted his wife in a smutty way up to this point so that “it 
was like somebody snatched off part of a woman’s clothes while she wasn’t looking 
and streets were crowded,” in unveiling her husband Janie is said by the narrator 
to have “done worse, she had cast down his empty armor before men and they 
had laughed, would keep on laughing. When he paraded his possessions hereafter, 
they would not consider the two together. They’d look with envy at the things and 
pity the man that owned them.”68 What this brings out in the use made of smutty 
language by women and Ty Ty Walden in God’s Little Acre is its aggressivity. Of the 
three men to whom Ty Ty smuttily exposes Griselda, two are murdered by the end 
of the narrative, while the third (Pluto) is a constant object of ridicule for all of the 
other characters in God’s Little Acre. In using smut the way Ty Ty does, then, the 
women in Caldwell’s novel effectively—that is to say, violently—respond to a world 
in which their capacities for action and expression are attenuated, but not entirely 
foreclosed.
 After Will and Griselda have coupled, but before his fatal march on the 
Scottsville mill, the hitherto relatively neutral reporting of the narration begins to 
get inflected with Will’s free indirect discourse: “[Griselda] put two spoonfuls [of 
sugar] into the coffee cup. She knew. It wasn’t every woman who would know how 
much sugar to put into his cup. She’s got the finest pair of rising beauties a man 
ever laid his eyes on, and when you once see them, you’re going to get right down 
on your hands and knees and lick something” (GLA, 163). This passage betrays a 
doubled consciousness of sorts in Caldwell’s book. On the one hand, the text seeks 
to manifest the degree to which these particular phrases have become as affectively 
soaked with Griselda for Will as they manifestly are for Ty Ty; on the other hand, 
they implicate the narration, potentially the book itself, in the smutty triads pre-
sented throughout the text. The narration starts to verbally expose Griselda before 
the reader, not with Ty Ty’s speech but mediated by a discourse loosely imitative of 
Will’s interiority. Yet this narrative arrangement raises questions of address, since 
it seems to call forth the reader and “his” body (Caldwell’s masculine norm seems 
in line with Freud’s in this respect) into the smutty encounter. Words cartoonishly 
adumbrating images of and responses to a female body here would seem to arro-
gate to themselves the capacity to evoke bodily actions—riotous laughter or more 
directly genitalized pleasures—but only when coupled with an intransigent object, 
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be it in the form of an attractive daughter-in-law or a paperback book. Accordingly, 
Caldwell’s use of Freudian smut is not simply a veridical or ethnographic reflection 
of lower-class mores and comportments but is also an active attempt to construct 
and reorganize experience along those very lines. As God’s Little Acre demon-
strates—and despite Bok’s conclusions in Commonwealth—sensual immediacy is 
potentially the goal of all sorts of frustrating mediations, especially those we give 
the name of smut.
 We can see how far Caldwell’s obscene potentials are from the immediate lewd 
threats Bok discerned in mid-twentieth-century visual culture by glancing briefly 
at his extraordinary 1940 cyclorama novel, Trouble in July. Instead of just giving 
the libidinal and affective features of this novel a smutty form, Caldwell generalizes 
Freudian smut in such a way that the frustration of an experience ends up making 
that experience all the more violently possible. Caldwell’s novel is a lynching novel, 
albeit one in which no one seems able to do what is expected of him or her in such 
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a text: Sonny, the African American man erroneously charged with the rape of a 
white woman, cannot quite manage to make good his escape, even though he is 
given ample opportunities and time to do so; Katy Barlow, the alleged victim of 
this rape, cannot quite muster the willpower needed to admit Sonny’s innocence 
to her family or community, though she feels a good deal of compunction about 
the prospect of the gruesome public death he faces; the white male rabblement in 
turn cannot quite work up enough focalized animus to put together an effectively 
functioning lynching party because they spend most of the novel pursuing old 
enmities and bickering among themselves instead; and Jeff McCurtain, the mor-
bidly obese sheriff of the town of Andrewjones, cannot quite figure out what—much 
less how—to do what is needed of him in time to do it. Trouble in July, therefore, is a 
lynching novel that acts at each step of the way to avoid having to depict a lynching, 
even though these repeated instances of frustration ultimately do give rise in the 
last chapter to the brutal murder of Sonny and the confession of Katy, whom the 
lynch mob promptly stones to death.
 Republished in October 1945, five months before the famous paperback reprint 
of God’s Little Acre, Trouble in July was the first Caldwell paperback to be released 
by Penguin, and its cover suggests a more troubling genealogy with which to assess 
the “obscene” functions of the peephole structures we explored previously in the 
first run of Caldwell paperback reissues (see fig. 8). Posed next to a pictographic 
representation of a courthouse and partly framed by angled strands of rope, a 
darkened man-shaped aperture looks out on to a brown wasteland over which a 
noose hangs from a bare tree backlit by a fiery horizon. If reading from the God’s 
Little Acre paperback forward to A Woman in the House led us through an endlessly 
receding series of covered holes, then starting from Penguin’s Trouble in July leaves 
us with a different absence to be filled, for looming over those later illustrations is 
not simply the ever-deferred promise of nude white women but also the threatened 
torture and murder of African American men. Caldwellian smut and frustration 
thus disclose the uncomfortable proximity of obscenity to Jim Crow, the obsessive 
focus of a fellow Georgian writer, Lillian Smith.

4. Sin, Sex, and Segregation in Lillian Smith’s  
 Silent South
So now she knew I knew she knew I knew, and I wondered how we would 
play out the Proust bit.
—samuel r. delany, “aye, and Gomorrah . . . ,” 1967
Over the last twenty-five years, the life’s work of the writer and civil rights 
activist Lillian Smith has proven to be a generative object of study for schol-
ars of twentieth-century Southern literature and culture, particularly as these 
fields relate to ideology, liberalism, racial conversion narratives, temporality, 
the grotesque, and same-sex desire.1 For the most part, this critical interest 
has tended to focus on Smith’s two major works of the 1940s, her first novel, 
Strange Fruit, and her first memoir, Killers of the Dream (1949). Even in those 
cases where her later texts—composed in a variety of genres, ranging from 
occasional essays, fiction, and lyrical memoirs to documentary writing and 
new journalism—come into consideration, these works have often been treated 
in isolation from, or in pointed contrast to, her earlier writings. Part of my aim 
here is to use Strange Fruit’s legal troubles with obscenity in the 1940s as an 
occasion for suggesting how Smith’s writerly output might be reconceived as 
a unified whole that is variously stimulated, provoked, disgusted, and haunted 
by the unmanageable appeals that words can conceivably make on bodies—
appeals that seemingly thwarted the efforts of reformers such as herself to 
persuade others that their modes of organizing life and their very lives them-
selves must change. Segregation is thus obscene in Smith’s work insofar as 
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segregationist rituals, customs, and habits are able to be followed, adopted, and 
embodied by means of the obscene speech acts that characterize so much segre-
gationist discourse. It is precisely in this way that obscenity becomes understood 
in Smith’s writing early on as a way of representing and living race bodily. As they 
developed between the 1930s and 1960s, Smith’s responses to the power of certain 
“obscene” words to do rather than to merely mean came not only to influence her 
later shift in attention from region to cosmos (and from racialist race to the human 
race) but also to highlight her specific contributions as a significant transitional 
figure in the history of twentieth-century Southern liberalism.
 Yet this relationship between obscenity and segregation never goes away in 
Smith’s writing, even as her thinking underwent a momentous recasting in the 
1950s and 1960s, when she attempted to overcome its challenges by using the writ-
ings of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin to develop an optimistic philosophy of man’s 
evolutionary history that would prove capable of neutralizing the obscene words 
(and thus bodily appeals) of segregation. Whereas the power of words to leave 
Southerners more done to than doing confronted Smith in the 1940s either with an 
overdetermined loss of agency or with idle speculation regarding alternate regional 
histories, her later reception of Teilhard’s The Phenomenon of Man (1955) caused 
her instead to broaden her conception of history to units of measurement larger 
than region, country, or race. I thus end the chapter first by briefly situating Smith’s 
preoccupation with alternate histories in terms of developments in midcentury 
liberalism and then by detailing how her attempt to overcome the obscenity of 
segregation in a new philosophy of history nevertheless reproduced some of the 
signal harms she had initially sought to circumvent. If the conclusion I draw from 
this does not let Smith off the hook, then that is not so much a criticism of her as 
it is an acknowledgment of just how deeply the harm of obscene words informed 
her way of seeing not just the South but eventually all that was, is, and shall be, and 
it is likewise a harm that received a complementary formulation from perhaps the 
most attentive, if unlikely, critics of her entire career as a writer: the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court.
I
During the first month of its release in 1944, a copy of Strange Fruit was purchased 
by a Boston-area resident as a birthday present for a daughter who was away at 
college. Before sending his gift, however, he decided to read the novel and was 
outraged to discover repeated instances of the word “fuckin.”2 The father notified 
the authorities of what he viewed to be the book’s indecency, and after reviewing 
the text themselves, the police notified local booksellers that Strange Fruit was 
in fact obscene and could no longer be offered for sale in Boston, an order that 
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most bookshop owners obeyed in the following months. Upset by the suppression 
of Smith’s novel, popular historian and local resident Bernard DeVoto managed 
to convince a Cambridge bookshop owner, Abraham Isenstadt, to put the police 
chief ’s decision to the test by selling him a copy of the novel, even though this 
meant that Isenstadt would likely face arrest and criminal prosecution, which he 
indeed subsequently did. At trial Smith’s publishers, Reynal & Hitchcock, helped 
provide counsel for Isenstadt’s defense, and during the pretrial proceedings Smith 
herself was asked if she would be willing to obviate the need for prosecution by 
deleting parts of the novel, including objectionable words and in some instances 
entire passages and scenes. She refused, and the trial went forward in the Middlesex 
Superior Court, where Isenstadt received a judge’s verdict of guilty for selling and 
having in his possession for the purpose of sale Smith’s Strange Fruit.3
 In 1945 Isenstadt appealed his conviction to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court. At the time of both his trial and his appeal, the statute under which he was 
prosecuted (Massachusetts General Laws, Ter. Ed., chapter 272, §28, as amended 
in 1934 and 1943) read as follows:
Whoever imports, prints, publishes, sells or distributes a book, pamphlet, 
ballad, printed paper, phonographic record or other thing which is obscene, 
indecent or impure, or manifestly tends to corrupt the morals of youth, or 
an obscene, indecent or impure print, picture, figure, image or description, 
manifestly tending to corrupt the morals of youth, or introduces into a family, 
school or place of education, or buys, procures, receives or has in his possession 
any such book, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, phonographic record, obscene, 
indecent or impure print, figure, image or other thing, either for the purpose 
of sale, exhibition, loan or circulation or with the intent to introduce the same 
into a family, school or place of education, shall . . . be punished.4
Isenstadt’s lawyers sought to undermine obscenity understood either as a legal 
definition or as an operational norm by taking an anatomist’s knife to the statute 
in question. Both in the Middlesex Superior Court and on appeal in the Supreme 
Judicial Court, their defense consisted of a nineteen-point attack on Massachusetts 
obscenity law, arguing that Strange Fruit was not obscene (point three), nor inde-
cent (point four), nor impure (point five); that the statute was in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it was too imprecisely worded (point eleven); 
and that the only relevant test for a book’s obscenity required the court to take into 
account both the whole work’s dominant effect and the opinion of literary experts 
as to the relationship of the work’s objectionable parts to this holistically defined 
dominant effect (point nineteen). The Middlesex Superior Court judge ended up 
rejecting all of the defense’s claims except the thirteenth (that the book should be 
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judged as a whole) and seventeenth (that the court should take into account con-
temporary community standards in interpreting what is obscene, indecent, impure, 
or manifestly corruptive of the morals of the young) points, with which the judge 
agreed at trial, though he nevertheless found Strange Fruit to be guilty of obscenity.
 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld Isenstadt’s conviction on 
appeal because, when judged as a whole, Strange Fruit could be said in the court’s 
“best judgment as trier of facts” to possess “the qualities of obscenity, indecency, 
or impurity” as described in the Commonwealth’s statute.5 The Isenstadt opinion 
begins by confronting Massachusetts’s notoriety as the nation’s region for unduly 
repressive censorship standards, especially those applied to books.6 Citing recent 
law review articles highly critical of obscenity prosecutions in the Commonwealth, 
the court reminds its detractors and critics that as a part of the judicial branch it is 
not in the business of making public policy:
With this background in mind it may not be out of place to recall that it is not 
our function to assume a “liberal” attitude or a “conservative” attitude. As in 
other cases of statutory construction and application, it is our plain but not 
necessarily easy duty to read the words of the statute in the sense in which they 
were intended, to accept and enforce the public policy of the Commonwealth as 
disclosed by its policymaking body, whatever our own personal opinions may 
be, and to avoid judicial legislation in the guise of new constructions to meet 
real or supposed new popular viewpoints, preserving always to the Legislature 
alone its proper prerogative of adjusting the statutes to changed conditions.7
Whatever legitimation problems obscenity law may have been undergoing in other 
state and appellate courts throughout the United States in the past decade, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court argues that the Commonwealth’s court-
rooms were not the proper venue for taking sides in the matter. The polemical 
thrust of the court’s opinion is thus made clear: other courts ought to be following, 
rather than disavowing, Massachusetts’s example in literary censorship by sedu-
lously administering obscenity law instead of drastically revising it.
 As if to ratify its disinterested stance, the court in Isenstadt moves on to assert 
that the governmental separation of powers continues to function smoothly in the 
Commonwealth. Unlike the state of New York, for instance, Massachusetts had 
been able to amend its obscenity statute through the state legislature so that works 
charged with obscenity now had to be judged as a whole. Therefore, if Woolsey’s 
test was in force throughout the Commonwealth by the mid-1940s, then that was 
because its lawmakers—rather than its renegade judges—had made it so. The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court can thus agree with the defense’s claims 
that Strange Fruit should be evaluated as a whole in any obscenity proceedings. In 
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a sharp rejoinder to those too quick to interpret Woolsey’s test as necessitating the 
end of book obscenity once and for all, however, the court’s opinion insists that a 
novel can still pose obscene threats even when judged as a whole, provided it “con-
tains prohibited matter in such quantity or of such nature as to flavor the whole and 
impart to the whole any of the qualities mentioned in the statute.”8
 A matter of both quantity and quality, holistic obscenity requires that judges 
and juries have sense enough to follow Woolsey’s lead in classifying with some 
precision the bodily reactions called forth by the matter charged with obscenity. 
As Woolsey himself admits in the Ulysses opinion, “I am quite aware that owing 
to some of its scenes ‘Ulysses’ is a rather strong draught to ask some sensitive, 
though normal, persons to take. But my considered opinion, after long reflection, 
is that, whilst in many places the effect of ‘Ulysses’ on the reader undoubtedly is 
somewhat emetic, nowhere does it tend to be an aphrodisiac.”9 Consequently, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reads Woolsey along the grain in claiming 
that “a book might be found to come within the prohibition of the statute although 
only a comparatively few passages contained matter objectionable according to the 
principles herein explained if that matter were such as to offer a strong salacious 
appeal and to cause the book to be bought and read on account of it.” A text may 
very well make historical, social, literary, emetic, or otherwise innocent appeals to 
its presumed readership in addition to salacious ones, but that does not also mean 
that these latter proscribable appeals would be any less capable of predominating 
nonetheless. In the court’s faithful construction of Woolsey, then, a work that is 
obscene on the whole need not be a wholly obscene work.
 Of course, to speak of a text’s salacious appeals raises a number of questions, 
not least those pertaining to address: to whom exactly are such appeals being made? 
The court in Isenstadt grants that obscenity’s appeals do not subsist in a vacuum but 
rather are a matter of determinate effects on probable consumers, meaning they do 
not involve “any classification of [a book’s] subject matter or of its words as being 
in themselves innocent or obscene” (Isenstadt, 318 Mass., at 549). There is no such 
thing as obscenity in itself; there is only obscenity for others, the proscribable effects 
of which include the incitement of “lascivious thoughts,” the arousal of “lustful 
desire,” and “the corruption of morals” among the community’s youth. First of all, 
this quasi-pragmatist insistence on approaching obscenity in terms of its effects on 
the world should be understood as the court’s attempt to demote the dispositive 
force of aesthetic criteria in making determinations as to a work’s obscenity. No 
mere idiosyncrasy of the Isenstadt court, the aversion to taking taste into account 
here should be viewed in the context of the broader crises of legitimacy that legal 
obscenity was experiencing in the United States at the time. If the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court were to admit that it was relevant to evaluate “refinement, 
propriety and good taste” in reaching its judgments here, then obscenity—already 
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elusive enough in the court’s present construction—would risk evaporating into 
the shapeless flux of ever more rapidly changing social conventions, taboos, and 
fashions: “A penal statute requiring conformity to some current standard of pro-
priety defined only by the statutory words quoted above would make the standard 
an uncertain one, shifting with every new judge or jury.”
 By making effects rather than aesthetic taste the test for obscenity, the Isenstadt 
opinion seeks instead to offer some conceptual stability to the increasingly indistinct 
terrain of legal obscenity: “The statute does not forbid realistically coarse scenes 
or vulgar words merely because they are coarse or vulgar, although such scenes 
or words may be considered so far as they bear upon the test already stated of the 
effect of the book upon its readers” (Isenstadt, at 550). However, this nonaesthetic 
standard for obscenity remains consistent with a version of aesthetic autonomy, 
insofar as the court promises to leave purely aesthetic works outside the purview 
of Massachusetts’s obscenity statute. Though the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court sees the danger in using aesthetic criteria to take the measure of obscenity, 
it cannot help suggesting at the same time that works whose qualities are simply 
aesthetic pose no obscene danger at all. A realist novel can be as vulgar or as coarse 
as it dares to be, so long as it does not coarsen or vulgarize those who come across 
it in the world to the point of moral corruption. Likewise, between realism and the 
real world there exists a gap that cannot be bridged through the bodies of readers 
because genuine realism, by virtue of its clearly fictional nature, avoids embodying 
its potential coarseness, vulgarity, or corruption despite its verisimilitude.
 If the effect of a work on all or part of a community is the test for obscenity in 
1940s Massachusetts, then texts charged with obscenity must “be judged in light 
of the customs and habits of thought of the time and place of the alleged offense” 
(Isenstadt, at 551). Notwithstanding the court’s implicit antipathy toward the use of 
aesthetic standards in assessing what is so obscene about obscenity, it is not at all 
clear how judging obscenity’s effects in terms of contemporary habits and customs 
avoids relativism any better than does the judging of obscene texts in terms of 
taste, convention, or taboo. In other words, the reformulation of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court’s aesthetic prejudices into quasi-sociological terms does not 
get rid of the problems posed by taste, remainders of which stubbornly persist in 
the Isenstadt opinion. For one thing, the echolaliac whirl of synonyms heard in the 
Massachusetts obscenity statute (obscene works are indecent, which means they 
are impure, which means they are obscene, which means they are indecent, which 
means they are impure, . . . ) reproduces itself in the very distinction upon which 
the Isenstadt court hopes to find solid ground. After all, because the objected-to 
taboos, conventions, and tastes themselves all comprise so many customs and habits 
of thought, and vice versa, they suggest that obscenity in the Commonwealth is no 
less subject to the uncertainties plaguing courts and legislatures throughout the 
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United States at the time. Juries, “representing a cross section of the people, both 
old and young,” may very well “commonly be a suitable arbiter” in obscenity trials 
(Isenstadt, at 558–60). Yet in the end it is not altogether clear how the manner in 
which juries arbitrate is necessarily different from the aesthetic procedures so force-
fully objected to throughout the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s opinion.
 This confusion of community standards with community taste expresses itself 
again in the court’s account of how juries should go about determining whether 
the charged work is “appreciably injurious to society” in the ways outlined by the 
Commonwealth’s statute. “A book,” the Isenstadt court writes, “that adversely affects 
a substantial proportion of its readers may well be found to lower appreciably the 
average moral tone of the mass in the respects hereinbefore described and to fall 
within the intended prohibition” (Isenstadt, at 552). That is to say, juries are to 
evaluate both obscene materials and their communities holistically: “the statute 
was designed for the protection of the public as a whole” (Isenstadt, at 551). Just as 
a text need not make salacious appeals on every or even in a majority of its pages 
to be judged obscene, the text does not have to be injurious to the entirety or 
even to a certain percentage of the local population before a jury can proscribe it 
as obscene. Instead, if the salacious appeals of the charged material predominate 
among a portion of the community to such a degree that those effects are of such a 
nature “as to flavor the whole [community] and impart to the whole [community] 
any of the qualities mentioned in the statute,” then a determination of obscenity 
could be legitimately made (Isenstadt, at 549). The Commonwealth’s juries at that 
time were thus instructed to read their local communities as they would an obscene 
book.
 While it would be easy for one to interpret these slippages between art and 
obscenity as inadvertent and thereby undermine the reasoning used throughout 
Isenstadt, I take this somewhat fuzzily maintained distinction to offer us instead 
a more forthright account of the relationship between obscenity and art than any 
to be found in those obscenity cases of the period that acted to deproscribe book 
obscenity. After all, one of the key arguments used by liberalizing jurists in neu-
tralizing contemporary perceptions of the threats posed by book obscenity was the 
contention that aesthetic quality necessarily trumped obscenity’s unruly appeals. 
Typical of such an approach is the opinion of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
in United States v. Levine (1936), in which Circuit Court Judge Learned Hand 
(Augustus Hand’s first cousin) observes that the standard for obscenity “must be 
the likelihood that the work will arouse the salacity of the reader to whom it is sent 
as to outweigh any literary, scientific or other merits it may have in that reader’s 
hands.”10 Therefore, the underlying assumption in Levine is that a literary text main-
tains its identity as a literary text until its obscenity becomes too much, at which 
point it ceases to be literary and reveals itself instead to be simply an obscene text.
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 On its face, this argument is a good deal more facile than the Isenstadt court’s 
convoluted formulation of the problem, in which aesthetic approaches to obscen-
ity are demoted, though aesthetics as such does not disappear altogether. In other 
words, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refuses to settle for conceptu-
alizing obscenity as a matter of either/or: “Sincerity and literary art are not the 
antitheses of obscenity, indecency, and impurity in such manner that one set of 
qualities can be set off against the other and judgment rendered according to an 
imaginary balance supposed to be left over on one side or the other. The same book 
may be characterized by all of these qualities. Indeed, obscenity may sometimes be 
made even more alluring and suggestive by the zeal which comes from sincerity and 
by the added force of artistic presentation” (Isenstadt, at 553). Unlike the obscenity 
case law that followed the deproscribing course marked out by Woolsey in United 
States v. One Book Called “Ulysses,” the Isenstadt opinion refuses to see the obscene 
and the literary as mutually exclusive. In part, this refusal is grounded in the court’s 
already described commitment to the governmental separation of powers: “If it is 
thought that modern conditions require that [an aesthetic] exception be made, the 
Legislature and not this court should make it” (Isenstadt, at 553–54). More impor-
tantly, however, in declining to separate the aesthetic from the obscene once and 
for all, the Isenstadt court offers a nuanced account of what both categories are 
mutually capable of doing in the world. If the opinion’s initial division of aesthetics 
from obscenity seemed to suggest that this autonomization of aesthetics implausibly 
requires that art be without effect (as in the hypothetical example of the genuinely 
realist novel), then in further developing its account of the art/obscenity split the 
Isenstadt opinion confronts the very real potential for there to be obscene artworks 
or literary obscenity or even a really salacious piece of realism.
 With this fairly subtle account of the relationship between obscenity and art 
in place, the court’s opinion summarizes (rather quickly) the plot of Strange Fruit 
and itemizes (at much greater length) the potentially obscene, indecent, or impure 
episodes and moments in Smith’s novel. Such moments and episodes are said to 
include “four scenes of sexual intercourse, including one supposed to have been 
imagined,” all of variable suggestiveness and lengths, “from a few lines to sev-
eral pages”; a fifth scene involving “amatory attitudes, kissing, a loosened blouse, 
exposed breasts, and circumstances suggesting but perhaps not necessarily requir-
ing an act of intercourse”; a sixth scene describing Tracy Deen’s drunken and failed 
attempt to rape Nonnie Anderson, from which scene Isenstadt quotes extensively; 
and fifty instances containing a variety of suspect material, including, “indecent 
assaults upon little girls,” accounts of masturbation involving boys, acts of excretion, 
bouncing breasts and rumps, and a boy exposing his genitalia to a group of laugh-
ing girls (Isenstadt, at 555). Though it argued earlier in the opinion that obscenity 
is more than a matter of counting pages, the Isenstadt court nevertheless made a 
Sin, Sex, and Segregation
145
special point of dividing its 250-page copy of Strange Fruit by these fifty passages 
in order to agree with the Middlesex Superior Court’s decision that the novel as a 
whole could be adjudged obscene (Isenstadt, at 549 and 555). Not the tragic emplot-
ment briefly described by the court but rather the exhaustively itemized salacious 
scenes that punctually occur every five pages are said to comprise the connective 
tissue forming the novel into a whole.
 The court goes on to take Smith’s novel to task for “offer[ing] no remedy” for 
the problems it addresses (Isenstadt, at 556). Also, despite agreeing with Isenstadt’s 
lawyers that illicit love outside of marriage is in itself a “permissible theme” for a 
novel, the opinion nevertheless faults Strange Fruit for its overreliance on obscene 
effects:
Regarding the book as a whole, it is our opinion that a jury of honest and rea-
sonable men could find beyond a reasonable doubt that it contains much that, 
even in this post-Victorian era, would tend to promote lascivious thoughts and 
to arouse lustful desire in the minds of substantial numbers of that public into 
whose hands this book, obviously intended for general sale, is likely to fall; that 
the matter which could be found objectionable is not necessary to convey any 
sincere message the book may contain and is of such character and so pervades 
the work as to give to the whole a sensual and licentious quality calculated to 
produce the harm which the statute was intended to prevent; and that that 
quality could be found to persist notwithstanding any literary or artistic merit 
(Isenstadt, at 556–57).
If the Isenstadt opinion goes out of its way to offer a more labile account of obscen-
ity and art than that to be found in liberalizing obscenity cases of the period, then 
it does so in part to ensure that Strange Fruit’s artistry does not exempt it from 
obscenity law; rather, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court finds Smith’s novel 
to be an instance of the sort of literary obscenity that is not just possible but also 
proscribable in the Commonwealth. Simply put, Strange Fruit’s artistry intensifies 
its obscene passagework.11
 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Lummus grants that the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court construes the statute correctly but has drawn the wrong 
conclusions from it. To be sure, Strange Fruit is “blemished by coarse words and 
scenes, some of which appear irrelevant to the plot,” but ultimately this extrane-
ous “coarseness is repellent,” not attractive.12 Alongside its disgusting qualities, 
Lummus sees the novel’s tragic elements as dampening the force of such claims: “It 
is a grim tragedy, not relieved even by humor. Virtue is not derided, neither is vice 
made attractive. In the book, the wages of sin is literally death. The reader is left 
depressed, unable to solve a tragic problem.”13 Since Strange Fruit neither promotes 
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lascivious thoughts nor arouses lustful desires, Lummus contends that if the novel 
now threatened to corrupt the morals of the Commonwealth’s youth, then that was 
because it was being talked about in Massachusetts’s courtrooms: “Such knowledge 
as I have leads me to believe that without such artificial stimulation novels of the 
class into which the book in question falls are read by few girls and by practically 
no boys.”14 Moreover, should a few of these hypothetical girls and boys actually get 
their hands on Strange Fruit, “they would find it dull reading. . . . And if by chance 
some should wade through it, I think it could not reasonably be found to have any 
erotic allurement, even for youth.”15 The unquestionably artful accomplishments of 
Smith’s novel raises doubts in Lummus’s dissenting opinion as to the potential for 
obscenity to be conveyed by means of those very same accomplishments. In fact, 
not even Strange Fruit’s foulmouthed words and scenes can enliven the deepening 
depression into which its overdetermined artistry puts its readers. Smith’s novel 
repulses rather than salaciously attracts.
II
In a series of thirty chapters that alternate narrative focalization mostly through 
members of one white family (the Deens) and the college-educated siblings of one 
African American family (the Andersons) living in the small fictional Georgia town 
of Maxwell, Strange Fruit does seem on its face to tell a story in which “the wages of 
sin is literally death.” Most conspicuously, two murders appear to be the direct con-
sequences of Tracy Deen’s illicit relationship with Nonnie Anderson. Tracy himself 
is gunned down by Nonnie’s brother, Ed, who manages to escape Maxwell before 
the body is discovered by Henry, one of the African American servants in the Deen 
household and Tracy’s best friend. Blame for Tracy’s death falls on Henry, and even 
though members of the “decent” white community attempt to protect him by hiding 
him in the town jail, the poor white rabblement quickly descends upon Maxwell 
and eventually discovers him. The lynching of Henry comprises the novel’s climax, 
and its varying effects on the town are described at length in the penultimate chap-
ter as the narration starts to become serially focalized through different members 
of the community in a number of brief sketches that canvass the range of Maxwell’s 
reactions to the spectacular brutalization of African American men. Along the 
way to this climax, Southern revival meetings come in for lengthy representations 
(the eighteenth chapter is narrated through the group consciousness constituted 
by the crowd gathered at one such meeting) and sustained criticism; the lack of an 
independent and openly critical Southern press gets punctually lamented; and by 
the end the black underclass, particularly its women, continue to serve the town’s 
“decent” whites as they have always done: “‘Time for working women to get up,’ 
[Nonnie’s sister, Bess] called briskly, and followed her words with a rough shake of 
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Nonnie’s shoulder, a push of her foot in [the] side [of Henry’s lover, Dessie]” (SF, 
313). The lynching of Henry is not a rupture in time for these women but rather its 
cyclical renewal, because it is just a typical, albeit eventful, part of Maxwell’s cal-
endar to which Smith’s novel apparently “offers no remedy,” as the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court insisted.
 More significantly, however, it would seem that Strange Fruit undermines 
the basis for such a remedy because words themselves overwhelm the prospect of 
ameliorative social change altogether. As the two rival views in Isenstadt contend, 
words in the novel do in fact have striking effects on people. For one thing, words 
in Strange Fruit are aprons with which to soothe troubled children. For instance, 
Tillie Anderson (the deceased mother of Bess, Ed, and Nonnie) is said to have 
once “use[d] words to take that look [of fear] off [her children’s] faces as she would 
have used her apron to wipe their noses” (SF, 19). Words also manage to get so 
emptied of their meanings that their remaindered husks start to jangle hilariously: 
“That was the pattern. Prentiss Reid [Maxwell’s ‘liberal’ newspaperman] said the 
tabooed, the terrible. Everybody laughed, making things all right, taking the mean-
ings from words, leaving only their shells to rattle around in your memory” (SF, 40). 
Some words are also flammable when uttered aloud: “When Tracy said the word 
something happened to Nonnie’s face and he was startled—as if he had lighted ten 
thousand candles with one small half-thought-out word” (SF, 49).
 Alternatively, certain words devastate:
Negro. [Nonnie]’d said it. Now everything would be spoiled. Ruined as it always 
was [for Tracy]! (SF, 81)
Colored girl. Negro. Spoiling every good moment, like a hair that’s got onto your 
food. Why under God’s heaven did [Tracy] keep on thinking those damned 
words! Why couldn’t he—Jesus! (SF, 121)
In addition to their fitfully ruinous, hirsute, and bioluminescent properties, words 
also appear to be magnetized: “Tracy and Henry, playing in the dark outside, drew 
near the words like bits of steel to a magnet” (SF, 96). They are also damnably cum-
bersome for Henry’s father: “Words so heavy they seemed to fall back on his own 
chest as he said them” (SF, 96). Furthermore, words tend to cling to you irrevoca-
bly, as Ed Anderson well knows: “Those words and the white children’s chocolate 
drop hurled at you on your way to school, which was their back way to school and 
the way they used most, you’d never forget. You’d pick up cow dung and throw it 
and yan yan yan back at them. It didn’t help much. They could wash off cow dung, 
forget a yell that had no meaning. You could never forget chocolate drop long as you 
lived. It was smeared on you to the bone” (SF, 144). Yet even Ed can get nostalgic 
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for the days when older poor whites in the county would hurl words as if they 
were projectiles at African American laborers: “[Cap’n Rushton] looked petered 
out, slumped down in his chair. Not as he used to be, riding his white mare across 
fields, jacking up the choppers, throwing words around like a hailstorm, though 
most took them with a laugh, liking the boss” (SF, 146). When they are not being 
used to break shackles (“And for a second the words [of Preacher Dunwoodie] had 
snapped a chain in two” [SF, 160]), words themselves comprise so many rhythmic 
fetters (“The words attached themselves to a revival tune now and began coiling, 
uncoiling, coiling in [Nonnie’s] mind” [SF, 193]) that may eventually start to det-
onate (“Words that, unspoken, seem so harmless would, once said aloud, become 
dangerous explosives containing hidden feelings that would flame into something 
[that Tracy’s sister, Laura Deen,] dared not set free” [SF, 206]). Even on the nov-
el’s penultimate page, words still obstinately confront Nonnie, Bess, Dessie, and 
presumably Smith’s readers as well with all the inexplicable violence of a natural 
disaster: “No, Nonnie wanted her [and Tracy’s] baby, she had said, and with those 
few words great obstacles had been thrown across their future as casually as an 
earthquake or storm does its work” (SF, 313).
 As this brief but by no means exhaustive survey suggests, words in Strange 
Fruit do not have meanings so much as they evoke erratic physical responses, rang-
ing from arousal, attraction, and solace to sensations of involuntary confinement, 
disgust, and even destruction. In other words, Smith’s novel approaches language 
itself in much the same spirit as does the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 
Words have significance for both only so long as they betray discernible effects in 
the world. A key difference, however, is that whereas Isenstadt is interested in the 
purely libidinal potentials the book’s language has for likely readers, Smith’s account 
of the good and the bad that words do seems more preoccupied with the identi-
ty-constituting functions they can perform as well, particularly along racialist lines. 
After all, besides Nonnie Anderson herself, what most noticeably links Tracy Deen 
to Ed Anderson (Tracy’s murderer) are the derogatory effects that the language of 
blackness (“negro,” “colored girl,” “chocolate drop”) is said to have had on both of 
them, despite their respective efforts to deny these words their unduly affecting 
force.
 One notable strategy for attempting to carry through this denial in the novel 
is to emphasize the separability of signifier (“colored girl”) from referent (Nonnie 
herself). For instance, as the second sentence of Strange Fruit highlights, and as 
the rest of the text averts to over and over again, Nonnie is so light-skinned that 
she could pass for white: “Tall and slim and white in the dusk, the girl stood there, 
hands on the picket gate” (SF, 1).16 Given Nonnie’s racially ambiguous appearance, 
Tracy is thus able to sustain the recurring fantasy that his relationship with her, 
which spans many years, is like any other same-race relationship in Maxwell, save 
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for those moments in which other people mention or Nonnie herself alludes to her 
blackness in words, at which point their entire history together becomes “spoiled” 
for him. In short, Tracy’s perception of the racial difference said to separate him 
from Nonnie increasingly becomes a function of the very language used to mark 
and maintain that difference, even as Tracy lamely tries to screen himself off from 
the effects that words like “colored girl” or “negro” manifestly have on him, if not 
on Nonnie herself: “But it wasn’t ruined. Out there on the lime cliff, brown water 
swirling below you, sky paled out by the moon above you, great oaks with sagging 
moss draping your nakedness, hiding you from the world, you could think that 
word [“negro”] without getting sick at your stomach. You could say it, say Nonnie’s 
name after it, and still believe in her and yourself. The world’s wrong, you could 
say. Dead wrong” (SF, 81). Haltingly, Nonnie goes on to echo this reverie, albeit in 
terms that manage to be more self-aware than, though just as quixotic as, those of 
Tracy: “She’d turn then, as if she had read his thoughts. ‘Race is something—made 
up, to me. Not real. I don’t—have to believe in it. Social position—ambition—seem 
made up too. Games for folks to—forget their troubles with. Bess says I’m crazy, 
that I live in a dream world’” (SF, 81).
 As this passage implies, Nonnie tends to read race like a good poststructuralist. 
After all it, like class, is said to be a discursive construct (“‘something—made up’”) 
that people use and are used by in order to get themselves distracted from the things 
that embroil their daily lives (“‘games for folks to—forget their troubles with’”). Far 
from stabilizing the meanings of racial constructs, however, language makes not 
only a game of the Manichaean melodramas of racialist ideologies but also a game 
that Nonnie can refuse to play because she does not “‘have to believe in it.’” That 
is to say, far from necessarily comprising the ever-present spoiler that they are for 
Tracy, “negro” and “colored girl” are simply words whose meanings and effects fail 
to fully actualize themselves because they never reliably refer to either objects or 
experiences in the real world; at the end of the day, race is “‘not real.’” If they are 
really just another set of fictions within social experience, then “colored girl” and 
“negro” need not therefore stick to Nonnie as they obstinately do to her “chocolate 
drop”–smeared brother.
 Though incapable of systematizing his views quite this cogently, the college 
dropout Tracy is still capable of sharing in Nonnie’s refusal of race in epiphanic 
moments that prove to be as fleeting as they are routinized: “God! You could hear 
that damned word and not mind it. You didn’t give a goddam what the world 
thought. She was yours, that’s all! She’s my girl. She’s lovely and beautiful, and she’s 
mine. He’d laughed, and pulled her to him again. Holding her there, he knew he 
loved her—as a man loves the woman for all his needs” (SF, 81). Tracy and Nonnie 
may be intermittently able to negate the significance that “negro” and “colored girl” 
have in the world, but they have nothing in their own world to affirm beyond a 
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relationship that is itself an effect of the power those words really do have and about 
which Tracy manifestly has more doubts than does Nonnie. “Colored girl” and 
“negro” may be unreal for Nonnie, but for Tracy they have a substance from which 
he cannot escape, despite his endless failed attempts to disavow or ignore them 
in his mind. Therefore, although Smith’s novel almost marvels at them, Nonnie’s 
postracial and proto-poststructuralist habits of thought are by no means efficacious 
or exemplary. No matter how susceptible blackness and the discourses sustaining 
it may prove to be to doubts and skepticism, in the theoretically obtuse everyday 
world they still retain their ability to hail, hierarchize, and—in at least two instances 
here—kill.
 An important site for these functions as well as the efforts made to resist them 
is Nonnie’s brother Ed, who from the very beginning appears before us as simulta-
neously blackened, quantified, and effaced: “[Ed] was a black digit marked out by 
white chalk. He wasn’t there on the sidewalk. He never had been there . . . he just 
wasn’t anywhere—where those eyes looked—where those damned eyes—” (SF, 
7). As a quasi-Ellisonian invisible man, Ed’s psychological ordeals in the novel 
understandably consist of so many struggles for recognition in his visit home to 
Maxwell, where his thoughts return continuously to how it is he came to be made 
this “black digit marked out by white chalk.” His memories reveal that the carefully 
observed silences surrounding race have been just as effective in making him a 
dark spectral digit as its words have been. During a trip with Sam Perry, a friend 
from childhood who is now a doctor for the county’s black population, Ed has an 
involuntary memory of when he was a teenager and boasted to Sam and a friend of 
theirs that he had already had sexual experiences with white women. Ed was forc-
ibly silenced by them at that time: “‘Boy,’ Sam laid his hand on Ed’s shoulder in his 
slow way, ‘leave white girls out of your mouth. And your mind.’ He added, ‘Might 
as well pick up a rattler, Ed’” (SF, 149). The need for a black man to keep quiet about 
white women here is a product of the same sorts of forces that had traumatically 
smeared Ed with the words “chocolate drop” even earlier in his youth. Silence thus 
acts on people much as words do in Strange Fruit insofar as Ed’s subjection to the 
distorting pressures exerted upon what he does and does not say follows from the 
feigned knowledgeableness with which he sought, and presumably still seeks, to 
cover up “the feel of his ignorance” (149). In short, pretending to “know white girls” 
is sure to get Ed deprived of the freedom to express or give name to his real sexual 
desires (149), whatever they may actually be.17
 What this suggests is that, according to Strange Fruit, segregation has turned 
the mid-twentieth-century South into the nation’s closet. It is a region in which 
knowledge refers us ultimately to sexual knowledge, and what this sexual knowl-
edge might mean exists in all sorts of fraught relationships—collusive, oppositional, 
competitive, or instrumental—to ignorance.18 Smith’s text is thus invested in 
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determining how and why race manages to get embodied in and confused with the 
silences, words, and assumptions connected to the forms that sexual desire happens 
to take.19 Accordingly, Strange Fruit demonstrates how significant irregularities in 
a community’s knowledge aid in the continuing enforcement of segregation in the 
Jim Crow South. The closet, in this view, comprises the messy ideological adhesive 
that effectively holds together that which it nevertheless keeps asunder. For exam-
ple, Ed may not be able to do much about the knowledge other people claim to have 
regarding his blackness, but the insidious means by which he is made to self-iden-
tify as just another “chocolate drop” also require him to give up whatever discretion 
he might otherwise expect to have over the kinds of knowledge that others very 
well cannot have of him. As Smith confesses in Killers of the Dream, “regardless of 
statistics, this every one knows: Whenever, wherever, race relations are discussed 
in the United States, sex moves arm in arm with the concept of segregation.”20 The 
grounding of racial difference in the stratified zones of one’s own body is therefore 
Smith’s bedrock for what she elsewhere calls in Killers of the Dream the Southerner’s 
intransigent “psychic fortifications” (KD, 65).21
 Curiously, however, it is those bodies that happen to be covered with white skin 
that are said to reproduce in turn the subjugations and hierarchizations at work in 
the community at large, a point that gets even more comprehensively formulated 
elsewhere in Killers of the Dream when Smith verbalizes the monitory lessons every 
child is said to silently receive in the South: “‘Now, parts of your body are segre-
gated areas which you must stay away from and keep others away from. These areas 
you touch only when necessary. In other words, you cannot associate freely with 
them any more than you can associate freely with colored children’” (KD, 73). In 
short, segregation derives its implacable effectiveness from its capacity for mimetic 
embodiment. It operates in the Jim Crow South by reducing the white Southerner’s 
body to a strange assimilative mechanism whose boundaries are hard to determine 
and whose figural and natural processes require a social hermeneutic like that of 
Smith’s to decipher. As Patricia Yaeger describes it: “For Smith, to be a white south-
erner is to know and to be the grotesque—to overwrite, overread, and participate 
in an economy of cruelty, defensiveness, reaction formation, and overcompensa-
tion.”22 At the very least, Smith’s work strives to unveil to her readers a “Colored 
Town” always already existing in the erogenous zones of the bodies of all white 
Southerners, thus privileging these bodies as the sites for simultaneously internaliz-
ing and externalizing segregation’s relentless enforcement.23 After all, looming over 
every such body in Killers of the Dream is a sign that reads, “‘Simply remember that 
morality is based on this mysterious matter of entrances and exits, and Sin hovers 
over all doors. Also, the authorities are watching’” (KD, 74). According to Smith, 




 All of this starts to make segregation’s closet look an awful lot like obscenity 
in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. According to Smith, the Jim Crow South 
creates complicit subjects out of white Southerners by teaching them to parcel 
up their bodies just as they are acculturated to parcel up their communities and 
relationships into a proliferating series of inclusive and exclusive binaries: sancti-
fied/sinful, skin/body, white/black, silence/words. This last binary is of particular 
interest because it suggests that perhaps segregation operates most effectively when 
it is least talked about. Just as there are parts of town and parts of the body that 
must be put in parentheses by white Southerners as they go about their day, the 
words attached to both of these somatic and topographical areas undergo coercive 
pressure to remain silent, since their mere expression risks upsetting the whole town 
and the whole body. As Jay Watson has pithily observed of Killers of the Dream: 
“Integration becomes the social equivalent of onanism; it boils down to playing 
with the wrong thing, the thing that must not be recognized as an integral and 
pleasurable part of you.”24 Segregation, like obscenity in Isenstadt, is thus a matter of 
parts potentially threatening to overwhelm wholes (whole texts, whole bodies, and 
whole communities), which in turn requires public interdictions and proscriptions 
against the unruly part in defense of the whole, against the word in favor of silence. 
The repression of sexuality accordingly facilitates the sexualization of segregation.
 Quite literally, then, segregation is obscene for Smith:
Out of [the] confusion [created by white fathers who disinherited their mixed-
race children] came that obscene word mongrelization and the phrase enforced 
intimate relations, both of which were mirrors of their own shabby past. Like 
all criminals, they felt compelled to confess their misdeeds and did so with the 
naïveté of a child by the use of these words. Now today’s politicians deliberately 
reach for these worn-out phrases when they need them to stir up excitement 
and fear and fantasies. (KD, 108)
Now, suddenly, shoving out pleasures and games and stinging questions come 
the terrors: . . . the singsong voices of politicians who preached their demonic 
suggestions to us as if elected by Satan to do so: telling us lies about skin color 
and a culture they were callously ignorant of—lies made of their own fantasies, 
of their secret deviations—forcing decayed pieces of theirs and the region’s 
obscenities into the minds of the young and leaving them there to fester. (KD, 2)
In the name of sacred womanhood, of purity, of preserving the home, lech-
erous old men and young ones, reeking with impurities, who had violated 
the home since they were sixteen years old, whipped up lynchings, organized 
Klans, burned crosses, aroused the poor and ignorant to wild excitement by 
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an obscene, perverse imagery describing the “menace” of Negro men hiding 
behind every cypress waiting to rape “our” women. (KD, 126)
Obscenity here is a matter of words enacting racial difference through the dangers 
said to be presented by particular forms of sexual desire: “mongrelization,” “enforced 
intimate relations,” and “the ‘menace’ of Negro men” to “‘our’ women” are all said to 
be the properly obscene means by which segregation changes from merely being a 
thought to becoming behavior. For Smith, the segregating harm done by obscene 
words derives from their unmanageable capacities for action.
 Unlike more recent literary criticism investigating language’s power to do things 
in the world, Smith believes that the obscene speech acts of segregation are fully 
intentional and do indeed function just as their speakers, writers, and users intend; 
in other words, she does not distinguish between the threats posed by segregation’s 
obscene words and the actions by which those threats would actually be achieved 
in the world.25 Segregation’s obscene words thus cannot ever really fail in the speech 
act theory that Smith tacitly develops in Strange Fruit and Killers of the Dream. 
Consequently, the possibilities described by Judith Butler for the “performative” to 
overturn or derail threats posed in language remain unthinkable in Smith’s work.26 
Instead, the obscenity of segregation in Smith’s work functions as pornography does 
in the essays of Catharine A. MacKinnon because obscenity is not so much a matter 
of defamation (the obscenity of segregation is not what it says) as it is an instance 
of discrimination (segregation’s obscenity is harmful because it always does).27 
Consequently, in Smith’s texts the harm to be found in the obscenity of segregation 
appears to be located in the functions necessarily performed by—not in the contents 
of—obscene words.28
 Of the various violent functions performed by these obscene words, perhaps 
the most troubling ones discussed in Killers of the Dream involve the ways in which 
such words create what women (black and white) are in the mid-twentieth-century 
South by framing them in terms of what can and cannot be done to them. For one 
thing, the only roles to which women can aspire are defined almost exclusively in 
terms of what kinds of service they can offer to the white men in their lives. As we 
have seen, the obscene words identified by Smith in her first memoir make a symbol 
of white women for white men, and this symbol simultaneously denies these women 
their desires (white women are not individuals with bodies so much as venerated 
abstractions like “sacred womanhood,” “purity,” or preservers of the home) while it 
elaborately and paradoxically forbids access to and knowledge of these putatively 
nonexistent desires (an interdiction mounted against “the ‘menace’ of Negro men”). 
As for African American women in Smith’s silenced South, obscenity’s words reduce 
them to mere objects for the contingent whims of white male desire and thus to 
monstrously productive wombs churning out “mongrels” by the millions.
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 Extrapolating from all of this, we are presented with the following situation: 
if, as a pamphleteer and little magazine publisher advocating civil rights in the 
early 1940s, Smith is able to advise white Southerners that they can do their part 
for desegregation by empathizing with, making friends with, or simply standing/
sitting next to African Americans whenever possible,29 then as a fiction writer and 
memoirist she seems to be saying that the problems that racially coded and sexually 
managed antagonisms raise in the Jim Crow South appear to be too ineluctably 
determined for human agents to ever confront and meaningfully alter. In Strange 
Fruit, this unduly hard determinism appears most clearly during the almost futile 
contemplation of paths not taken. Consider the following examples of characters 
contemplating the wrong turns made in their region’s past and in their own:
If [Laura Deen] could go back far enough . .  . there’d be a place where she 
would find a Tracy and a Laura who had been, maybe, fond of each other. 
Surely if she could get back far enough, she’d find a time when maybe they’d 
played together as little children and enjoyed each other. And beginning there, 
she could take his path and travel it until she found out why it led—where it 
did. And yet she knew that she did not want to do it. If she began to see it, his 
way, she would travel his path again and again and again, all her life, trying to 
understand, assuming all he had felt, hurting with his pain. No, it was easier, 
easier to keep on feeling resentment—or nothing. As he must always have felt 
toward her. (272)
[Sam Perry, who has just helped Ed escape Maxwell,] turned his car south. 
Started on the longest journey a man ever makes as he tried to go step by step 
back through his life and the lives of those nearest him, to find the place where 
things had taken a wrong turn. Seeking, as children seek in recapitulating play, 
to master a painful experience, repeating it until it can be summoned back and 
forth at will. And as he drove on and on from Macon to Maxwell, from fresh 
early dawn to blazing dead heat, trying to find a way into the past, he kept 
pushing back a feeling that stole through his body like a soft tune he’d never 
let himself listen to. It was as if he told himself, “You can’t think that now . . . 
maybe later,” though he told himself nothing. (283)
Better let [the lynching] pass. Let the thing go! Do something [for the next day’s 
newspaper] on the great need for a paved road through the county. Always safe 
to write about roads. God! [Prentiss Reid] laughed aloud, threw his cigarette 
into the spittoon.
 Yeah . . . [writing an editorial criticizing the lynching would] make folks 
worse . . . do more harm than good—. . .
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 That’s the South’s trouble. Ignorant. Doesn’t know anything. Doesn’t even 
know what’s happening outside in the world! Shut itself up with its trouble and 
its ignorance until the two together have gnawed the sense out of it. Believes 
world was created in six days. Believes white man was created by God to rule 
the world. As soon believe a nigger was as good as a white man as to believe in 
evolution. All tied up together. Ignorance. Scared of everything about science, 
except its gadgets. Afraid not to believe in hell, even. Afraid to be free. (309–10)
Segregation and its obscene words may have repugnantly violent effects, but they 
are an overlapping pair of problems without any likely solution in the 1940s South. 
If social and race relations are as bad as these passages cumulatively suggest, if the 
ideological effectiveness of segregation is securely rooted in and enacted through-
out a history no Southerner can hope to touch—after all, Prentiss Reid’s thoughts 
seem to suggest that paving roads to let the world into the South will not efface the 
tobacco roads in Southerners’ minds—then the only reasonable responses appear 
to be either hypocritical mutism or science fiction. Either Southerners ought to 
start acting like their “liberal” press and respond to segregation and lynching with a 
disapproving silence (just as Prentiss Reid does in Strange Fruit) or they should get 
busy rewriting their histories so they can adjust (in their imaginations at least) the 
“wrong” paths taken at some point in the region’s past. In other words, perhaps Jim 
Crow’s bad history need not bar the narration of alternate, counterfactual histories 
with their own potentials to disclose or even actualize alternative futures.
III
What these two tacitly opposed responses to segregation in Smith’s texts of the 
1940s—hypocritical restraint or alternate histories—present us with are the limits 
within which Southern liberalism seemed thinkable at that time. Manifestly unsat-
isfied with the intractability of the problem as framed by her in the 1940s, Smith 
began in the next decade to address herself in earnest to the possibility of finding 
and offering new solutions to segregation. At the very least, it was in such a spirit 
that she undertook The Journey (1954), her second memoir, which is composed of 
a strange hybrid of genres and modes, including autobiographical writing, travel 
narratives, and inspirational tracts. The rhetorical gambit of the argument in The 
Journey is the sustained attempt to pass off Killer of the Dream’s impasses as so many 
ordeals waiting to be mastered. Increasingly a keyword in her work following her 
cancer diagnosis in 1953, “ordeal” came to denote for Smith nothing less than the 
conditions necessary for all distinctly human acts of creativity.30 Against worldviews 
that would stress both radical contingency and the incapacity of human agents 
to have any sort of meaningful effect on the world, Smith’s later writing presents 
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instead a philosophy of history comfortingly rooted in evolution and developmen-
tal biology.
 To this end, The Journey starts to develop an epochal overview of terres-
trial history according to which the human species appears as the privileged and 
as-yet-ever-unfolding product of environmentally instigated ordeals. Human prop-
erties and capacities are said to be the hard-won artifacts of evolutionary trials met 
and effectively surpassed deep in our species’ past, but this should not lead one to 
assume that all such ordeals have in fact been overcome entirely. In fact, in a case 
of ontogeny reliably recapitulating phylogeny, even old trials must be met anew by 
each individual woman and man as she/he develops physically, psychologically, and 
socially.31 A prized instance of just such an ordeal for Smith in The Journey is the one 
that comes into being in the relationship between mother and child, whereby the 
resolution of tensions between anxiety and tenderness are understood as helping 
the “little human animal” to become “a human being”: “Without the anxiety which 
comes first out of child-helplessness, we would not so desperately need tenderness; 
without tenderness we could not have found the miraculous talents, the powers, 
which have changed us into human beings; and once finding them, we would not 
have developed them further had we not been urged on by necessity and ordeal to 
dream and bring forth the dream.”32 Said to be more than merely biological matter 
by virtue of his/her interpersonal self-awareness, the human being comprises the 
evolutionarily generated result of a self-regulating economy of problems and their 
immanent solutions, of needs and their imminent satisfaction, and of dreams and 
their eventual actualization. In particular, the very existence of human beings as 
such is taken by Smith in The Journey to be an irrefutable marker or trace of diffi-
cult evolutionary trials overcome as well as an indication that all future ordeals can 
indeed be successfully mastered. As Smith’s highly selective historical overviews 
and examples here aim to reveal, anthropogenesis has been and continues to be an 
experience in the perfectibility of nature.
 To be sure, this is not a framework through which many of Smith’s contemporar-
ies sought to approach civil rights activism and desegregation. Yet the earlier vision of 
the South set forth by her in Strange Fruit and Killers of the Dream did indeed encom-
pass the double bind within which many pre-Brown Southern liberals saw themselves 
more and more trapped: full of desperate hopes for the prospects of desegregation 
and reenfranchisement, yet increasingly driven to treat Jim Crow as the inexorable 
final result of Southern history to date. Smith’s eventual response to this dilemma in 
and after The Journey was to develop her own philosophy of history rather than to 
submit to the bad outcomes of history or to offer imagined alternatives to the past, 
even though both options appealed to many of her fellow liberals at the time.
 In order to develop this point, it is worthwhile to consider more closely Gunnar 
Myrdal’s magnum opus An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern 
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Democracy (1944). Though not as expressly deterministic as many comparable works 
of the period, An American Dilemma nevertheless does refer often to the obdurate 
persistence of racialist themes in U.S. history and to the obstacles facing those who 
would strive to overcome them. For instance, in his chapter on the factors underlying 
the politics of the singular “Negro Problem,” Myrdal alludes to the transhistorical 
efficacy of white supremacy in unifying white Southerners across regional and class 
differences into one solid mass of racial animus. At the very least, Myrdal assumes 
that something like this has been the case in the South since at least just before the 
Civil War: “In their poverty, ignorance, and dependence, [antebellum poor white 
Southerners] knew generally little about the world outside the Southern region 
which was gradually becoming culturally isolated. And they were offered one great 
and glittering solace: ‘white supremacy.’ They were not at the bottom, they were 
protected from the status of Negroes by a clear dividing line, and they were told 
that they could compete freely up to the very top.”33 According to Myrdal, this racial 
antagonism started to take on a more explicitly political cast in the first years of 
Reconstruction, with the freedmen being met “with a solid mistrust against them, 
which was crystallized into an elaborate political philosophy, powerful even in its 
partial disorganization.”34 On the basis of this Solid South framework, Myrdal is 
able to make the following incredible claim: “Negro disenfranchisement is evidently 
part and parcel of a much more general tendency toward political conservatism 
which stamps the entire region. The Negro is, as we shall find, a main cause of this 
general conservatism.”35 Though certainly a “complicated matter” subject to longer 
and more nuanced histories of subjugation and institutionalized oppression—as 
Myrdal himself demonstrates at length—white Southern attitudes toward African 
Americans nevertheless appear in An American Dilemma to have solidified into an 
overwhelming force around the time of the Civil War, the effects of which have been 
continuously operative and unavoidably felt throughout the South ever since.36
 While he tends to interpret racial disenfranchisement in the South in an almost 
teleological manner, Myrdal still manages to insist that the 1940s presented the 
United States and the South with a surprisingly volatile situation. Besides the direct 
assaults on racial disenfranchisement posed by downward pressures on poll taxes 
and improving education among African Americans, he also notes that there were 
“various social trends” undermining political discrimination in the South, ranging 
from the exhaustion of legal defenses against disenfranchisement to the Supreme 
Court’s increasingly critical perspectives regarding the South’s segregating folkways 
as well as the greater “respect for the law” to be found more and more often among 
the region’s youth.37 As farsighted as his prognoses here may in fact be in many 
respects—in particular, Myrdal’s hunch that the Supreme Court would soon start 
to take a more interventionist role in legal battles over segregation seems down-
right prescient—they still carry over into their “solution” some hyperdeterministic 
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premises. For instance, the effectiveness of “various social trends” in and of them-
selves are simply taken as given, which raises the question: why would the South’s 
few scruple-ridden liberals need to adopt more than moderate approaches if these 
trends were eventually going to work their way toward a satisfactory resolution of 
their own accord? The situation in which the midcentury Jim Crow South found 
itself may seem terminally unstable in An American Dilemma, but underneath 
this superficial agitation the terrible racialist theme of Southern history appears to 
remain as hyperbolically determined and determining as ever.
 Opposing the quasi-naturalistic reticence of liberal histories in the vein of 
Myrdal are the alternate, counterfactual histories that became visible in the late 
1940s and early 1950s when historians began to burst open those monolithic 
accounts of the region that presented racial segregation as the unavoidable mes-
sage of Southern history. Of these historians, C. Vann Woodward remains the 
figure most famously connected with the overturning of such views of the region’s 
history, and as such his works are valuable measures by which to assess Smith’s 
early works in terms of contemporary developments in Southern liberalism. In 
particular, Woodward’s Origins of the New South, 1877–1913 (1951) and The Strange 
Career of Jim Crow (1955) did much to stress the discontinuities between the legal 
institutional arrangements codified in the 1890s and the state of such arrange-
ments immediately following the Civil War. Much like Laura Deen, Sam Perry, 
or Prentiss Reid in Strange Fruit, Woodward sought to go back in time and figure 
out where the wrong turns had been taken in the region’s past. In Origins of the 
New South, the effort to deny segregation its implacable inevitability in Southern 
history manifests itself in Woodward’s attacks on the misuse of the expressions 
“Solid South” and “Bourbon,” both of which are said to be “of questionable value 
to the historian” because the “solidarity of the region has long been exaggerated.”38 
Referring specifically to the first years of Reconstruction, Woodward observes 
that “disaffection had been unnaturally bottled up for a generation—first by the 
threat of war, then by invasion, and finally by Reconstruction. The Redeemers’ 
plan to prolong repression by threat of Negro domination and constrain all war-
ring factions within their Procrustean one-party system met with trouble from 
the start. Independent movements renouncing allegiance to the Democratic party 
broke out in nearly all Southern states almost as soon as they were redeemed. 
Boasts of white solidarity that impressed outsiders were often loudest in the pres-
ence of division.”39 Far from being the motive force of Southern history, post–Civil 
War white supremacy was simply another myth that latter-day historians of the 
region needed to interrogate more critically than they had hitherto. Instead, for 
Woodward the narrative of what occurred in the South between 1865 and the 
1890s was full of more variable and ambiguous outcomes than Myrdal seemed 
willing to consider.
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 In many ways, The Strange Career of Jim Crow simply overlays Woodward’s argu-
ments about disenfranchisement in Origins of the New South onto the even more 
vexing issues raised by segregation.40 To this end, the second chapter of The Strange 
Career of Jim Crow attempts to map out three “forgotten alternatives” to the institu-
tionalization of racism that Woodward sees as having occurred in the 1890s: Southern 
radicalism, conservative philosophy, and a liberal philosophy of race relations that in 
his view constitute “alternative philosophies [that] rejected the doctrines of extreme 
racism and all three were indigenously and thoroughly Southern in origin”.41 As 
exemplary figures of nineteenth-century Southern liberalism, Woodward singles 
out George Washington Cable and Lewis Harvie Blair before admitting that “neither 
Harvie nor Cable attracted a following in the South. Acceptance of their doctrines 
had to await the development of urban liberalism, which did not arrive in any force 
until the second quarter of the twentieth century.” Pitched somewhere between “the 
doctrinaire Negrophile of the left and the fanatical Negrophobe of the right,” nine-
teenth-century Southern conservatism exerted a much more substantial influence 
on the region’s history than did the sparse record left by its few contemporary lib-
erals (SC, 47). According to Woodward, the forgotten alternatives suggested by the 
history of conservatism in the South merely qualified the more violent aspects of 
white supremacy: “The conservatives acknowledged that the Negroes belonged in 
a subordinate role, but denied that subordinates had to be ostracized; they believed 
that the Negro was inferior, but denied that it followed that inferiors must be seg-
regated or publicly humiliated” (SC, 48). Not forms of white supremacy per se but 
rather “an aristocratic philosophy and noblesse oblige” were all that such conservatism 
necessitated (SC, 49). In this paternalistic view, African Americans were to have been 
protected, not degraded by their “superior” white neighbors and fellow citizens.
 Given these shortcomings of both Southern liberalism and Southern conserva-
tism in the nineteenth century, the forgotten alternative most favored by Woodward 
is that of Southern radicalism, best emblematized for him by the Populist move-
ment, which presented the South with a perspective on race that went beyond “the 
delusions and sentimental liberalism on the one hand, and the illusions of romantic 
paternalism on the other.” Instead, it opened up the prospect of interracial class 
alliances in spite of existing racial prejudices: “There was in the Populist approach 
to the Negro a limited type of equalitarianism quite different from that preached 
by the radical Republicans and wholly absent from the conservative approach. This 
was an equalitarianism of want and poverty, the kinship of a common grievance 
and a common oppressor” (SC, 61). Thus, at the end of his succinct survey of the 
achievements of Populism, Woodward goes so far as to contend: “It is altogether 
probable that during the brief Populist upheaval of the ’nineties Negroes and native 
whites achieved a greater comity of mind and harmony of political purpose than 
ever before or since in the South” (SC, 64). As Woodward hastens to point out, 
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however, his reasons for exhuming these neglected alternatives to Jim Crow are not 
to celebrate Populism above all other political movements and tendencies in the 
South’s past. Instead, the point here is simply “to indicate that things have not always 
been the same in the South.” In other words, “the effort to justify them as a conse-
quence of Reconstruction and a necessity of the times is embarrassed by the fact 
that they did not originate in those times. And the belief that they are immutable 
and unchangeable is not supported by history” (SC, 65). Racism in the South’s past 
was therefore not so much an endlessly recurring fact as it was a contingent, albeit 
powerful force to which the region regrettably capitulated in the 1890s when social 
alternatives to it wavered in the restraints each offered (SC, 67–109). As the work 
of historians following in this vein has since tried to demonstrate, the region’s past 
is filled with “might-have-beens” that could very well have been the case, and at 
the heart of this project has long been the tacit claim that counterfactual histories 
make qualitative changes in the present more (not less) possible.42
 As we have seen, Smith’s two major works of the 1940s—Strange Fruit and 
Killers of the Dream—provide us with a body of work narrating the transition from 
the overly determined assumptions of Myrdal to the alternatives opened up by the 
likes of Woodward.43 Smith, therefore, is a bridge in the history of liberalism and the 
South, and her mediating functions in this respect are to be understood as encom-
passing both her fiction and her activist writing. If Strange Fruit seems almost 
implacable in the ways in which it preemptively forecloses the solutions adverted 
to later in Killers of the Dream, then the clanging shut of the doors on Jim Crow’s 
closet does not necessarily preclude the impulse for qualitative change, an impulse 
that manifests itself in Smith’s first novel in the form of privately expressed desires 
for counterfactual histories promising alternative futures. This is an impulse that 
quite explicitly informs Woodward’s work of the early 1950s, which itself evocatively 
altered the ways in which Southern history was conceivable at a time when social 
reform was not only institutionally motivated by Supreme Court rulings such as 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954) but also collectively demanded and achieved 
in ways entirely unthinkable in the terms assumed by Strange Fruit, where mass 
politics means lynchings, not sit-ins or marches or freedom rides.44 This does not 
detract from the significance of Smith’s first novel as a missing link of sorts in the 
history of Southern liberalism, however, because while it abstains from offering the 
sorts of solutions that the first edition of Killers of the Dream tentatively rehearses or 
that civil rights activism after Brown later opens up, Strange Fruit nevertheless does 
do an estimable job of unveiling the deterministic premises of works like Myrdal’s 
book. Strange Fruit is, as it were, a baring of the racialist device within the work of 
liberals faced with the problems of the South in the 1940s, liberals who nevertheless 
remained committed to seeing—if not necessarily to making—Jim Crow’s strange 
career come to an end somehow.
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 A similar and significant distinction insinuates itself as well between the 
courses charted out by Woodward and the idiosyncratic one followed by Smith in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Whereas the clarifying functions of alternate histories allow 
Woodward to commit himself fully to confronting racism and its discourses in all 
their muddled particularity, the opening of such alternatives permits Smith in her 
later work to retire to somewhat rarefied heights, just as the civil rights movement 
propagated rapidly. Unlike Woodward, Smith in the 1950s did not go on to debunk 
the implacability of racialist ideologies by means of a new reading of Southern 
history; instead, she set out to express totalizing humanist worldviews with which 
to efface them. As she points out in a 1965 letter:
I am involved with segregation that is symbol and symptom of this dehu-
manization; but this “segregation” is bigger than race, [sic] (conformity is also 
a form of segregation); it has to do with numberless relationships that are 
necessary not only to bind men into one world but necessary for their increas-
ing complexity of mind and spirit as they continue to evolve themselves into 
human beings. I am talking about the things Teilhard de Chardin talked about, 
not the things Walter White talked about in his day or James Baldwin and Le 
Roi [sic] Jones are talking about now.45
For Smith, “segregation” symptomatically and symbolically refers to a truly sublime 
set of associations, ranging from the localized and ephemeral matters pertaining 
to the prospects of desegregation in the mid-century U.S. South all the way up to 
the cosmic evolutionary destiny of the human being as such. Perhaps even more 
strikingly, however, she insists here that if the struggle for racial desegregation 
has any meaning at all, then that meaning must be understood to derive from the 
small part it plays in the further integration of man’s species-being (in overcoming 
“dehumanization”). Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s The Phenomenon of Man—but 
not LeRoi Jones’s Dutchman (1964)—was the key to conceptually reorganizing the 
repugnant contingencies of racial segregation in the United States into a totalizing 
and compelling whole because the stakes of Smith’s writing and activism are said 
to be nothing less than the development or the regression of the entire species.
 It is thus not in the least surprising that when she encountered The Phenomenon 
of Man in the late 1950s and early 1960s Smith did so with all the force of recogni-
tion. Indelibly persuaded by (because she already shared) the promissory mood in 
which this Jesuit paleontologist approaches evolution, Smith attempts in her 1961 
revised conclusion to Killers of the Dream to refigure her life’s work in the mythic 
and reassuringly teleological terms of Phenomenon of Man because her work, if it 
meant and would continue to mean anything, is said to have done its utmost to 
“count in the project called Human Being Evolving. And as we think of what could 
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happen to the human race, if we want it to happen, when we think of the billions of 
dormant seeds in our nature and culture awaiting warmth and cultivation, we find 
ourselves ready to pick up our little watering-pot and sacks of rich soil and start 
out on the million-year plan for the growing of a New Man” (KD, 214). Countering 
those who would either converse rationally with individual human beings or appeal 
demagogically to the masses, Smith sees her life’s work as bridging the gap between 
myth and reason through its commitment to expressing a materialism fully com-
patible with faith: “For neither the faith that [our fathers] leaned on nor the doubt 
which drove us to overvalue science can make a future fit for men. No more than 
ovum or sperm alone creates the child. Faith and doubt both are needed—not as 
antagonists but working side by side—to take us around the unknown curve.”46 
What present times urgently require, Smith argues, are new rationally presented 
myths capable of fostering and thereafter sustaining a sense of community among 
the entire human race. With its faux-scientific jargon (hominisation, noogenesis, 
noosphere, psychergy, etc.) and its invitingly inclusive views of evolution as fun-
damentally antientropic and human-affirming, Chardin’s Phenomenon of Man 
provides Smith not only with the means for shaping such myths for her fellow 
Southerners but also with the missing plank necessary for finally joining together 
her split projects as a writer and an activist. Casting her glance back over her life, 
Smith discovered that she was in fact a proto–Teilhard de Chardin all along. Not 
civil rights but the lure of the evolutionarily elected human being spreading its 
integrated and integrating consciousness across the universe had been the grand 
mythical subject of her activism and her writing every step of the way, thus making 
Georgia’s Strange Fruit just another exemplary instance of the universe’s phenom-
enon of man.
 Smith’s late evolutionary evangelism accordingly makes the region’s problems 
seem far too limited in scope to qualify as a valid case study on which to base any 
philosophy of history as pitilessly immobilizing as the one intimated in Strange 
Fruit. Instead, the real object of history in Smith’s later important works, such as 
The Journey, becomes the millennia-spanning story of the human species, which 
also happens to read like a determinist narrative, albeit one with a more promisingly 
open ending. As Smith herself puts it in The Journey:
To believe in something not yet proved and to underwrite it with our lives: it 
is the only way we can leave the future open. Man, surrounded by facts, per-
mitting himself no surmise, no intuitive flash, no great hypothesis, no risk is 
in a locked cell. Ignorance cannot seal the mind and imagination more surely. 
To find the point where hypothesis and fact meet; the delicate equilibrium 
between dream and reality; the place where fantasy and earthly things are 
metamorphosed into a work of art; the hour when faith in the future becomes 
Sin, Sex, and Segregation
163
knowledge of the past; to lay down one’s power for others in need; to shake off 
the old ordeal and get ready for the new; to question, knowing that never can 
the full answer be found; to accept uncertainties quietly, even our incomplete 
knowledge of God: this is what man’s journey is about, I think.47
Consequently, the way in which Smith seeks to open up the South to a different 
future is to superimpose the species’ history onto that of the region (“the point 
where hypothesis and fact meet”), an example that none of her fellow liberals 
seemed all that willing to follow, though W. E. B. Du Bois appears to have been 
the first to anticipate Smith’s later evolutionary turn. In his review of Strange Fruit, 
he prophetically notes: “On each page the reader sees how both elements (white 
and black) in Maxwell are caught in a skein (economic, ethnic, emotional) that 
only evolution can untangle or revolution break.”48 Much like the examples made 
by Cable and Blair in Woodward’s Origins of the New South, Smith’s opting for the 
former did not attract much of a following among her contemporaries; unlike them, 
however, it remains doubtful that it ever will, at least so long as something like an 
interplanetary liberalism answering to their urban liberalism remains indiscernible 
on our horizon. Likewise, it is a wonder that Smith’s shift in focus to the species 
did not also produce the slightest engagement with science fiction, especially in 
the vein of Olaf Stapledon’s Last and First Men (1930) or H. G. Wells’s The Shape of 
Things to Come (1933).
 Along with this consequential shift in deterministic perspective comes a per-
haps even more significant modification in the capacities of words to do things 
to people. As we have seen, Strange Fruit and Killers of the Dream both ground 
Southern segregation in obscene words and their complementary silences. Smith 
never really forgets this troubling feature that her early work obsessively explores, 
even after she starts to discern a way out for the region in the alternative perspec-
tives provided by anthropogenesis. Consequently, much of her writing in the 1950s 
and 1960s concerns itself with neutralizing the effects that segregation’s obscene 
words have had by rendering those words ambiguous. Instead of speech acts, seg-
regation becomes just another instance of polysemy, of signs indefinite enough to 
suggest hidden contents just below their hazy surface. In short, Smith strives to 
make segregation symptomatic and allegorical instead of obscene. Accordingly, the 
South’s alternate history that Smith claims to have discovered in something “bigger 
than race” does not just provide her with the conceptual means of overcoming the 
region’s “bad” determinism. It also enables her to undermine the power of segrega-
tion’s obscene words by translating them into less effective ones. Segregation need 
not endlessly create and re-create the segregated South’s closet through obscenity; 
instead, it can be rendered as “dehumanization,” a term that in turn symbolically 
refers us to the ordeals—but not to the tragic fated outcomes—of the human race 
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over the course of its epochal history on this planet. Thus, in Smith’s later work, 
racial segregation in the region is best understood in terms of the Anthropocene, 
rather than the Jim Crow era. Likewise, segregation’s obscene words are to be 
approached in other words altogether so as to conjure away their traumatic barbs, 
gashes, and deformations.
 Smith’s late philosophy of history thus attempts to invert the holistic test for 
obscenity described in Commonwealth v. Isenstadt. That is to say, instead of trying 
to protect the whole from its potentially overwhelming parts, she takes as her mea-
sure later in life an abstract whole (the human race) in which no present part 
(racialist race) can ever really hope to predominate. Smith’s turn to man’s evo-
lutionary prospects does not so much indicate that she breaks with the past but 
rather implies an even more fundamental desire for continuity: human evolution 
provides a precedent for overcoming dehumanization (formerly known as “segre-
gation”) because it is the story of how humans of all generations are progressively 
becoming still more and more human. Therefore, if there was an authority to which 
Smith could refer in assessing the prospects for civil rights in the Jim Crow South 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, then that authority was to be found in the stability 
supposedly underlying anthropocentrism itself. In other words, Smith’s evolution-
ary turn does not totally efface the obscenity of her early writings. If anything, 
her leap from race and region to species and cosmos marks an even deeper (if 
hidden) engagement with segregation’s obscenity, for she, like the South’s racist 
politicians, cannot help making “dehumanization” an obscene word just like the 
obscene words of segregation. As we have seen, “sacred womanhood,” “purity,” and 
“preservers of the home” were the words that framed what white women in the 
South were in terms of what could and could not be done to them. They apparently 
did not have desires of their own because they were little more than disembodied 
abstractions for the region’s white men. Similarly, Smith’s later deployment of the 
language of dehumanization reduces us all to our abstract taxonomic essence: we 
are not lesbians, Southerners, Americans, liberals, conservatives, fascists, proles, 
fellow travelers, scabs, communists, or any other likely form of personal or group 
identity; instead, we are each of us, symptomatically and symbolically, just humans, 
singular but equivalent exemplars of homo sapiens. If we read this process of alle-
gorical abstraction obscenely—that is, if we remain attentive to the ways in which 
obscenity discriminates through words—then Smith’s solution to Southern segre-
gation seems downright demagogic because what that solution appears to entail 
at the end of the day is the making of a white woman out of everyone everywhere 
always.
Conclusion: Off the Page
While visiting New York City in 1936 to drum up funds with which to com-
plete his music degree at the Tuskegee Institute, Ralph Ellison was the guest 
of Langston Hughes at a Broadway performance of Jack Kirkland’s phenom-
enally successful stage adaptation of Erskine Caldwell’s Tobacco Road (1933). 
To the mortification of himself and Hughes, however, he caused a scene when 
he started to laugh uncontrollably at the antics of the poor whites depicted 
on stage:
For me the shock of Caldwell’s art began when Ellie May and Lov were 
swept up by a forbidden sexual attraction so strong that, uttering sounds 
of animal passion, they went floundering and skittering back-to-back 
across the stage in the startling action which father Jeeter, that randy 
Adam in an Eden gone to weed, named “horsing.” For when the two went 
into their bizarre choreography of sexual “frustrabation” I was reduced 
to such helpless laughter that I distracted the entire balcony and embar-
rassed both myself and my host. It was a terrible moment, for before I 
could regain control, more attention was being directed toward me than 
at the action unfolding on the stage.1
Notably, this “extravagance of laughter” both singled Ellison out as an object 
of sight for the rest of the audience and indicated his own inadvertent iden-
tification with Caldwell’s poor white trash, who in real life would have been 
anathema to him because of the threat of violence they necessarily carried 
with them: “But even closer to my immediate experience, wasn’t Ellie May’s 
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and Lov’s ‘horsing’ all over the stage of Tobacco Road embarrassingly symbolic of 
my own frustration as a healthy young man whose sexual outlet was limited (for 
the most part) to ‘belly-rubbing’ with girls met casually at public dances? It was 
and it wasn’t, depending upon my willingness to make or withhold a human iden-
tification. Actually, I had no choice but to identify, for Caldwell’s art had seen to 
that.”2 Literally split in two during this laughing fit—one half laughing wildly while 
the other critically dissected what this laughter might be made to mean—Ellison 
found that “as the unruly world of Tobacco Road finally returned, my divided selves 
were made one again by a sense of catharsis. Yes, but at the expense of undergoing 
what a humiliating, body-wracking conflict of emotions! Embarrassment, self-an-
ger, ethnic scorn, and at last a feeling of comic relief. And all because Erskine 
Caldwell compelled me to laugh at his symbolic, and therefore non-threatening, 
Southern whites, and thus shocked me into recognizing certain absurd aspects of 
our common humanity.”3 Describing this as an embodied experience of Kenneth 
Burke’s “perspective by incongruity,” Ellison goes on to note that it was “as though I 
had plunged through the wacky mirrors of a fun house, to discover on the other side 
a weird distortion of perspective which made for a painful but redeeming rectifica-
tion of vision. And in a flash, time was telescoped and the imaginary assumed the 
lineaments of past experiences through which Jeeter Lester’s comic essence became 
a recognizable property of characters and events that I had known in the past.”4
 Published in 1985, Ralph Ellison’s “An Extravagance of Laughter” clarifies a 
great deal not only about the obscene potentials of Caldwell’s work in particu-
lar but also about what was at stake in early twentieth-century literary obscenity 
more generally. The grotesque body-rubbing performed by Lov and Ellie May on a 
Broadway stage failed to elicit a genitally organized response from Ellison because 
of what was so conspicuously withheld from sight. Not sex or nudity but strangely 
staged back-bumping is all that Caldwell is said to have provided, to which Ellison, 
still adjusting to life in the Big Apple, could not help but react with explosive hilar-
ity. Caldwell’s art of “frustrabation” is thus Ellison’s way of wittily condensing the 
eroticized charge of laughter that is described in terms of smut by Sigmund Freud, 
for whom such outbursts of mirth could in fact release the built-up sexual ten-
sions caused by a failed seduction without necessarily foreclosing sexual satisfaction 
of some sort eventually. The immediate frustration of a man’s public attempts to 
seduce a woman into having sex with him does not mean that the virtualization of 
such an encounter in his mind and those around him will fail to offer compensatory 
pleasures, perhaps even aggressively pursued ones. Masturbatory self-regard may 
thus take place either because of this frustration or in spite of it, and what Caldwell’s 
work powerfully demonstrated to Ellison during this laughing fit was that distin-
guishing the one from the other may not even be possible.5 Are Lov and Ellie May 
grinding their backs together because they cannot actually couple with each other 
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on a Broadway stage or in spite of that fact? That is to say, is their back-bumping 
situationally determined or is it instead an expression of an obstinate individual 
will capable of asserting its limited agency in defiance of such a determination? 
Correlatively, does Ellison’s extravagant laughter confirm that he is the powerless 
object of Caldwell’s smutty staging—“I had no choice but to identify, for Tobacco 
Road’s art had seen to that”—or does it reveal to him who he really is instead by 
allowing him to “recogniz[e] certain absurd aspects of our common humanity”? 
Is “frustrabation” an experience in objectification (in being more “done to” than 
“doing”) or in identity formation (in figuring out who one really is among other 
people)?
 As we have seen at length, these are precisely the questions that literary obscen-
ity raises for James T. Farrell, Wyndham Lewis, and Lillian Smith as well, though 
each has abiding reservations as to what sorts of identities and readers may ulti-
mately arise from such encounters with obscenity. For one thing, Farrell’s Studs 
Lonigan trilogy tends to figure objectification as an experience in overidentifica-
tion. Studs becomes the dispossessed object of a variety of contemporary societal 
forces—popular culture, reactionary anti-Communism, Catholicism, and so 
forth—by responding too forthrightly to the contradictory stimuli and cues pro-
vided by his surroundings. The interference pattern created by these overlapping 
prompts constitutes who he is at any given time, and since these behaviors and 
identities never really synchronize, he can be made to do anything even while 
he himself intends to do nothing. Conversely, Lewis’s Cantleman preemptively 
ironizes this relationship by assuming that who one is need not correlate with 
what one may be conspicuously compelled to do. If the Western world in the early 
twentieth century was indeed filling up with people who only knew how to read 
obscenely—that is, with their bodies rather than with their minds or in their own 
words—and if Watsonian behaviorism indeed provided psychology with a vulgar 
explanation for why this was happening and how those in power could best use it 
to their own advantage, then Lewis insisted upon the possibility that “to do” and 
“to be” do not necessarily comprise the same thing: to read obscenely is not to 
be an obscene reader in the end, to respond amorously to Stella does not mean 
Cantleman is actually in love with her, and to give in to the lure of sex in a time 
of war is not the same thing as being the dupe of nature or the nations of Europe. 
Cantleman is not an object of his milieu because of what he does but rather in spite 
of it. That the final sentence of “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” undercuts the adequacy 
of this comportment does not belie the fact that Lewis himself sought to embody 
it time and again in his own postwar literary career. As for Smith, she took all too 
seriously the possibility that “to do” is indeed the same thing as “to be” when it 
came to responding to the obscene words of the Jim Crow South. Otherwise, there 
would seem to be no rational explanation for why segregation remained the case 
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in the 1940s and 1950s when there were so many persuasive logical arguments to 
be made against it. The capacity of words to act in the world through the bodies of 
the people who encounter them is taken as given in Smith’s writing, and rather than 
try to secure a space for one’s self or identity by way of hostile irony or performa-
tive contradiction, Smith devoted the last years of her life to stripping language of 
its effective force instead. By abstractly recasting the civil rights movement in the 
allegorical terms of man’s evolutionary history and destiny, Smith strove to make 
the obscene words of segregation turn into mere stand-ins for the irrational appeals 
of dehumanization, into so many ordeals to be surmounted on the path to man’s 
eventual humanization. Forcing words to mean instead of do, Smith tried to make 
the world safe for the endless conversation of liberalism.
 Though their political orientations do not line up at all, these authors wrote 
obscene works that confuse because of explanations with in spite of explanations, 
such that the one comes to inform the other inextricably. Having an uncontrollable 
bodily experience because of words on a page and in spite of them therefore con-
firms that we are indeed both “done to” and “doing” at the same time.6 For Farrell, 
Lewis, and Smith, however, experiencing an overwhelming embodied response 
because of and in spite of words on a page is not something that can be merely 
attributed to the once-potent efficacy of the English language. For Lewis and Smith 
in particular, there are malign social, cultural, and ideological forces behind the 
susceptibility of early twentieth-century readers to literary obscenity, and this is 
what most notably differentiates Studs Lonigan, Cantleman, and Nonnie Anderson 
from that exemplary reader in European modernist obscenity, Emma Bovary, who 
never asks who or what in her world is pulling her strings when she tries to make 
words get off the page and come to life for her. For literary naturalists and those 
modernists—like Lewis—with a tendency to interpret cultural phenomena in terms 
of determinism and cooptation, obscenity was not a problem in and of itself; rather, 
it was problematic because of what it indexed, which was a growing vulnerability 
to harmful forces and trends in society by way of our susceptibility to mute words 
on a page. What Lewis and Smith in particular sought to do with their “obscene” 
writing, then, was to point fingers and name names, to flesh out what and who 
stood behind early twentieth-century obscenity.
 Caldwell is an invaluable counterpoint here precisely because his work is more 
concerned with how words might be understood to get off the page rather than who 
or what stands to gain if they ever do. Of course, this is not to say that his novels 
of the 1930s and 1940s are bereft of such content. Eugenics discourses are all over 
the cyclorama novels, and like many other naturalist writers of the 1930s, his polit-
ical commitments were credibly fellow-traveling. More than any other naturalistic 
exponent of literary obscenity in English at this time, however, Caldwell tried to 
account for how an unmanageable bodily response to printed words might come 
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about in the first place, and his solution—that such a response occurs by virtue of 
the conspicuous failure of such words to evoke an immediate response—informed 
his compositional reliance on repetition and his preoccupation with powerful visual 
experiences that elude verbal expression. Caldwell’s writing thus testifies not only 
to the dormant potency of words in and of themselves but also to the shift in the 
proscriptive focus of legal obscenity from books to visual culture that was taking 
place in the first half of the twentieth century.
 This same shift is cannily reenacted in Ellison’s essay, which is nominally in 
honor of Caldwell’s writing, though what Caldwell actually wrote does not get 
mentioned at all. Instead, the scene for Ellison’s appreciation of Caldwell’s art is 
a darkened Broadway theater, not a comfortable chair in a quiet room with a lot 
of light by which to read. In a stunning sleight of hand, Ellison honors the octo-
genarian Caldwell by praising Jack Kirkland instead, insofar as the performance 
of a theatrical adaptation of Tobacco Road is made to stand in for—indeed, it 
wholly supersedes—the act of reading that novel itself. If the Freudian smut of 
Caldwell’s writing translates quite well into the physical immediacy of the play’s 
“frustrabation,” then that attests to the prominence of smutty triads in Caldwell’s 
compositional methods and to Kirkland’s fidelity to those methods. Accordingly, 
Ellison does offer a lot of insights into Caldwell’s writing in “An Extravagance of 
Laughter,” but remarkably he manages to do so without once noting the difference 
between a theatrical adaptation and a book, between being wracked with smutty 
laughter while viewing a play with an audience and having a similar experience 
while reading a novel alone at home. On the one hand, Ellison would seem to be 
suggesting that the two experiences are equivalent, that books indeed remain a force 
to be reckoned with when it comes to our susceptibility to uncontrollable bodily 
experiences. On the other hand, Caldwell’s novel at most provides the mere pretext 
for the encounter with an audience that the performing arts and visual culture 
are hereafter better equipped to satisfy. Caldwell’s Tobacco Road may be smutty, 
but Jack Kirkland’s Tobacco Road is actually smut. Extending this logic into the 
period in which Ellison wrote his essay, we might note that Kathy Acker’s Empire 
of the Senseless (1988) may have “obscene” content, but Robert Mapplethorpe’s X 
Portfolio series (1978) and Karen Finley’s We Keep Our Victims Ready (1989) are 
actually obscene.7 The demotion of writing’s effective force with respect to visual 
culture, performance art, and new media may be something we simply take for 
granted today, but the proscribably “obscene” works of Lewis, Caldwell, and Smith 
still represent a range of exemplary responses to obscenity at a time when such a 
demotion was only just emergent. By respectively reducing obscene reading prac-
tices to performative contradictions, predicating the ability of obscene books to 
arouse readers on their ostentatious failure to actually arouse readers, and robbing 
obscene words of their sensory content through abstraction and allegory, each 
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wrestled with literary obscenity both because of and in spite of the bodily appeals of 
words on a page. Muddying the distinction between because of explanations and in 
spite of ones is certainly a common feature of the works of each of these authors, but 
it also contributed to the world we inhabit today in which legal obscenity persists 
regardless of whatever effective force words on the page may still fitfully possess 
here and there.
 Ellison’s essay thus gives us a striking reason for why this came to be the case. 
For him the result of Caldwell’s obscene “frustrabation” is a “rectification of vision” 
whereby he experiences extravagantly and hilariously—that is to say, bodily—an 
unlikely sense of unity with a “repugnant cultural other.”8 Here the uncontrollable 
effects smuttily produced by Kirkland’s actors on a Broadway stage—and suppos-
edly Caldwell’s words on the page as well—act to promote an unlikely sense of 
recognition that not only humanizes the Other but also teaches Ellison a new lesson 
in what it means to be human himself. Whereas it is an occasion for cutting off 
almost all meaningful ties to other people in the works of Lewis, and whereas it 
ineluctably facilitates the continuation of segregating mores in those of Smith, liter-
ary obscenity in Ellison’s missed encounter with Caldwell’s writing produces instead 
a profound sense of empathetic identification that fosters improbable interpersonal 
connections across lines of race and class.
 In other words, Caldwell got obscene books laughed off the stage, and if this 
Smith-like civics lesson in humanization—and not the darker homicidal impulses 
of Cantleman’s performative chortles—is all that is to be found in the smutty mirth 
that occurs when words do indeed get off the page, then how could anyone really 
be afraid of literary obscenity anymore?
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 3. A notable recent exception to this 
tendency to downplay the importance of 
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“Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” in the study of 
modernism and obscenity is Potter, Obscene 
Modernism, 75–91.
 4. See Kenner, Wyndham Lewis, esp. 107.
 5. See Stanfield, “‘This Implacable Doctrine.’”
 6. Lewis, “Cantelman’s [sic] Spring-Mate,” 
here 14. Hereafter abbreviated “CS-M”; further 
references provided parenthetically.
 7. See Jameson, Fables of Aggression, 26–29.
 8. Ibid., 27.
 9. Ibid., 28.
 10. For more on the formative influence of 
contemporary French neoclassical critiques of 
Romanticism on Lewis’s critical thought and 
writing, see the insightful intellectual history 
offered in Wagner, Wyndham Lewis.
 11. Watson, “The New Science of Animal 
Behavior,” 352–53.
 12. Ibid., 348.
 13. Despite the stridency of the claims made 
by Watson and other first-wave behaviorists as to 
the novelty of their theories and practices, early 
behaviorism may nevertheless be retrospec-
tively understood as having more continuities 
than discontinuities with the contemporary 
practice of psychology. For more on Watson, 
behaviorism, and their connections to early 
twentieth-century functional psychology, see 
Buckley, Mechanical Man, esp. 33–58.
 14. For James, introspection was a privileged 
method in the investigation of psychology’s 
subject matter, understood by him to consist 
of the dynamic interactions and relationships 
formed by states of consciousness, the objects of 
those states, and the encompassing world shared 
by the introspecting subject and the observing 
psychologist. See James, Principles of Psychology, 
1:185. For his later skeptical reframing of the very 
existence of consciousness, see James, “Does 
‘Consciousness’ Exist?”
 15. Watson, Behaviorism, 140–43.
 16. For a cogent and useful discussion of the 
methodological value of intersubjective agree-
ment in behaviorist data language, see Zuriff, 
Behaviorism, esp. 13–54.
 17. Lewis, The Art of Being Ruled, 349.
 18. Ibid.
 19. Ibid., 231.
 20. Ibid., 232.
 21. Cf. Miller, Late Modernism, 49–54, and 
Nicholls, Modernisms, 183–84.
 22. Lewis, Men Without Art, 95.
 23. It ought to be noted here that while Lewis 
does not completely disavow the utility of certain 
inner methods, he does limit the scope of such 
methods to particularized uses (“as a sort of 
comic relief ”) as well as to a restricted range of 
character types. See ibid., 98: “So what I think 
can be laid down is this: In dealing with (1) the 
extremely aged; (2) young children; (3) half-wits; 
and (4) animals, the internal method can be 
extremely effective. In my opinion it should be 
entirely confined to those classes of characters.”
 24. Ibid., 93; emphasis original.
 25. Ibid., 95.
 26. Ibid., 92.
 27. Ibid., 93.
 28. Miller, Late Modernism, 49.
 29. Watson, “Psychology as the Behaviorist 
Views It,” 167.
 30. Indeed, Watson foregrounded this project 
early. For instance, see the second sentence of 
ibid., 158: “[Psychology’s] theoretical goal is the 
prediction and control of behavior.”
 31. Watson, Behaviorism, 97.
 32. Watson, “The New Science of Animal 
Behavior,” 353.
 33. Watson, Behaviorism, 11.
 34. Ibid., 276.
 35. Ibid., 303–4.
 36. Lewis, The Complete Wild Body, 78. 
Hereafter abbreviated “B”; further references 
provided parenthetically.
 37. Cf. Potter, Obscene Modernism, 78.
 38. Descartes, “Discourse on Method” and “The 
Meditations,” 44.
 39. Ibid., 44–45.
 40. Ibid., 45.
 41. Watson, Behaviorism, 3.
 42. See ibid., 266–68.
 43. Ibid., 233.
 44. For Watson’s Romanian nurse example, see 
ibid.
 45. Cf. Jameson, Fables of Aggression, 26.
 46. Lewis, Time and Western Man, 303; 
emphasis original.
 47. Lewis, The Apes of God, 123.
 48. As Ker-Orr admits at one point, “I learnt a 
great deal from Bestre. He is one of my masters” 
(“B,” 84).
 49. Lewis, Blasting & Bombardiering, 1.
 50. Ibid., 5.
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 51. Ibid.
 52. See Caillois, The Edge of Reason, esp. 
99–103.
 53. The quoted adverbs are Anderson’s. See 
Anderson, “Judicial Opinion (Our Suppressed 
October Issue),” 46.




 58. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. 182.
 59. For instance, see Morris L. Ernst’s 
“Introduction” in Joyce, Ulysses.
 60. See Vanderham, James Joyce and 
Censorship, esp. 121–28. Cf. Fiedler, “To Whom 
Does Joyce Belong?”
 61. See Greene, “Arbitrary Tastes and 
Commonsense Pleasures.”
 62. In this regard, Hand would have us 
reconsider the legitimate ascription of obscenity 
to many of the “classics.” See Anderson, 247 F. at 
384.
 63. Ibid.
 64. Anderson, “Judicial Opinion,” 48.
 65. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. at 
184–85.
 66. Besig, 208 F.2d at 147.
 67. One Book Entitled “Ulysses,” 72 F.2d at 708.
 68. Ibid., at 708–9.
 69. See Tischler, “A Rose Is a Pose.”
 70. Anderson, “Judicial Opinion,” 49.
 71. Ibid.
 72. See Hardy, The Trumpet-Major, 45–61. As 
indicated by Cantleman’s thumb-biting while 
reading of John Loveday’s dilemma in chapter 9 
of Hardy’s novel, these passages involving Anne 
and old Mr. Derriman would have been read by 
Cantleman before those evoking his gratuitous 
chuckles, so the reference to mimesis or to pro-
cesses of modeling here is tenable on its face.
 73. Ibid., 7.
 74. Joyce, Dubliners, 12.
 75. Ibid.
 76. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. at 371.
 77. For a symptomatically critical take on 
Cockburn’s test, see Alpert, “Judicial Censorship 
of Obscene Literature.”
 78. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. at 184.
 79. The Supreme Court began to acknowledge 
something like a standard of variable obscenity 
(according to which obscenity determinations 
must take into account modes of advertising, 
distribution, and sale of the charged object, espe-
cially in those cases involving minors) in 1968. 
See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629.
 80. Hunter, Saunders, and Williamson, On 
Pornography, 135.
 81. See Ellmann, James Joyce, esp. 230, 340–42, 
and 364.
 82. Cf. the old bookworm’s final Sadean 
monologue in front of the narrator in Joyce, 
Dubliners, 19–20: “And if a boy had a girl for a 
sweetheart and told lies about it then he [i.e., the 
old bookworm] would give him such a whipping 
as no boy ever got in this world. He said that 
there was nothing in this world he would like so 
well as that. He described to me how he would 
whip such a boy as if he were unfolding some 
elaborate mystery.”
 83. Ibid., 18.
 84. In this view, then, “An Encounter” bears 
comparing with Joyce’s essay “Oscar Wilde: The 
Poet of ‘Salome’” (1909). See Joyce, Occasional, 
Critical, and Political Writing, esp. 151: “Oscar 
Wilde’s self-defence in the Scots Observer 
should be accepted as legitimate by any bench 
of impartial judges. Each man writes his own 
sin into Dorian Gray (Wilde’s most celebrated 
novel). What Dorian Gray’s sin was no one says 
and no one knows. He who discovers it has 
committed it.”
 85. Cf. Hunter, Saunders, and Williamson, On 
Pornography, esp. 12–56.
 86. For a cogent critical reading of how this 
feature often expresses itself (sometimes tacitly, 
sometimes explicitly) in the form of an anti-Se-
mitic conspiracy theory throughout Lewis’s work 
of the 1920s and 1930s, see Ayers, Wyndham 
Lewis and Western Man.
 87. See Lewis, Time and Western Man.
 88. See Lewis, Art of Being Ruled, 341, and 
Lewis, Time and Western Man, 330. In the case 
of Snooty Baronet, this duplication is noted by 
Stanfield, “‘This Implacable Doctrine.’”
 89. See Lewis, The Roaring Queen, esp. 32–38, 
63–66, 71–77, and 127–32.
 90. Lewis, Snooty Baronet, 251.
 91. Ibid., 235.
 92. Caillois, The Edge of Reason, 91.
178
Notes to Pages 96–104
Chapter 3
 1. With All My Might (1987) is Caldwell’s 
other autobiography. He also published two 
autobiographical long works on race relations 
and Protestantism in the South: In Search of 
Bisco (1965) and Deep South: Memory and 
Observation (1968), respectively.
 2. Caldwell, Call It Experience, 5. Hereafter 
abbreviated CIE; further references provided 
parenthetically.
 3. For more on Caldwell’s reception history, 
see MacDonald, Critical Essays on Erskine 
Caldwell, and McDonald, Critical Response to 
Erskine Caldwell.
 4. Wagenknecht, Cavalcade of the American 
Novel, 415.
 5. For a discerning, if unduly tentative 
attempt to trouble this consensus, see Arnold, 
Erskine Caldwell Reconsidered, 49–58. Cf. 
McDonald, Critical Response to Erskine Caldwell, 
1–16, and McDonald, Reading Erskine Caldwell, 
1–10.
 6. Characteristically, Caldwell’s autobiogra-
phy exaggerates somewhat: it seems he did not 
receive a key to the city but merely “a scroll des-
ignating him an honorary member” of Kansas 
City. See Klevar, Erskine Caldwell, 278–81.
 7. The relative scarcity of Sister Carrie is a 
trace of that book’s censorship history. Tacitly 
suppressing the novel, Doubleday limited the 
book’s initial run to one thousand copies, of 
which nearly half were unbound. For more on 
the publication and (nonexistent) advertising 
of Dreiser’s first novel, see Lingeman, Theodore 
Dreiser: At the Gates of the City, 281–301.
 8. Rainey, Institutions of Modernism, 76.
 9. Caldwell learned the lesson (and learned 
it well, it would seem) of socially necessary labor 
time fairly early in life: “I was in my fifteenth 
year, the time being 1918, when I learned that 
under certain conditions money could be earned 
by work, and that labor under other circum-
stances did not necessarily produce pay” (CIE, 
13). Not surprisingly, a substantial part of the 
experience referred to in the title of Caldwell’s 
first autobiography concerns that of learning 
how to make writing pay and then continuing to 
make it pay.
 10. All of this information derives from 
the page bearing the edition’s copy number in 
Caldwell, The Bastard, n.p. The copy referred 
to throughout this chapter belongs to the 
University of California at Berkeley and is num-
bered 244.
 11. Much of what follows in this paragraph 
owes a great deal to Rainey, Institutions of 
Modernism.
 12. It should be noted that, in addition to the 
ten thousand copies of the novel made available 
in the first trade edition, Boni and Liveright also 
offered a luxury edition of An American Tragedy, 
autographed by Dreiser himself and priced at 
$12.50 per volume. For more on the mixed pub-
lication of An American Tragedy, see Lingeman, 
Theodore Dreiser: An American Journey, 257–80.
 13. Several works in the past three decades 
have contributed significantly to our under-
standing of the institutions and market 
structures subtending modernist literary and 
cultural production. See Dettmar and Watt, 
Marketing Modernisms; Wexler, Who Paid for 
Modernism?; Turner, Marketing Modernism 
between the Two World Wars; and Rosenquist, 
Modernism, the Market and the Institution of the 
New.
 14. Limited editions of works by modernist 
writers continued to appear at the beginning of 
the 1930s, but their frequency decreased pre-
dictably (yet significantly) because of poor sales. 
For a brief look at the example of the 1930 Hours 
Press edition of Pound’s A Draft of XXX Cantos, 
see Rainey, “A Poem Including History,” 212–14.
 15. For more on Caldwell’s royalty problems 
with The Heron Press, see Arnold, Conversations 
with Erskine Caldwell, esp. 270–71, and Dan B. 
Miller, Erskine Caldwell, 111.
 16. For more on Caldwell’s unpublished 
short novel entitled The Bogus Ones, written 
in response to the suppression of The Bastard, 
see Cook, Erskine Caldwell and the Fiction of 
Poverty, 17–18; Klevar, Erskine Caldwell, 83–99; 
Dan B. Miller, Erskine Caldwell, 95–101, 110–11; 
and Owen, “‘The Bogus Ones.’”
 17. Caldwell, “In Defense of Myself.”
 18. Lawrence, Phoenix, 172.
 19. Ibid., 173.
 20. Ibid., 175.
 21. Ibid., 176.
 22. Ibid., 175.
 23. Miller, The World of Lawrence, 177.
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 24. Ladenson, Dirt for Art’s Sake, 145. 
Ladenson offers her own gloss of a portion of the 
Miller passage I have quoted in this paragraph as 
well.
 25. The relationship of Caldwell’s work to that 
of Lawrence has not been adequately pursued in 
the study of either author, and it is unfortunately 
not within the scope of this project to under-
take a sustained comparative analysis beyond 
the suggestive links indicated here. For more 
on Lawrence and Caldwell, see Cook, Erskine 
Caldwell and the Fiction of Poverty, 17–18, and 
Owen, “‘The Bogus Ones,’” esp. 35–37.
 26. Caldwell, Writing in America, 95.
 27. See Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 56ff.
 28. Kingsley, 360 U.S. 684.
 29. Caldwell, “In Defense of Myself,” n.p.
 30. Caldwell, The Bastard, 15–16. Hereafter 
abbreviated TB; further references provided 
parenthetically.
 31. In effect, Caldwell’s remarks on the hooch 
dancer’s dance in The Bastard anticipate develop-
ments in obscenity jurisprudence in the United 
States, Great Britain, and the Commonwealth 
by almost half a century. See the discussion of 
variable obscenity in Hunter, Saunders, and 
Williamson, On Pornography, 240.
 32. It should be noted that in subsequent 
chapters, the narrator violates the novella’s point 
of view at least three more times to give the 
reader access to the interiorities and life histories 
of John Hunter (the Lewisville Sheriff ’s son) and 
Myra Morgan. See TB, 59–65, 152–54, 160.
 33. To underscore Potter’s point once more, 
this time with an example drawn from Caldwell’s 
career, I would like to point out that the Viking 
Press released Caldwell’s Journeyman in a 
limited edition of 1,475 copies because it feared 
obscenity prosecutions of the kind God’s Little 
Acre had faced in the state of New York upon the 
release of that book in 1933. Journeyman did not 
have enough artistic merit in the estimations of 
Viking’s editors and lawyers to justify a larger 
initial print-run, like the one afforded God’s 
Little Acre. For more on this decision by Viking, 
see Klevar, Erskine Caldwell, 147, 153, 157. For the 
New York City obscenity case involving God’s 
Little Acre, see Viking Press, 264 N.Y.S. 534.
 34. Potter, Obscene Modernism, 69.
 35. Caldwell, God’s Little Acre, 88. Hereafter 
abbreviated GLA; further references provided 
parenthetically.
 36. Vials, “Whose Dixie?” 85.
 37. Caldwell, Journeyman, 168–69. Hereafter 
abbreviated J; further references provided 
parenthetically.
 38. See MacDonald, “Repetition as Technique 
in the Short Stories of Erskine Caldwell”; 
Castille, “‘No More Obscene than the Truth’”; 
and Metress, “Repetition as Radical Critique in 
Erskine Caldwell’s God’s Little Acre.”
 39. See Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
 40. My gloss of Freud and Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle here owes much to Green, Time in 
Psychoanalysis, esp. 75–99.
 41. See Stein, The Making of Americans, esp. 
191–98.
 42. Cf. Lyotard, “Discourse Figure.”
 43. Cf. the replacement of visual details with 
statements as to the brute coordination of cause 
and effect in the hooch dancer episode in TB, 
52–53.
 44. For Greenberg’s call for the purifying sep-
aration of artistic mediums from each other, see 
“Towards a Newer Laocoon” (1940), in Clement 
Greenberg, 1:23–38. For Greenberg’s naturaliza-
tion of vision, see Art and Culture, esp. 136–37 
and 143.
 45. Smithson’s wall installation consisted of 
a set of mirrors constructed in such a way as to 
cancel planes of focus, to split the spectator’s 
field of vision, and to make the spectator disap-
pear altogether, depending on where she/he was 
positioned with respect to the mirror chambers. 
Duchamp’s final major work is a tableau com-
prised of a wooden door with peepholes looking 
out onto a recumbent naked woman holding up 
a gas lamp while her legs are spread and her face 
is occluded.
 46. For more information on the formation of 
the New American Library and its two signa-
ture imprints, Signet and Mentor, see especially 
Bonn, Heavy Traffic and High Culture. Cf. Bonn, 
Under Cover, esp. 48–49, 69–70. For more on 
Caldwell’s decision to enter into the incredibly 
remunerative world of paperback reprints, see 
Klevar, Erskine Caldwell, 267–71 and 282.
 47. For more on the critical turn against 
Caldwell during and after the 1940s, see the 
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essays collected in the second part of McDonald, 
Critical Response to Erskine Caldwell, 107–91.
 48. See Klevar, Erskine Caldwell, 270–71.
 49. Bonn, Under Cover, 102.
 50. Though the cover to Tragic Ground here 
designates it as a Penguin Book, this edition (as 
well as that of the Journeyman cover included 
here) was in fact issued by Signet in the transi-
tional period between Weybright and Enoch’s 
move from Penguin to New American Library. 
Note that, contrary to branding practices asso-
ciated with both companies at the time, neither 
the Penguin nor the Signet logos are included in 
the top framing bar of the cover.
 51. Cf. Vials, “Whose Dixie?” esp. 85–86. Vials 
implicitly takes on Laura Mulvey’s totalizing 
(and one would think warmed-over) thesis 
in “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” 
(1973/1975) far too uncritically for his remarks 
on the flawed sexual politics of the male gaze in 
Caldwell’s fiction to have quite the same force his 
other insights into Caldwell’s eccentric composi-
tional methods tend to have.
 52. Again, the resonances with Duchamp’s 
Étant donnés are quite striking here.
 53. Much of this information regarding the 
proscription of Caldwell’s fiction in Great Britain 
and the United States appears in chronicle-like 
form in Haight, Banned Books, 106–7.
 54. A richer historical reckoning of U.S. 
mass-market paperback publishing would start 
with the production methods, marketing prac-
tices, and cultural effects of such works during 
the first U.S. paperback revolution that took 
place throughout the nineteenth century. I refer 
the interested reader here to Denning, Mechanic 
Accents, and to Tebbel, Between the Covers.
 55. See Bonn, Under Cover, 41–42.
 56. Following the precedent set by the first 
trade edition of Ulysses, the first Penguin edition 
of God’s Little Acre included the entirety of City 
Magistrate Benjamin Greenspan’s favorable 
opinion of the novel as an appendix.
 57. Qtd. in United States House of 
Representatives, Report of the Select Committee 
on Current Pornographic Materials, 1.
 58. Ibid., 116.
 59. Ibid., 117.
 60. Ibid., 120.
 61. Ibid., 121–22. For more on the Gathings 
Committee (particularly its effects on the 
paperback publishing industry and its critical—
derisive even—reception in contemporary public 
discourses), please refer to the following: Bonn, 
High Culture, 133–53; Bonn, Under Cover, 55, 103; 
Davis, Two-Bit Culture; and Speer, “Paperback 
Pornography.”
 62. See Haight, Banned Books, 109–10.
 63. See Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the 
Unconscious, 99–100.
 64. Ibid., 99.
 65. Ibid., 100.
 66. Ibid., 99.
 67. For a complementary use of Freudian 
smut to approach the transitive and mimetically 
ideational qualities that can be discerned within 
the formal disruptions of late modernist laugh-
ter, see Miller, Late Modernism, esp. 55–57.
 68. Hurston, Their Eyes Were Watching God, 
78 and 79–80.
Chapter 4
 1. For more on Smith and ideology, see Jay 
Watson, “Uncovering the Body, Discovering 
Ideology.” For a notable effort to situate Smith 
in terms of liberalism, see Haddox, “Lillian 
Smith, Cold War Intellectual.” The relation of 
Smith’s writing to racial conversion narratives 
is discussed in Hobson, But Now I See, 18–36. 
Smith likewise figures into the nuanced account 
of temporality in Southern fiction offered in 
Duck, The Nation’s Region, 195–99. The role of 
the grotesque in Smith’s work is accounted for in 
Yaeger, Dirt and Desire, esp. 237–48. Depictions 
of same-sex desire in Smith’s early writing are 
analyzed in Johnson, “The Language of Sexuality 
and Silence in Lillian Smith’s Strange Fruit,” and 
in Gary Richards, Lovers and Beloveds, 94–116.
 2. See Lillian Smith, Strange Fruit, 192: 
“[Nonnie Anderson] was remembering when 
she was eleven. [Big Henry] had met up with her 
on the way from school and said, swinging his 
books back and forth across his shoulders as he 
said it, ‘Say,’ he said and grinned, ‘say, how about 
fuckin with me?’ And as she stared the color had 
beat through her face and neck. ‘You knows,’ 
he grinned, ‘fuckin,’ and opened his pants.” 
Hereafter abbreviated SF; further references 
provided parenthetically.
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 3. Most of this paragraph derives from 
Smith’s own account in Lillian Smith, How Am I 
to Be Heard? 81–82. Cf. DeVoto, “The Decision in 
the Strange Fruit Case.”
 4. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. at 547.
 5. Ibid., at 556.
 6. Cf. Duhamel, After “Strange Fruit,” and 
McCoy, “Banned in Boston.”
 7. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. at 548.
 8. Ibid., at 549.
 9. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. at 185.
 10. Levine, 83 F.2d at 158.
 11. The remaining four pages of the Isenstadt 
opinion address and dismiss in turn the nine-
teen-point attack waged by Isenstadt’s lawyers 
on the Commonwealth’s obscenity statute. The 
court also reiterates that juries (and not literary, 
social, and psychological “experts”) are the real 
authorities in obscenity cases. The opinion then 
closes by noting that an amendment to the state’s 
obscenity statute is set to go into effect later in 
the year and that this amendment will allow 
obscenity proceedings to be instigated against 
books directly. See ibid., at 561.
 12. Ibid.
 13. Ibid.
 14. Ibid., at 562.
 15. Ibid.
 16. Cf. SF, 1–2, 6, 14, 30, 145, 168, 193, 201, 
238, 243, 267, 274. Notably, when there was 
talk of filming Strange Fruit in the early 1960s, 
Smith lobbied hard for Audrey Hepburn to 
play Nonnie. See Lillian Smith, How Am I to Be 
Heard? 280 and 289.
 17. If anything, the demands that Ed makes of 
his sister Nonnie seem to suggest his desires are 
more likely incestuous (SF, 12, 25–29, 155–56).
 18. The foundational text for this line of 
inquiry remains Sedgwick, Epistemology of the 
Closet.
 19. By way of comparison, see Johnson, “The 
Language of Sexuality and Silence,” 17–19.
 20. Lillian Smith, Killers of the Dream, 106. 
Hereafter abbreviated KD; further references 
provided parenthetically.
 21. Cf. Watson, “Uncovering the Body, 
Discovering Ideology,” esp. 473.
 22. Yaeger, Dirt and Desire, 246–47.
 23. Cf. Jenkins, The South in Black and White, 
esp. 117.
 24. Watson, “Uncovering the Body, 
Discovering Ideology,” 491.
 25. Two salient counterweights to Smith’s view 
here are Felman, The Literary Speech Act, and 
Butler, Excitable Speech.
 26. In the terms established by J. L. Austin, 
Smith confuses perlocutionary performatives 
with illocutionary ones, much as Catharine A. 
MacKinnon is said to do by Butler, for whom 
such a confusion implicitly necessitates greater 
state-sponsored censorship and oversight in 
place of the formation of nonsovereign agents 
who are able to act on behalf of their interests 
and to contest injurious language, in some cases 
by appropriating and repurposing it. See Butler, 
Excitable Speech, esp. 17–27, 39–41, 63–69, 73–74, 
112.
 27. See MacKinnon, Only Words.
 28. See ibid., 29–31.
 29. See White and Sugg Jr., From the 
Mountain, 116–30.
 30. As Smith declares in the opening pages of 
The Journey, “only in ordeal is a man revealed at 
his most creative.” See Lillian Smith, The Journey, 
10.
 31. Not for nothing, Smith poses birth “as the 
prototype of all human ordeal.” See ibid., 206–7, 
209.
 32. Ibid., 77–78.
 33. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 
1:444.
 34. Ibid., 1:445.
 35. Ibid., 1:440.
 36. Ibid.
 37. Ibid., 1:514; emphasis original.
 38. Woodward, Origins of the New South, 
1877–1913, 75.
 39. Ibid., 76.
 40. Cf. King, A Southern Renaissance, 270–71.
 41. Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim 
Crow, 45. Hereafter abbreviated SC; further 
references provided parenthetically.
 42. For instance, see Barbara J. Fields, 
“Ideology and Race in American History.”
 43. For more on Smith’s role in the history of 
Southern liberalism, see Sosna, In Search of the 
Silent South, 174–97.
 44. See Mack, “Rethinking Civil Rights 
Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown.”
 45. Lillian Smith, How Am I to Be Heard? 327.
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 46. Lillian Smith, The Journey, 55. Cf. Teilhard 
de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, 283–84.
 47. Lillian Smith, The Journey, 256.
 48. Du Bois, “Searing Novel of the South,” 1.
Conclusion
 1. Ellison, Going to the Territory, 186.
 2. Ibid., 196.
 3. Ibid., 193.
 4. Ibid., 194. For more on Kenneth Burke’s 
“perspective by incongruity,” see Burke, 
Permanence and Change, 69ff.
 5. Cf. Burke, Permanence and Change, 36: 
“Shifts of interpretation result from the different 
ways in which we group events in the because of, 
in spite of, and regardless of categories.”
 6. This is my Burkean gloss on Fleissner’s 
cogent explication of the roles played by compul-
sion and embodiment in early twentieth-century 
U.S. literary naturalism.
 7. Of those artists (Finley, Mapplethorpe, 
Holly Hughes, John Fleck, and Tim Miller) who 
found themselves deprived of NEA funding due 
to charges of indecency in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, Mapplethorpe has received the lion’s 
share of the critical and biographical attention: 
Morrisroe, Mapplethorpe; Danto, Playing with 
the Edge; and Patti Smith, Just Kids. For more 
on Finley and her work, see the following: Carr, 
On Edge, 121–31; de Grazia, Girls Lean Back 
Everywhere, 658–88; Hart, Fatal Women, 89–104; 
and Shank, Beyond the Boundaries, 199–212.
 8. For more on “repugnant cultural other,” 
see Harding, “Representing Fundamentalism.”
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